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To date there are 56 nuclear power plants in the United States
licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to operate in
the commercial production of electricity. Of the 87 additional plants
under construction, 69 have been given fully authorized construction
permits, while 18 have had limited site work authorized. Additionally,
electrical utilities are planning 93 more nuclear units, for which 72
nuclear reactors have already been ordered (ERDA, 1976). The geograph-
ical distribution of these units is shown in Figure 1.
For those nuclear power plants currently planned or already under
construction, the cognizant utilities are faced with planning around a
ten-year project duration with the construction phase consuming five to
six years of that period. Total investment is presently upward of
$800 million per 1100 MWe unit ($750 to $850 per kWe) with planned
construction manhours estimated at upwards of 12 million manhours (11 to
12 mh/kWe for an average unit of 800 to 1150 MWe) and design manhours
close to 2 million manhours for each unit (Budwani, 1975).
Nuclear Power Plant Construction in the United States
The first commercial nuclear power plant was constructed at
Shippingport, Pennsylvania, by the Duquesne Light Company and went into
operation in 1957. Since that time, American utilities have displayed
an initially cautious but steady trend toward the use of nuclear power.
By 1972, fully one-half of America's future committed electrical
generation capacity was nuclear (Schuster, 1972). Table 1 provides a


































NO. OF PLANTS MWe CAP. NO. OF PLANTS MWe CAP.
1972 50 22,164 15 11,386
1973 48 22,745 19 15,253
1974 48 21,940 16 14,732
1975 45 25,050 15 15,059
1976 42 20,547 5 4,116
1977 24 12,558 18 17,365
1978 15 6,210 15 15,450
1979 9 4,416 18 18,723
1980 10 5,100 13 13,030
1981 4 1,850 7 7,355




1986 2 1,500 1 1,500
Indefinite 3 495 3 3,290
TOTALS
:
301 144,619 MWe 153 147,219 MWe

terms of the year the plants are expected to begin commercial operation.
It should be noted from Table 1 that although the total figure of 153
nuclear plants represents only one-half the total number of fossil plants
that are planned, the total generation capacities of the nuclear and
fossil plants are about evenly divided.
For the utilities involved, the development of any one of these
nuclear power plant projects usually consists of the following phases:
(!) load growth estimation, (2) conceptual planning, (3) siting,
(4) design, (5) construction permit authorization, (6) construction,
(7) startup and testing, (8) operating license authorization, and
(9) commercial operation. These phases are not all independent in time
or sequence and each involves a great deal of money, research, and the
cooperation of many diversified parties. The construction phase, for
example, involves the interests of the following major parties: the
utility, the contractor, labor unions, the consultants, the equipment
suppliers, and the general public (represented in part by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission as well as other interested local regulatory
bodies)
.
A complete understanding of the construction phase of a nuclear
power plant can be gained only after a broad understanding of the phases
preceding construction is achieved. The question, "Why build a nuclear
power plant at all?" must be clearly answered in order to establish a
proper perspective for the analysis of the construction phase of such a
plant.
Electrical Load Growth
The decision by a utility to build any type of new generation
station, whether fossil, nuclear or hydroelectric, is based upon the

utility's obligation to provide electricity in its operating area which
will meet future as well as present demands. Typically, utility cor-
porate planning to meet the future electrical needs for any load area
must anticipate the load characteristics 20 to 50 years ahead. With
the exception of isolated rural areas where marked decreases in popula-
tion have occurred, the general trend in electrical capacity requirements
is upward. The magnitude of this trend was indicated by Mr. J. E. Grund
of the Portland General Electric Company in 1974 when he stated that the
historical electrical load growth average for the entire United States
was about 7 percent per year.
Even with an extensive data base of historical trends for any one
electrical load area, it is very difficult to predict the electrical
needs of an area for a period of time 20 years in the future. In 1972,
the electrical load growth for the next decade was anticipated to average
8.2 percent per year nationwide (Schuster, 1972). This prediction was
made without knowledge of the 1973 oil embargo and subsequent economic
recession in this country, which resulted in severe austerity programs
on the part of many Americans. The recession has been a prime contribu-
tor to a marked reduction in electrical load growth, to only 2 percent
in 1975 (Brush, 1976).
Although there is some uncertainty about how quickly an economic
recovery in the United States will result in a renewed spurt in elec-
trical load growth, it would appear reasonable to assume that economic
recovery will result in increased electrical requirements for the
future. As a result, the utilities of the electrical power industry
must continue to plan and construct additional power plants.

The Choice of Nuclear Power
After an estimate for load growth has been made, the utility must
next determine the particular generation mode for the additional power
that will be provided. The three major options for most parts of the
United States are coal-fired, oil-fired and nuclear power plants.
Hydroelectric power is a fourth choice in some areas. The major con-
siderations involved in the choice of fuel type include: (1) capital
cost of construction, (2) fuel costs, (3) maintenance costs, (4) avail-
ability factors, (5) reliability considerations, (6) capacity factors,
(7) financing capability of the utility, and (8) siting considerations.
In addition, corporate goals and the regulatory environment of the day
will significantly impact upon the choice.
The decision by a utility to "go nuclear" is often based upon
several major economic advantages afforded by a nuclear plant. These
advantages (Hosmer, 1969 and Grunt, 1974) include: (1) the elimination
of air pollution, (2) reliability, safety, and flexibility in meeting
load requirement changes, (3) increased availability of nuclear fuel
relative to some fossil fuels, (4) lower costs over the life of the
plant, particularly in large central power stations, and (5) opportun-
ities to enhance fuel economies.
Although the capital costs of construction of a nuclear power plant
are significantly higher than for a fossil plant, the average cost of
the plant per kilowatt of electricity over the life of the plant is often
less. This is primarily due to lower fuel and maintenance costs in a
nuclear plant, increased reliability and availability and the fact that
a nuclear plant has a significantly longer economic life. Figure 2
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Figure 2. Coat of Fuels, U.S. Electric Utilities
(from Electrical World , November 1, 1975)

8the past decade. As indicated, there was a significant rise in oil
prices in 1973. This has made oil-fired plants economically infeasible
since that time. It may also be noted that the cost of nuclear fuel
remained stable for many years, but since 1974 even this form of fuel
has experienced a relatively high rate of increase.
Nuclear Power Participants
Table 2 provides a listing of the ten major utilities in terms of
committed new generation capacity. It should be noted that all of them
have made the decision to build nuclear power plants. It is interesting,
although not necessarily significant, that with the exception of Southern
California Edison all of the leaders are located in the Eastern portion
of the United States. The typical utility, having reached the decision
to "go nuclear," must turn to an elite group of industrial firms that
are capable of providing services to the nuclear power industry. Design
and construction services are generally provided by Architect-Engineering
(A/E) firms, Contractors or Engineering-Constructor firms. The Nuclear
Steam Supply System (NSSS) and the turbines are typically manufactured
and erected by specialty firms.
Tables 3 and 4 provide a listing of the leading Engineers and/or
Constructors in the power industry, initially by total MWeof committed
capacity, and secondly by total number of plants. Probably the most
significant fact to be drawn from these tables is that the Bechtel
Power Corporation is the distinct leader in terms of these parameters.
Stone & Webster, Sargent & Lundy, Ebasco and United Engineers & Con-
structors are leaders in the nuclear field.
Table 5 provides a listing of the leading boiler and reactor
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Table 3. Leading Engineers and/or Constructor By Total MWe of
Committed Capacity—Fossil and Nuclear Combined, and
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Table 5. Leading Boiler and Reactor Suppliers in MWe, Number
of Plants Involved, and Percentage of Total Plants*
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* Based on information received for 208 of 301 committed fossil plants
and 123 of 153 nuclear plants. Not all suppliers shown.
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Table 6. Leading Turbogenerator Suppliers by Number of Plants and
Percentage of Total Plants* (from Power Eng ineer ing , April,
1972)
Supplier
Fossil % of Nuclear % of
Total Total Total Total Total Total




Boveri 11 9,080 5.3% 4 4,794 3.7%
General
Electric 110 56,149 53.1% 45 37,088 42.8%
Westinghouse
Electric 56 29,547 27.0% 49 43,572 46.6%
* Based on information received for 207 of 301 committed fossil
plants and 105 of 153 committed nuclear plants.
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turbogenerator suppliers. General Electric and Westinghouse share
dominance in both of these areas. This is probably due to the fact
that both GE and Westinghouse became involved as primary contract
holders for the first nuclear power plants that were built under
turnkey contracts during the 1960 's.
The Future of Nuclear Power Construction
Nuclear power plant construction in the United States is a field
that is very much alive and possesses tremendous potential for growth.
Continued electrical load growth in this country will necessitate the
construction of an increasing number of power plants, at a time during
which the shortages of alternative fossil fuels are becoming critical.
In addition, increased environmental standards for fossil plants, parti-
cularly in terras of the sulfur content of stack emissions, have made
nuclear power economically more advantageous than ever before.
The sound defeat of the June 6, 1976, so-called "California Initia-
tive" appears to suggest that the American public has accepted nuclear
power as a necessary part of life. Further development of the peaceful
uses of atomic power are certainly to be anticipated.
In summarizing a critical review of American energy programs,
Mr. Stephen A. Wakefield, Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Energy
and Minerals, stated, "We have to build and license nuclear (power)
plants (1973, p. 33)." It appears that the concerns and objections of
environmental groups and others over the potential hazard of nuclear
power plants are being dealt with in a complete and thorough manner
,
and the unmistakable conclusion is that nuclear power plants will con-
tinue to be constructed in large numbers in the United States. As an
indication of this fact, plans for 11 nuclear power generation units
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were announced in 1975, with four reactors ordered and a total capacity
of the 11 of 13,350,000 kW. In 1974, 30 nuclear units were announced
with a total capacity of 36,378,000 kW (ERDA, 1976).
The Need for Research
The bright picture for nuclear power plant construction is dimmed
somewhat, however, by some very serious problems that are being faced
by the industry. The most serious problem is the absence of, and present
lack of progress toward, workable spent fuel reprocessing plants. In
view of the available uranium reserves, these plants are necessary if
nuclear power is to grow.
Beyond spent fuel reprocessing, however, there are additional
problems. The most significant construction problems center on the
fact that almost every nuclear power plant project has been riddled with
major cost overruns and significant schedule delays. To illustrate,
ERDA (1976) has reported that an initial review of the year 1975 indi-
cated that the anticipated commercial operation dates for 72 nuclear
units were deferred for a period of six months or longer, and orders for
12 units were cancelled.
The particular problems that are currently slowing progress on
various plants now under construction cover a wide range from unit to
unit, but can be grouped into three major categories (AEC, 1974):
(1) changes in design imposed by the NRC, architect-engineers, code
changes and others, (2) unavailability of material and equipment, and
(3) problems relating to various aspects of the work force.
In April of 1974 the Atomic Energy Commission (which was reorgan-
ized in 1974 into the NRC and ERDA respectively) issued an "Action Plan
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to Shorten Construction Time of Nuclear Power Plants." In this plan,
general problems common to many plants were identified and discussed
and specific recommendations were made in order to deal with the problems
In the long run, it can be expected that this type of an approach will
be helpful in obtaining solutions to the many problems encountered on a
nuclear power plant. It is important to realize, however, that the
AEC Action Plan is only one type of approach, and is not the total
answer in itself.
The first step, perhaps, in solving the problems in nuclear power
plant construction is to clearly define the state of the art of nuclear
power plant construction. The problems must be understood in detail,
and increased communications must be established among all interested
parties. A reliable and functioning interchange of ideas must be
established inside and outside the nuclear industry in order to provide
motivated and talented individuals with all of the available information
that can be used to attack a particular problem. Until the state of
the art has been defined, the entire nuclear construction process cannot
be critically examined in order to make improvements.
Research Procedure
An attempt has been made in this thesis to combine information
relating to nuclear power plant construction available in literature
sources with information gleaned from an extensive series of personal
field interviews. The research procedure involved a number of site
visits and interviews at two nuclear power plants currently under
construction in Pennsylvania, and home office visits to the utilities,




The writer spent a total of 12 days at the Three Mile Island
nuclear station in Middleton, Pennsylvania. Days were spent in per-
sonal interviews with the lead engineers from the various disciplines
of the utility and constructor involved in the project, as well as the
project managers and selected workers. In general, any information that
was requested was made available to the writer, and arrangements were
made to allow him to view first hand many of the detailed problems that
occurred, as they were happening.
Following the interviews at Three Mile Island, several visits were
made to both the Susquehanna Steam Electric nuclear station in Berwick,
Pennsylvania, and a fossil power plant at Homer City, Pennsylvania, in
order to make comparisons in procedures and viewpoints and to identify
differences from the Three Mile Island project.
The information obtained at all three construction sites was aug-
mented by information gleaned from visits to the home offices of the
firms involved in these projects. A literature study was then conducted,
with emphasis placed upon the problem areas which had been identified by
the writer.
Thesis Objective
The objective of this thesis is to establish an overview of the
state of the art of construction in the nuclear power generation industry,
The writer will attempt to describe the problems and needs of all of
the major parties involved in the construction phase of a nuclear power
plant project; from both a technical and managerial viewpoint. All of
the important problem areas will be examined by synthesizing the infor-
mation gained from the extensive personal field interviews and the




The material found in the thesis is divided into 12 parts. In
Chapter 2 the regulatory environment of the nuclear industry is
described. In Chapters 3 through 6, major items that impact directly
on construction are discussed, including design, standardization,
project control, the concept of quality assurance, and the requirements
for preconstruction activities. Chapters 7, 8, and 9 provide a detailed
discussion of the problems encountered in the field for the various
field disciplines, including civil, electrical, instrumentation, piping,
welding, and mechanical equipment. The applicable power codes are
discussed in Chapter 10, and in Chapter 11 the construction requirements
for interfacing with the startup and testing phase of the plant is
discussed. Chapter 12 is devoted to an analysis of labor in the power
industry. Finally, Chapter 13 provides a summary and conclusions drawn




A proper understanding of construction in the nuclear power
industry must begin with a study of the regulation and licensing aspects
that are so dominant in nuclear construction. As mentioned in the
previous chapter, licensing is a lengthy and complicated process that
must be initiated in the very earliest stages of project development.
In this chapter, the discussion will center on federal regulation,
sources of licenses, and the impact of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
on power plant construction.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Federal regulation of the civilian use of nuclear power is admin-
istered by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Established in 1974, this
agency bases its credibility on established technical expertise and total
autonomy from nuclear research and development organizations. The
Nuclear Regulatory Commission is responsible for regulation of the
licensing, design, construction and operation of nuclear plants, and,
as will be shown, plays a dominant role in establishing direction for
the power industry.
Historical Development
Research, development, and regulation of nuclear energy activities
during the 1960's and early 1970's was the composite responsibility of
one government agency, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) . As the
prospects of nuclear energy usage and dependence continued to increase
during these years, the activity level of advisory groups opposed to

20
the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy also increased. It
became the growing concern of many in government and in the power
industry that a method be developed to insure that the best interests
of the public were being served with regard to nuclear power. These
public interests, in particular, were the protection of public health
and safety, environmental quality, and national security. In order to
preclude the possibility of a conflict of interest within the AEC,
which was also concerned with nuclear research and development, it was
determined that regulation of nuclear activities in the United States
should be the sole responsibility of a totally independent agency.
The vehicle employed to bring about the establishment of that in-
dependent agency was the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. Very simply,
the AEC was abolished, and two agencies were established in its place.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was established to regulate all
civilian nuclear activities. The second agency established, the Energy
Research and Development Administration (ERDA) , was charged with
responsibility for research and development of not only nuclear energy,
but all forms of energy. The significant point about the two agencies
is that they are totally independent of one another.
Beyond the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, itself, additional
information on the split of responsibilities and philosophies of opera-
tion of the NRC can be found in the testimony on April 28, 1975, by
William A. Anders, Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to the
House Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment (Anders, 1975).
NRC Purpose
As previously mentioned, the purpose of the NRC is to provide in-
dependent regulation of civilian nuclear activities to insure the
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protection of public health and safety, environmental quality and
national security. Chairman Anders' opening remarks to the House Sub-
committee underscored the importance of independent regulation from a
technical, economic and social point of view. Another primary goal of
the Commission is to insure that the power industry and the American
public retain confidence in the ability of the NRC to properly regulate
and fulfill its charge CAnders, 1975).
In relaying the philosophy of the NRC, Chairman Anders was short
and to the point. His testimony revealed that the philosophy of the
NRC finds its base in one point: "The business of the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission is regulation. We must maintain a position above the
fray, and not allow ourselves to be either apologists for or antagonists
of nuclear power. Development or promotion of nuclear technology is
the function and responsibility of others. Our job is protecting the
health and safety of the public," (Anders, 1975, p. 1).
Organization
The Commission, itself, is composed of five commissioners, at
present, William A. Anders, Chairman, Marcus A. Rowden, Edward A. Mason,
Victor Gilinsky, and Richard T. Kennedy. The five commissioners, as
noted by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller at the occasion of the
swearing-in ceremony for the commissioners on January 23, 1975, represent
composite expertise in the sciences, government and law. These five
commissioners are supported by an extensive staff organization and a
line organization for operations. Major support of the Executive Director
for Operations is divided within five areas. These areas of responsi-
bility include standards development, nuclear material safety and
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safeguards, nuclear reactor regulation, nuclear regulatory research,
and inspection and enforcement. An overall organization chart for the
NRC is shown in Figure 3.
Of the five operational groups, field construction personnel are
most familiar with the activities of the Office of Inspection and
Enforcement. Although each of the other groups impacts directly on
the construction of a nuclear power plant project, it is the division
of Field Operations that provides the on-site inspectors for compliance
checks. The inspectors are organized geographically into five regions,
as indicated in Figure 3, with regional offices in Philadelphia, Atlanta,
Chicago, Dallas, and San Francisco. Figure 4 indicates the organization
of Region I, with its home office in Philadelphia.
Licensing
A discussion of the licensing of nuclear power plants in 1976 is
significantly different from a similar discussion which may have been
presented in 1972. The licensing requirements themselves have not
changed drastically, but the preparation and handling of those require-
ments has been strengthened. More significant than any improvements in
the licensing process, however, has been the impact of the economic
crisis on construction schedules. In the early 1970' s, every day of
delay in acquiring a construction permit was a day delay in starting
construction. As a result, the length of time required for license
application reviews received a lot of attention from the parties











































































































































financial constraints, in many cases securing the construction permit
1
may not even be on the critical path.
The discussion which follows will attempt to point out where
procedural improvements have been made, and also indicate the areas
which the writer feels still require attention. As the prospects for
economic recovery brighten, the possibility of a return to the licensing
furor of several years ago becomes increasingly more real. As capital
becomes readily available, it will be quickly determined if the regula-
tory agencies and licensing agents of the industry have made good use
of their time out of the limelight.
Licensing Procedure
Local licensing requirements vary significantly from state to state.
The chapter in this report which deals with Preconstruction Activities
will indicate the tremendous number of permits required for construction
of a nuclear power plant. This discussion will be limited to the con-
struction permit and operating license issued by the NRC under the
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
The key term to become familiar with at the outset of this dis-
cussion is PSAR, the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report. The PSAR,
which is developed and submitted by the plant utility or owner, indicates
in detail the design assumptions and limitations of the proposed plant.
In addition to the PSAR, an Environmental Report is filed by the owner.
These documents are reviewed by the NRC in a process that in 1976 takes
Mr. Jack Thorpe, Manager of Licensing and Environmental Affairs,




about 18 months (Palmeter, 1975). Subsequent review is conducted by
the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards CACRS) which is commissioned
by the NRC, but acts independently of them. The NRC technical review
centers on plant safety, environmental considerations, and antitrust
implications, while ACRS studies the overall view of how the application
fits into the big picture, with emphasis on generic subjects.
As mentioned, today's NRC review takes approximately 18 months from
submission of the PSAR to issuance of a construction permit. In 1967
this time was 10.5 months, in 1970 it was 20 months, and in 1972 it was
over 30 months (Olds, March 1973). It is predicted that this period of
18 months is a relatively stable figure, and no significant reductions or
increases are anticipated by either industry or regulatory personnel.
The next step in the licensing procedure is the public hearing. The
hearing is conducted by a three-member hearing board composed of a
chairman and two technical advisors with expertise in environmental and
nuclear technology. The original purpose of the public hearing was to
provide information to the public regarding the application. In fact,
this purpose has been significantly compromised, if not eliminated
entirely. Public hearings will be discussed later in this chapter,
along with several other items identified as common criticisms of the
NRC and its procedures. It is sufficient, at this point, to understand
that the nature of the public hearing is potentially complex and unpre-
dictable. Depending upon the nature of interveners, the duration can
fluctuate tremendously. The hearing for Long Island Lighting's Shoreman
plant took two and one-half years, while that for Metropolitan Edison's
Three Mile Island Unit 2 (JMI 2) was completed on the first morning.
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Upon completion of the public hearing, a successful application
results in the issuance of a construction permit. The construction
permit basically gives the utility the authority to build the nuclear
plant in accordance with the PSAR. This point cannot be overemphasized.
Inspections and citations during construction, as well as review for
further licensing, will be based primarily upon the PSAR. This is why a
utility must be certain that the PSAR, which will often be developed for
the owner by an A/E or other consultant, contains only what is desired.
The utility will be held responsible for compliance to the PSAR, even
when it later appears that specific parts of the PSAR prove to be more
stringent than would otherwise have been required in order to be licensed,
The NRC is aiding the utilities in this area by the continual development
2
of Regulatory Guides to delineate a program that is acceptable.
After construction has progressed, several other licenses are
required prior to operation. There are separate permits required for
bringing nuclear fuel on site, loading fuel, testing, and commercial
operation, to name only a few. The application for commercial licensing
is dependent upon review by the NRC of the Final Safety Analysis Report
(FSAR) . The procedure is similar, in some respects, to the procedure
followed to obtain a construction permit. The FSAR is a detailed
summary of what was actually done in the design and construction of the
plant. Compilation of the FSAR actually begins with the PSAR, and it is
completed long before the construction is finished. According to
2
Mr. Robert T. Heishman, Director Projects Section, Reactor Construc-
tion and Engineering Support Branch, Region I NRC, in a personal
interview, March 3, 1976.
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Mr. Joe Wright of General Public Utilities Service Corporation, the
FSAR for TMI 2 was submitted very shortly after the approval of the
PSAR. Licensing stages at the end of construction are directly related
to the procedures and successful progress of the startup and test program.
Details of this program are included in Chapter 12 of this report.
The last phase before licensing for commercial operation is often
another public hearing. This hearing is not mandatory, but is held only
if requested. A request for a hearing may come from an adversary who
still hopes to delay or prevent licensing, or it may come from an appli-
cant who is having problems that he has been unable to resolve with the
NRC. It appears that the latter case is less common.
The PSAR Itself
It appears that extensive technical and legal gyrations often
accompany the successful application for a construction permit. The
PSAR is the document about which many of these gyrations revolve. The
PSAR contains detailed information on the site, the design, safety
analyses and environmental considerations. Landmark court decisions
such as the Calvert Cliffs decision (Olds, March 1973) and sweeping
environmental reforms, generated by vaguely generalized Congressional
statutes, have expanded the responsibility of the NRC review to a mag-
nitude far overshadowing the original radiological safety study.
Accompanying a tremendous expansion and reworking of the AEC and NRC to
handle this review has come the dramatically increased requirements
and complexities of the PSAR itself. An indication of the complexity
involved is the fact that no fewer than 39 Regulatory Guides were




Regulatory Guide 1.70, "Standard Format and Content of Safety
Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants" (Revision 2, September 1975),
provides basic guidance for the development of the PSAR. During the
review of applications submitted under Revision 1 (October 1972) of
this Guide, it was found that certain items were consistently absent from
numerous PSAR reports. Prior to the issuance of Revision 2 to Regulatory
Guide 1.70, 38 sub-guides were issued providing new or additional infor-
mation for Safety Analysis Reports. These guides are numbered 1.70.1
through 1.70.38, and provide information that was included in Revision 2.
To state that the PSAR is a detailed compilation of information
about the project does not really indicate the magnitude of the informa-
tion that is currently required. As an indication of the broad scope
of subjects that are covered, Table 7 which lists the Guide Number and
Title of Applicable Regulatory Guides has been included with this report.
Because the FSAR requires a more detailed reporting of information,
it usually far exceeds the PSAR in length. As an example, the FSAR for
Three Mile Island 2 at the time of its submission was 12 volumes in its
entirety.
Licensing Delay Points
According to John F. O'Leary, former Director of the AEC Director-
ate of Licensing, there are four types of delay that may influence the
review of a license application (Olds, 1973). These four include:
CD NRC staff limitation to handle the review, (2) procedural delays,
(3) applicant-caused delays, and (4) system-involved delays. It can
be generally agreed that the NRC has sufficiently increased its staff
and improved its procedures so that the problem of NRC staff limita-
tions has been brought under control (Olds, 1973).
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Table 7. Regulatory Guides For Safety Analysis Reports
Reg Guide
Number Title
1.70 Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for
Nuclear Power Plants (Revision 2, 9/75)
1.70.1 Additional Information—Hydrological Considerations
for Nuclear Power Plants (Revision 1, 1/75)
1.70.2 Additional Information—Air Filtration Systems and
Containment Sumps for Nuclear Power Plants (12/73)
1.70.3 Additional Information—Radiation Protection (Revision
1, 11/74)
1.70.4 Additional Information—Fire Protection Considerations
for Nuclear Power Plants (2/74)
1.70.5 Additional Information—Water Level (Flood) Design




Design and Construction (7/74)
1.70.7 Additional Information—Geography and Demography
Considerations for Nuclear Power Plants (8/74)
1.70.8 Additional Information—Nearby Industrial, Transporta-
tion, and Military Facilities (9/74)
1.70.9 Additional Information—Design of Seismic Category I
Structures (11/74)
1.70.10 Additional Information—Wind and Tornado Loadings
(11/74)
1.70.11 Information for Safety Analysis Reports
—
Quality
Assurance During Operations Phase (12/74)
1.70.12 Information for Safety Analysis Reports—Reactor
Materials (12/74)
1.70.13 Information for Safety Analysis Reports—Code Cases
Applicable to Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary
Components (12/74)
1.70.14 Information for Safety Analysis Reports—Emergency
Planning 0-2/74)
1.70.15 Information for Safety Analysis Reports—Industrial
Security for Nuclear Power Plants (12/74)
1.70.16 Information for Safety Analysis Reports—Missile
Barrier Design Procedures (12/74)
1.70.17 Information for Safety Analysis Reports—Hydrologic
Engineering (1/75)
1.70.18 Information for Safety Analysis Reports—Mechanical
Systems and Components (1/75)
1.70.19 Information for Safety Analysis Reports—Steam
Generators (1/75)
1.70.20 Information for Safety Analysis Reports—Reactor
Coolant Pressure Boundary Materials and
Inservice Inspection (1/75)







1.70 1.70.22 Information for Safety Analysis Reports—Instrumen-
tation and Controls (2/75)
1.70.23 Information for Safety Analysis Reports—Seismic
Qualification of Instrumentation and Electrical
Equipment (2/75)
1.70.24 Information for Safety Analysis Reports—Environmen-
tal Design of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment
Qualification Tests and Analysis (2/75)
1.70.25 Information for Safety Analysis Reports—Inservice
Inspection of ASME Code Class 2 and 3 Components
(2/75)
1.70.26 Information for Safety Analysis Reports—Metallic
Materials for Engineered Safety Features (2/75)
1.70.27 Information for Safety Analysis Reports—Radioactive
Waste Management (4/75)
1.70.28 Information for Safety Analysis Reports—Steam and
Feedwater System Materials (4/75)
1.70.29 Information for Safety Analysis Reports—Meteorology
(4/75)
1.70.30 Information for Safety Analysis Reports—Pump Fly-
wheel Integrity (4/75)
1.70.31 Information for Safety Analysis Reports—Plant
Procedures (5/75)
1.70.32 Information for Safety Analysis Reports—Reactor
Water Cleanup System (5/75)
1.70.33 Information for Safety Analysis Reports—Initial Test
Programs (5/75)
1.70.34 Information for Safety Analysis Reports—Fuel System
Design (5/75)
1.70.35 Information for Safety Analysis Reports—Internally
Generated Missile (6/75)
1.70.36 Information for Safety Analysis Reports—Electric
Power (6/75)
1.70.37 Information for Safety Analysis Reports—Pressurizer
Relief Discharge System (6/75)




Procedural delays occur more frequently when a new review or phase
of review is introduced. Quite often, requirements for these reviews
come to the NRC in generalities and catch phrases, with no real guidance
for implementation. As a result, as in the case of the environmental
review, a system must be invented and implemented almost overnight (Olds,
March 1973). The antitrust review is another review that was begun with-
out the prior establishment of any limits or precedent. Until several
reviews for each requirement have been completed, and the limits more
clearly defined, there is a potential for delays in the processing of an
application.
The third type of delay, caused by the applicant himself, is the
type that the utility and the NRC can do the most to correct. Initially,
the application may not be sufficiently complete when it is submitted.
Delay is caused because the NRC must determine areas of inadequacy and
make requests for information (Price, 1974). A delay on the part
of the applicant in responding to the NRC requests will further slow the
process.
In the opinion of the writer the origins of this problem lie with
both the NRC and the utility industry. Initially, the NRC has not
always made itself clear on what was required. Coupled with a continu-
ously changing scope of requirements, this creates a difficult and
frustrating situation for the utility. The Regulatory Guide system
represents a large step in correcting requirement information deficien-
cies. Additional information is published by the NRC in the form of
amendments, Information Guides, Safety Guides, and public announcements.
In an interview with Mr. O'Leary, he emphasized in his statement
on the applicant-caused type of delay that quite often the utilities
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have not kept up with changes and modifications as they occurred. As
of 1973 there was no known system of close monitoring, abstracting,
codifying, and distribution of information on nuclear proceedings
within the industry. It should be noted that this type of system does
exist within the petroleum industry and in the power industry when
related to Federal Power Commission rulings (Olds, 1973).
The final type of delay, called system-invoked delays, are related
to the state of technology within the industry. Many of the existing
codes and standards for non-nuclear work have been determined to be
unacceptable for nuclear work. New codes and procedures must, therefore,
be developed, and this procedure by its very nature takes a great deal
of time. The reworking of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code
(IAEA, 1966) is a good example of this problem. Unfortunately, indivi-
dual applications may get delayed due to the need to develop a better
standard for the evaluation of a system or component in the design.
Regulatory Guides
A Regulatory Guide (Reg Guide) is intended to be exactly what it
is titled, namely, a guide. It is, in concept, a description of "an
acceptable method" for implementing specific Commission regulations.
In itself, it is not an enforceable regulation, and an owner can employ
methods that vary from the guide if he can provide a basis for an
acceptable compliance to regulations. Reg Guides are developed with
information and assistance from the industry, and often will endorse an
industry code or standard, either in whole or with exceptions.
In practice, Reg Guides appear to be more binding than the name
"guide" implies. Initially, the review of an application will take
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longer if the applicant has varied from the method outlined as a guide
for a particular requirement. Secondly, the applicant can incur a
great deal of cost in time and manpower attempting to redefine a com-
pletely different system, which may or may not be found to be acceptable
at a later date. In general, an applicant must examine the economic
consequences of his alternatives very closely before deciding to vary
from a Reg Guide. It appears that on significant items variation is
often justified. This statement probably does not hold true on minor
points.
Reg Guides are issued in the following ten broad divisions: Power
Reactors, Research and Test Reactors, Fuels and Materials Facilities,
Environmental and Siting, Materials and Plant Protection, Products,
Transportation, Occupational Health, Antitrust Review, and General.
The first division of Power Reactors is the division which governs the
design and construction of commercial power plants. Within this divi-
sion there are 102 Reg Guides either published or very close to publi-
cation. This number includes Reg Guides 1.70.1 through 1.70.38 as one
publication. In addition to these Reg Guides, there are 68 additional
Reg Guides in various stages of development.
The Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Gilbert Associates, 1975)
developed the graphical presentation in Figure 5 in order to indicate
the impact of time and Reg Guides on regulatory requirements. Moving
horizontally from 1967 to 1974, the curve of requirements continuously
climbs. The vertical axis is used to present the relative impact of
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Common Criticisms of the NRC
Almost any conversation with industry personnel about the problems
in nuclear construction will reveal heartfelt convictions that the
regulatory requirements, or the NRC itself, are at the center of many
of the problems in nuclear construction. Not surprisingly, the problems
or complaints that are aired are very consistent within the groups of
field personnel, home office management, and designers or consultants.
Several items were mentioned to the writer by all groups, although not
necessarily in the same order of importance or from the same point of
view. Unofficial NRC comments were received concerning many of the
standard complaints.
In the following paragraphs, the complaints are stated and the
writer's opinion about their validity and the presentation of possible
solutions are presented.
The Moving Target of Requirements
The primary form of frustration within the nuclear industry has
probably been the continuous series of revisions and upgrading of NRC
requirements, guides and criteria. Figure 5 provides some insight into
the magnitude of changes that have occurred on a yearly basis in the
past. It is clear that the system will probably never reach a point of
no changes. Hopefully, however, a shift in the magnitude of the impact
of the changes is already being witnessed.
The problem may be more serious than it should be, however, if
changes are made that are really not necessary. According to Sol Burstein
(1973), Senior Vice President for Wisconsin Electric Power, the basis
for establishing criteria is incorrect. The nuclear industry appears to

37
base its rules on what the limits of design and margins of safety
could be, instead of basing them on what they should be. No other
industry attempts to develop standards that establish minimum require-
ments beyond question and criticism. Yet, this is the method that has
been chosen, and there does not appear to be any movement to change it.
Just as automobile requirements continue to become more stringent,
so those for nuclear plants tighten, too, but apparently on a much more
dramatic scale. As an example, Mr. Robert Heishman of Region I of the
NRC noted that only recently the NRC has imposed a requirement for a
quality assurance program for concrete block being used as dividing
walls within the containment structure. These walls are not load
bearing and have been built for years without a QA program applied.
Another example of the state of flux of criteria exists with
regard to Boiling Water Reactors (BWR) which have been designed and
built for many years. Recent research has indicated a possible problem
may exist with the torus design for the BWR. Basically, the torus is
a round, donut-shaped cylinder that is partially filled with water. In
the event of a steam leak because of a pipe failure, the steam condenses
in the torus and a reduction in pressure in the system results. The
new concern centers around the fact that the forces associated with a
maximum loss of power accident have become more clearly understood, and
the magnitude and direction of the resultant force due to such an
accident appears to be different from that used as a base for previous
design. The margin of safety of design was, therefore, re-evaluated
and the establishment of additional technical specs defining differential
pressure requirements within the torus during operations to limit forces
as well as an extensive torus strengthening backfit program has begun.
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In addition to research, other factors are involved in the con-
tinuous upgrading of criteria. First, there is the rapidly moving
trend of issuing sub-standards, commonly referred to as daughter stan-
dards, to explain what the standards mean. For example, ANSI N45.2 was
written to explain Appendix B. Invariably, the daughter standards are
longer and just as difficult to understand. Occasionally, industry
people admit that they are not certain about exactly what some standards
say. Standards can take up volumes , and checklists are required in
design and construction to make them useable.
Many of the codes and standards developed are necessary, but, in
the opinion of many construction and design personnel interviewed, there
are some that are perhaps questionable at best. A standard that tells
how to perform nuclear physics calculations cannot give technical com-
petence to anyone who would choose to use it. Therefore, it may not
be required for a technically competent person.
In the opinion of the writer there is a strong need to step back
and look at what has already been developed. The regulatory and industry
committees must slow down in volume production and address the following
type of question about each standard, "What contribution does the
standard make with respect to the objectives that it is trying to
achieve?"
The last factor that is responsible for continuous changes may be
found within the NRC itself. Industry personnel have reported to the
writer that a de facto situation exists in which a new question or
requirement becomes a badge of recognition for particular NRC personnel.
As a result, it is claimed that many NRC people work overtime to develop
new areas for questioning and development of standards.
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The Absence of Engineering Judgment
Interpretation of the written word is a critical problem for all
parties in the nuclear industry. Utility personnel often complain that
the NRC applies no judgment to the written word, and many feel this places
the unfair burden of exactness and clarity on the owner. In the placing
of reinforcing steel for a nuclear containment, for example, if the
specs call for a six-inch center-to-center placement, the NRC requires
Quality Control inspectors to insist on exactly six inches. There appears
to be no allowance for tolerance range of plus or minus of a fraction of
an inch, even though the error was included in the design factor of
safety.
In the case of a concrete pour for the base slab of the auxiliary
building at Three Mile Island Unit 1, a tent was constructed around a
pour of about 400 cubic yards during cold weather. Specifications
required that the temperature of the air to be above 32°F. In fact,
utility observers noted that it was so hot in the tent that the workmen
took their jackets off. Yet, a QC inspector employed by the constructor
took a thermometer inside the forms near a crack in the tent, and dis-
covered that the temperature at one point was below 32°F. According to
QA requirements the pour had to be shut down until the leak was fixed.
At first reading, it may appear that industry has a valid com-
plaint about the inability of inspectors to apply sound engineering
judgment. In actuality, however, this assertion is not correct. If
an inspector is required to exercise judgment beyond the developed
specifications, he is being drawn into the design cycle. The NRC should
probably not be responsible for altering the design in any way, and
even though the inspector might be capable of applying the proper
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judgment, it should be avoided at any cost. To do otherwise would
probably open the door for compromise and flagrant non-compliance in
the future.
Instead, sound engineering judgment should be applied at the design
stage, when the specifications are being developed. If the designer
wishes to allow a tolerance in rebar placement, for instance, he should
indicate this directly in the specifications. The same argument is valid
if he wishes to have the 32°F temperature in a concrete pour be considered
as an average temperature. Then, when the NRC approves the specifica-
tions, the inspectors have their tolerances defined, and they are defined
in a deliberate manner, rather than casually by an individual inspector.
According to Robert Heishman of Region I, the NRC has issued cita-
tions for rebar placements which were only 0.1 inch off center placing
because the variance violated the specifications. The reason for this
was probably not because it is so unsafe, but rather to make a point.
NRC inspectors pointed out to the writer that acceptance of this work
could indicate a willingness to accept sloppy tolerances elsewhere.
Industry sources have also noted that it is quite possible that the
citation was also issued just as a show of power.
The Rachet
Owners, designers and constructors alike report that the NRC uses
what is commonly referred to as "the rachet" to accomplish many of its
goals. In licensing, the approach works in a subtle but direct manner.
Although a Reg Guide is not law, it does present a method that is
acceptable for a phase of the system. If an alternate method is chosen,
the new method must be proven at the time of licensing. This can take
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a great deal of expertise and legal manipulating, and can be very
expensive. The ultimate fear is a delay in licensing, which will
result in a tremendous loss of income. With this delay held over the
applicant's head, the NRC can often find cooperation where it may not
otherwise have existed. Further, this same rachet has been used to
commit utilities to requirements beyond those currently applicable, but
which are viewed by the NRC to be on the horizon.
Who Watches Over The NRC?
For an industry that is being so thoroughly dominated by the NRC,
and for the taxpayer who is paying the bill, the question might very
well arise, "Who is watching over the NRC?"
Ultimately, it is felt that the public watches over the NRC. There
are, however, several points of balance between the two groups which
must be considered. Initially, within the NRC itself is an Office of
Inspection and Auditing that handles complaints about its members. The
Commissioners themselves are the next point of control, leading directly
to the Joint Atomic Energy Committee of Congress. Beyond Congress,
public hearings, judicial proceedings and rulemaking proceedings allow
a recourse of action for applicants and the public.
The opportunities for individuals within the NRC to usurp authority
have been markedly reduced in recent years. Requirements are more
clearly defined, and team inspections which provide a rotation of inspec-
tors with group conclusions are probably helping the situation.
It is worthy of note that the NRC historically has been reluctant
to fight the initial loss of court action by appeal. This is not
necessarily true for applicants or interveners, and actually indicates
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a weakness the NRC should perhaps examine in a more detailed fashion.
If the NRC feels that it is correct in a case, they should probably
avail themselves of every chance to have their position accepted.
Another source of control over the NRC is probably the long-range
pressure exerted by the industry and professional organizations on the
development of standards. This has begun to take effect, and it is
anticipated that these groups will continue to work closely with the
NRC in the future.
After extensive interviews with people throughout the power industry,
it is the writer's opinion that although many individual cases of minor
violations or usurping of authority may be found, the NRC is doing a
good job. The people employed by the NRC are knowledgeable and sincere,
and keep the welfare of the public in the foremost of their mind. From
the public's point of view, no sleep need be lost out of concern for the
ability of the NRC to do its job.
NRC Resident Inspectors
Of all the proposals for improvement of the regulatory process, the
one about which there is the largest degree of disagreement is the idea
of converting the inspectors from a regional orientation to position
of resident inspector directly on the construction site. The writer
has found that disagreement ranges from organization to organization,
and from person to person within each organization.
Proponents of the resident inspector philosophy say that it will
provide continuity and a more timely solution to problems. If a
resident inspector were available, the proponents feel he could point
out problems as they develop, which would result in more immediate
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correction. Currently it is often the case that problems are not
pointed out until the particular phase of work on which the problems
occur is complete. The net result is a change or correction that is
appreciably more expensive and time-consuming than necessary. In
addition, there is a significant impact on morale and labor productivity
whenever work must be redone.
Mr. Saxon Palmeter, Manager of Construction of GPU Service Corpora-
tion, noted that the resident inspector philosophy worked very well at
Shippingport, and many who saw its effectiveness feel that it would cut
out many of today's problems. Opponents of the plan say that a power
plant of the 1970 's cannot be compared to the simpler Shippingport
facility. It is difficult to predict how site-related problems of
today would compare to those of early vintage plants. It is safe to
say, however, that a resident inspector who spends more time and is
more involved with the site will be better able to provide direct
assistance in the event of a nuclear accident.
It is felt that one of the major drawbacks to a resident inspector
program would be in selecting the person to fill the job at the site.
Regardless of how technically trained an individual has become, no one
person is qualified to make decisions on the broad scale of subjects that
is required on modern plants. If this is the case, then the agreement
implies that the individual must still draw on a pool of experts for
answers, so there would be no economic improvement in the system.
A major criticism of the proposal is the conjecture that a
resident inspector would become personally involved in too many details
and his objectivity would be compromised. This is a fear at both
extremes. From the public's point of view, there is the fear that the
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inspector would be overly lenient with individuals with whom he has
developed friendships. Although this would not have to happen, the
potential is definitely present. One instance in the writer's experience
where this has not happened is in Admiral Rickover's nuclear submarine
program. Rickover has resident civilian inspectors at all nuclear
shipyards who have been consistent and hard-lined throughout the years,
in spite of any professional or social relationships. It is safe to
say, however, that Admiral Rickover has a great deal more control over
the individuals involved than the NRC might have.
At the other end of the scale, industry people should be concerned
about the potential for further expansion of regulatory influence if
the inspectors were permanently stationed on the site. The fact that
the utility retains responsibility for everything on site is basic, and
the writer feels that no effort should be made to allow the government
to assume any of that responsibility. A permanent resident situation,
on the other hand, would create the possibility for a forceful and dom-
ineering inspector to expand the limits of his authority over a period
of time on one site. This would give rise to inconsistencies from site
to site and region to region.
It is interesting to note, however, that the resident inspector
program is actually under consideration by the NRC. There is currently
an 18-month trial program in operation at operating facilities, as
opposed to construction sites, by the Chicago based Region III of the
NRC. The program was evaluated at six months and 14 months and as yet
an official report has not been issued. Unofficial conversations with
the NRC indicate that the program is not working out very well. Details
of this situation were not made available to the writer.
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In order to deal intelligently with the problem, one must return
to the announced primary responsibility of the NRC. That responsibility
is to protect the health and safety of the public. It is unclear
whether placing inspectors on site permanently will necessarily improve
the NRC's potential for fulfilling its mission. There is a strong possi-
bility it would be counterproductive in that the inspector would be
automatically involved in every problem that arose, and his objectivity
could be colored. As far as manning the positions, it might not be
any more difficult for the NRC to find qualified personnel than it is
for the utilities, designers, and constructors. Yet, there is the
possibility that a government agency could assign a less qualified
resident in order to retain a pool of experts in the home office.
One exception to arguments against the resident inspector program
could be the use of this type of program at a fabrication facility for
the Nuclear Steam Supply System for a new power plant. These facilities
are limited in number, and could justify continued inspection and
review as opposed to the sampling that is currently in practice.
Both sides of the argument recognize that the question of right
and wrong should be made as clear as possible. It appears that no one
is interested in emerging from the process without fulfilling require-
ments, they are simply looking for the best way to get to the answer.
It is the opinion of the writer that a resident inspector would not be
able to improve the present system significantly, and the potential for
compromise and counterproductivity is too great to risk.
Standardization
The problems and progress of standardization are discussed in
detail in Chapter 4 of this report.
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Regional Variation of Requirements
The regulatory requirements for plants of the same vintage do not
vary in written form. In fact, however, the interpretation of the
written word varies, sometimes significantly, within the NRC from region
to region and inspector to inspector. It is generally agreed that the
major variations are between regions, since the philosophy of the indi-
vidual regional directors goes a long way in defining the philosophy
of his inspectors. Training of inspectors is conducted on a regional
basis, and here may be one source of the problem.
A similar problem has existed in the past with other similar
groups, such as with the regional code inspectors for the ASME code.
The ASME recognized the problem and increased the qualifications and
training of its staff and inspectors. The net result was a drastic
improvement in consistency among the regions.
The NRC recognizes that there is a degree of validity to these
complaints about inconsistency. In response, there has been a major
effort underway to correct the problem. Unfortunately, specific data
related to the problem has not been abundant. Utilities are often
anxious to talk in generalities about the problem, but are unable to
provide specific examples of problems. This makes the correction a
little harder and more time consuming.
A major step in the right direction was the centralizing by the
NRC of all licensing procedures in one office. In this way, all
applicants are reviewed by the same group under the same standards.
Two programs being sponsored by the Bechtel Power Corporation are also
expected to help. Initially, the Standardized Nuclear Unit Power
Plant System (SNUPPS), which is discussed in detail in the chapter on
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Standardization, requires a minimum representation of two of the three
regions of the NRC involved for any inspection. As a result, at least
three of the five regions will be forced to agree on methods and
follow through on them. Although this is good, it must be noted that
duplication of inspection is also expensive.
Secondly, the Bechtel Power Corporation has recently developed a
standardized group of procedures that, if accepted in each region, could
set the standard for the regions in themselves. Due to antitrust con-
siderations, the NRC cannot give blanket approval to such a system, but
it appears that Bechtel can proceed with the introduction of this system
in every region where it has a contract.
Licensing Problems
The problems of lengthy review time and the existence of a unique
review of each design relate directly to standardization. These items
will also be discussed in Chapter 4 of this report.
Exorbitant Licensing Fees
It is interesting to note that the cost of obtaining the operating
license for a nuclear plant is very large, and must be borne by the
applicant. According to Metropolitan Edison Corporation, the licensing
fee for Three Mile Island Unit I was about $700,000. Current estimates
predict $2 million for the same task in the near future.
Public Hearings
The problem of public hearings was introduced earlier, but requires
some additional explanation. The public hearing was originally a mech-
anism for informing the public. Now, it appears that the hearing,
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particularly at the operating license stage, serves little, if any,
useful purpose. The public hearing remains the most unpredictable and
crucial item of a utility awaiting its construction permit. In fact,
there is very little information conveyed at the hearing, and rather
than informing the public, the NRC must assume a role of defending its
position for already having approved the application.
What occurs, in general, at a hearing is that representatives from
each party involved present their data and reports for the application.
This is done not by reading the reports, but by indicating which volumes
contain them. Without an adversary, commonly referred to as the inter-
vener, no points are even discussed.
The problem of interveners is of major concern to many. Under the
present system the public is actually shortchanged in court because an
intervener must have a great deal of money in order to successfully
oppose an application. Thus, the average concerned American does not
have the funds to employ the technical expertise required for battling
a utility or the NRC in court. Hopefully, the public's view is adequately
protected in the original NRC review.
In addition, delays caused by interveners in the licensing of a
plant can cause serious harm to the public. Mr. Sol Burstein (1973),
referred to earlier, pointed out the possibilities of reduced reserve
margins, damage due to deferring of scheduled maintenance on existing
generation plants, and the cost in fossil fuel resources, air and water
discharges, and other financial impacts caused by long delays in
licensing a needed plant.
A public hearing at the operating license stage is held only by
request, which is a step in the right direction. It is the writer's
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opinion that serious thought should be given, however, to a revision
of the public hearing phase for the construction permit.
Conclusions
The regulatory structure for the nuclear industry is a complex and
powerful organization that carries a tremendous burden of responsibility.
The purpose of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is to protect the health
and safety of the public. The methods and procedures to be used by the
commission have not been adequately addressed by Congress, and, as a
result, they have come about in a lengthy but rapidly expanding process
of evolution. There remain many problems within the regulatory process,
but on the whole the writer feels that the nuclear industry is on a
firm path of continued improvement. The NRC is composed of dedicated
and responsible individuals who are doing a difficult job in an
excellent manner. The general public can have a great deal of confidence
in the regulatory system.
Regulation and licensing impact directly on the design of the project,
in terms of both scheduling and specific design criteria. The next
chapter will discuss this impact in detail, as well as identify the





As noted in Chapter 1, the objective of this thesis does not
include a detailed study of the design phase of nuclear power plants.
It is important, however, to understand how the design phase impacts
upon the construction phase if the latter is to be satisfactorily under-
stood. This point of interface which occurs between the architect-
engineer and the constructor is one of the most critical ones of the
entire process. In order to understand this interface, one must under-
stand the role that is played by the A/E. In this chapter, therefore,
the general sequence of events related to nuclear power plant projects
will be examined from a designer's point of view. The impact of owner
involvement, the motivation of the A/E firm and several of the major
shortcomings related to the role of A/E firms will be discussed.
It appears that in the future standardization will play an increas-
ingly important role in nuclear power plant projects. The majority of
the anticipated standardization improvements apply directly to the work
done by the A/E or by the regulatory agencies which review the A/E's
design. This broad area of standardization will, therefore, be discussed
in the latter half of the chapter.
The Design Process
The design process of a nuclear power plant is one that represents
up to 2.2 million design manhours (Budwani, 1975) and results in the
generation of a large number of major drawings, major specifications,
and many thousands of detail drawings, computer printouts and support
documents. Generation and control of these documents is an extremely
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difficult task that is primarily the responsibility of the architect-
engineer. In addition to the design of the plant it is common for an
architect-engineer to provide the owner with a great many more services.
These services often include load growth analysis, siting for future
generation stations, development of environmental statements, licensing
applications, and inspection of construction on site. The following
discussion will examine these services in some detail.
Long Range Planning
There are a variety of reasons and methods which a utility might
use in the selection of an architect-engineer for the design of a new
generation station. Conversations that the writer has had with employees
of an A/E design firm indicated that in most cases the utility selects
an A/E firm long before a plant is ready for design. This selection is
usually based upon: (1) long association, (2) availability of accept-
able people for a design team, (3) economic considerations, (4) capabil-
ities of the firm, and (5) past history.
Once selection of the A/E has occurred, the A/E begins to coordi-
nate his activities with the Utility Systems Planning Group of the utility,
This group is usually charged with the responsibility of forecasting
needs for a period of about 20 or 30 years ahead in relation to pre-
dicted load growth and the existing and planned physical plants which
will support that growth. Consideration is given by this group to
writing off older, less economical plants as well as construction of new
plants. This group may indicate, for example, that the utility will
require 1,000 MWe of additional generation capacity by 1987.
The next step would probably involve the A/E who would assist the
utility in determining the location of the site for the additional
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1,000 MWe capacity plant. Typically, as many as three potential
sites may be considered with special attention given to the point of
load or location of transmission lines. Several of the other major
site considerations that will usually be evaluated are: (1) proximity
of population centers, (2) seismic considerations, (3) environmental
factors, (4) accessibility for construction, (5) security, and
(6) regulatory considerations. Also, a significant factor is the
impact of corporate philosophies on siting. For example, one utility
may want its plants as close to the home office as possible, while
another may want them spread out throughout the service area.
Plant Selection
Following the selection of a site, the A/E and utility will work
together to develop an economic analysis that will determine if the
proposed plant should be either the nuclear, fossil fuel or hydro-
electric type. Assuming that a nuclear plant is selected, perhaps the
first major step in the design process involves the selection of a
supplier for the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) . In the United
States this choice is currently the four existing suppliers of light
water reactors. General Electric produces the only Boiling Water
Reactor (BWR) System in the United States. Pressurized Water Reactor
(PWR) Systems may, however, be purchased from Westinghouse, Babcock and
Wilcox, or Combustion Engineering. A fifth supplier, Gulf General
Atomic, who has been experiencing some problems with their reactor
contracts recently, also supplied PWR systems in the past. The analysis
of which nuclear system to choose usually rests on the system price
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quotation, the stated economy of fuel use, and the technical capabilities
that the suppliers are prepared to commit to this particular project.
Preliminary layouts of each plant system are normally developed
by the A/E firm at this stage with a typical "balance of plant," which
includes all the additional systems for the power plant, for each
proposed generation station included. These layouts become the basis
for the conceptual estimates that will be used for control purposes for
the actual system which is selected. As soon as possible after the
utility has selected the system to be employed, a letter of intent to
purchase is issued to the supplier.
The second major component that must be identified before the design
process can proceed is the choice of turbine. Possible turbine suppliers
include Westinghouse, General Electric, and Allis Chalmers. Proposals,
analysis and selection of the turbine system to be employed follows a
pattern very similar to that for the NSSS system, except that design
criteria for the NSSS is used in selecting the turbine. At this point
in the process the A/E firm begins the actual design of the nuclear
power plant.
Licensing
One of the most immediate concerns of the utility and the A/E at
the outset of a nuclear project is, of course, the problem of licensing.
The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) and the Environmental
Report, which were discussed in Chapter 2, must be begun immediately.
Although the utility submits the PSAR and the Environmental Report to
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and is totally responsible for its
content, the A/E is typically responsible for its development. The
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utility usually relies on the experience and technical expertise of the
A/E to develop such an extensive document, while at the same time
maintaining enough control to insure that the PSAR reflects the desires
of the utility. This task is difficult but critical if the utility is
to minimize alterations to either the PSAR or utility planning at a
later date. As was mentioned in Chapter 2, many utilities in the past
have been forced to go to great measures to meet a requirement that was
stated in the utility's own PSAR even though it was not necessarily
required for safety or by the NRC.
When it is completed, the PSAR represents a thorough specification
which provides information related to reactor manufacturing requirements,
system description, internal control systems, quality assurance and the
financial capability of the utility to build the proposed nuclear power
plant.
Design
Detailed design of the plant usually begins about six months after
the start of the development of the PSAR. During the 16- to 18-month
period that the NRC is reviewing the PSAR and the Environmental Report,
detailed design of the plant proceeds at full speed. The total design
process for a nuclear power plant represents from one to four million
design manhours depending upon the number of reactor units involved,
licensing requirements, plant arrangements, assignment of personnel and
the accounting system, used to calculate the number of manhours employed.
Table 8 gives data from several actual nuclear power plants indicating
the type of plant, number of units, total engineering or design manhours
and a breakdown of manhours per kWe. The latter figures of manhours
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Table 8. Engineering Manhours for One-and Two-Unit Nuclear
Plants of 800 to 1150 MWe Per Unit (from Power




PWRx 1 1,602,000 1.42
PWRx 1 1,806,000 1.68
PWR x 2 4,300,000 1.89
PWRx 2 4,000,000 1.70
PWR x 2 2,334,000 1.06
PWR x 2 2,693,000 1.23
PWR x 2 2,902,000 1.75
PWR x 2 2,581,000 1.61
BWR x 1 900,000 1.75
BWR x 1 2,191,000 1.90
BWR x 2 2,500,000 1.20
BWR x 2 3,550,000 1.70
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per kWe average 1.6 manhours/kWe indicating an average requirement
of 1,600,000 engineering manhours for a single 1,000 MWe unit.
The actual design process for a nuclear plant is not very different
from that which is used for a fossil plant. The individual designers
still design the specific components according to the particular codes
and specifications which govern these components. The major differences
in the design process involve the sheer magnitude of work which is
required and the importance of the role which quality assurance plays
in the design. For instance, the NRC requires a design control mechanism
within the A/E organization to insure that each designer used the correct
code or specification. This control is established by the "Design Control
Procedures" developed by the design firm for the project which are used
by the A/E quality control personnel to verify that the work has been
performed correctly. Documentation of quality control activities of
this type causes a significant increase in the work load of the A/E.
A second control mechanism for the design process is the profes-
sional license requirement for the individual designers. The designers
must strive to maintain professional excellence in order to live up to
the goals of their chosen profession.
In addition to the generation of design drawings, the detailed
design requires the development of detailed specifications for materials,
manufacturing and fabrication. This task is probably the most challenging
for the A/E, and one that will be discussed later in this chapter under
the heading of A/E Shortcomings. Typically, the A/E must also develop
a list of qualified bidders along with the drawings and specifications.
In some cases, the utility will request, analyze and award bids, but
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usually the A/E will prepare all of the information along with a recom-
mendation for the bid award and then submit it to the utility for
action.
Design-Construction Interface
The interface between the A/E and the constructor in the field is
a critically important factor in the overall success of the project.
The smooth and timely flow of information from the A/E to the constructor
and vice versa is not a simple task. As problems develop, and delays
occur, it is not uncommon for one party to blame the other rather than
working as a team to solve the problem. This may be particularly true
when the constructor or A/E on the job also has the capability to per-
form the other party's function, but was not awarded that contract.
Obviously, methods must be established to facilitate the normal
flow of information. Drawings must be delivered to the constructor, and
the constructor's future requirements must be relayed to the A/E. In
addition, there must be mechanisms for A/E design changes, constructor
requests for design changes, approval of constructor drawings and
general resolution of problems that occur in the field.
Because of the magnitude of the project, the large sums of money
being allocated, and the criticality of time, it is of extreme importance
that the owner become actively involved in the project at the interface.
Owner involvement in the management and control of the project in the
writer's opinion is extremely healthy and can also be very helpful to
the entire process. In fact, it is an involvement which is necessary
in order to meet certain NRC requirements. In many cases, the NRC
deals only with the owner concerning problems of a detailed nature.
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This requires the owner to be actively involved in all phases of the
project. A total lack of owner involvement would probably result in
chaotic conditions, while the proper degree of involvement allows timely
decisions to problems as they occur, while maintaining the proper team
attitude.
It is vital, however, when establishing owner involvement, to
clearly define the limits of responsibility and authority for all
parties involved. The utility, of course, holds the ultimate authority
for the project, but the utility must clearly indicate at the beginning
which party will make which decision. During the progress of the project,
all parties must respect each other's authority. It would not be
healthy, for example, to allow the utility to make decisions governing
construction methods. Clarity and consistency are the key words when
dealing with owner involvement in the project.
Cost Control In The Design Product
As will be discussed in the next chapter, entitled "Project
Control," the typical A/E and utility relationship is based upon a cost-
plus-a-fixed-fee type of contract. This is due primarily to the length
of the project, the magnitude of work involved and the uncertainty of
the regulatory requirements for the project at the beginning. This
situation gives rise to concern over the fact that the A/E has no money
invested in the project, and as a result may have a low motivation to
minimize costs for the utility during the design process.
Aside from monetary considerations, however, it must be recognized
that the A/E firm is motivated by several factors. Initially, the A/E
firm is in competition with several others for future contracts, and as
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a result has a requirement to provide a quality product at minimal cost.
In addition, the A/E firm will typically desire to maintain a good
reputation for professional reasons.
It is the writer's opinion, however, that utilities do have some
cause for concern. Although A/E motivation is probably often sound, the
present system does not provide the utility with a financial lever to
guarantee that it receives the most economical design and finished plant,
It appears that there is a need to consider the development of a new
set of conditions to define the utility-A/E relationship which will
remedy the present situation.
Need For A/E Improvement
Conversations that the writer has had with various people in the
power industry have revealed that there are several general areas with
regard to the functioning of a typical A/E on a nuclear power plant
project which must be improved. Three of these areas that were noted
are: (1) the inability of A/E firms to write good specifications,
(2) the failure of the A/E firm to provide complete drawings when they
are needed in the field, and (3) the failure of the A/E firm to effec-
tively minimize interferences in the design. Although there is probably
some validity to the above three criticisms, it is necessary to examine
each criticism in more detail to see if all the fault lies with the A/E
firms or if there are other parties who share the blame.
In the area of specifications, there appears to be some truth in
the argument that many specifications have often not been well written.
Examples of these poorly written specifications are often identified
on a nuclear plant by a quality control inspector who must insist that
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the work be performed in accordance with the specification, even
though he as well as others recognize that the field has proposed an
equally good or better method for performing the work. Two examples
of the problems common to nuclear plant specifications were mentioned
in the previous chapter of this thesis. These examples dealt with
concrete placement methods and the location of reinforcing bars in a
form.
It is understandable, however, that with the tremendous magnitude
and complexity of the design load for a nuclear power plant, there will
be mistakes and shortcomings in some of the specifications. In addition,
the art of writing a specification for field use as well as use by a
quality control team is still relatively new to the power industry.
The designers of nuclear power plants are still in a growing and learning
phase, and the future holds great hope for improvement.
The problem of not having drawings complete when they are
required in the field is a critical one, but one which is not entirely
the fault of the A/E firm. The real problem appears to center on the
fact that the actual construction of the plant usually begins when only
a very small percentage, often 15 percent, of the design work is complete.
Fifty percent complete would be a more optimum figure. In a sense, the
A/E is behind the constructor almost before he gets started. There is
also a need for the constructor to properly notify the design team of
the order and time requirements for the drawings for the field. One
solution to this problem used by many design firms, as will be discussed
in Chapter 6, is the expanded assignment of construction personnel to
the design team. A tremendous improvement in the design-construction
interface is anticipated as the results of this trend are realized.
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The final criticism of A/E's is their failure to minimize
interferences in the design. Initially, it would be very difficult to
establish what a minimum number of interferences would be for a project
as complex as a nuclear plant. And yet, there are some obvious improve-
ments that can be made. One instance which was related to the writer
involved a case where the A/E assigned a field team to detail small
bore piping. The purpose of being at the site was to provide the
designer's personnel with the opportunity to walk down the pipeline as
they worked to insure that major interferences would not appear on the
drawings. What actually occurred, however, was that the designers
worked in their office space, and the constructor's employees were the
first ones to identify problems by physically walking the pipeline with
the drawings. This type of situation reflects a possible lack of
field knowledge on the part of a number of members of the design team
that will be discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis.
A great many of the problems experienced by an A/E are related to
the fact that every nuclear power plant is a unique design; there are
no standard plants or systems approved by the NRC. The following dis-
cussion will consider this point by analyzing the state of standardiza-
tion that exists in the nuclear power plant industry today.
Standardization
It is important at this point to define exactly what is meant by
the term "standardization" when it is applied to a nuclear power plant.
Initially, according to Mr. John E. Ward 0,973) of Sargent and Lundy,
there are three major areas of concern: CD utilization of accepted
design standards in design and licensing review, (2) incorporation of
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components and system design determined to be acceptable into future
applications in order to stabilize the technology and the licensing
review, and (3) attempt to duplicate an acceptable system so that the
licensing review for the second system is only an acceptance of the
previous review. Recognizing that any industry code or standard will
change periodically, Mr. Ward noted that standardization must be under-
stood as a series of standards, each within a limited time frame of
several years. Within the nuclear power industry, the interest in
standardization has centered around: (1) standardization of the
licensing review through a reference system in design, (2) plant
duplication, (3) the issuance of a license to manufacture and (4) stan-
dardize through joint ventures.
Advantages of Standardization
From the viewpoint of the regulatory agency (Muntzing, 1973) the
expected benefits of standardization include enhanced safety, shortened
lead times and reduced costs. In the writer's opinion the idea of
enhancing safety is the most important one from any point of view.
Mr. Muntzing pointed out the fact that standardization can help enhance
safety as a result of the additional efforts of regulatory bodies in
safety reviews of a design that are repeated many times. Further,
Muntzing noted that the experience that the construction and operating
personnel gain by continually working with identical systems will
probably enhance safety.
Mr. Muntzing' s idea that standardization could reduce lead times in
a nuclear plant schedule is based upon shortening the times for preparing
applications, the licensing review and for the manufacturing of
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components. Cost reductions due to standardization would be evidenced
in a reduced design effort, savings in interest on funds borrowed for
reduced periods of time, savings in component costs due to multiple
orders, and possibly in the exchange of spare parts between utilities.
Additional benefits to the industry (Ward, 1973) would include a
"disengaging of the rachet," as discussed in Chapter 2, and the more
efficient use of available trained and skilled nuclear manpower. In
the area of systems standardization, the following benefits would
accrue to the various segments of the nuclear industry (Bieldanes, 1974,
p. 239):
1. Owner . The owner can plan to have a safe, reliable system
that meets regulatory requirements. Because backfitting and
other modifications are minimized, the costs not only should
be less but should be predictable.
2. Architect-Engineer . The designer will show the minimum
requirements so he can proceed in a timely manner with procure-
ments and detailed design.
3. Vendors . The suppliers will be confident their product is
acceptable if they comply with all requirements of the standard.
4. Regulators . After the AEC has accepted a standard system
design, subsequent systems designed in accordance with this
standard design need not be reviewed. AEC need only to
determine that the owner has complied with the standard.
One specific result of a program of increased standardization dis-
cussed with the writer by designers at Gilbert Associates, Inc. was
that through the use of standardization techniques they were able to
achieve true spatial separations for safety systems. The requirements




The potential disadvantages of standardization are serious, and
should serve as strong warning toward moderation. The potential
problems (Muntzing, 1973) lie primarily in the areas of innovation,
competition, and utility involvement in the project. Some industry
people fear that an attempt to rapidly standardize the nuclear industry
would stifle innovation and improvement in design. As Mr. John E. Ward
(1973, p. 293) stated:
The nuclear industry, which successfully demonstrated its potential
less than 20 years ago, is attempting to standardize its designs.
We might still be flying in the corrugated metal-sided Ford
Trimotor if the aircraft industry had standardized in the same time
frame.
It must be understood that standardization can perpetuate errors in
addition to reducing costs and time schedules.
In the area of competition, there is concern (Muntzing, 1973) that
rapid standardization will severely limit the ability of new companies
to enter the market, either as suppliers, designers, or constructors.
Although it might be easier for a supplier to achieve regulatory
approval to a standardized component, there is strong evidence that the
cost of developing an acceptable quality program would preclude parti-
cipation from new companies. In fact, even without standardization, it
is difficult for new companies to enter the competition for nuclear work,
The final concern about standardization is that it will result in
a reduced need for utility involvement on a detailed basis with the
project. This possibility is serious (Muntzing, 1973) in that the net
result is exactly opposite of the regulatory position that a high level
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of technical competency on the part of the utility must be demonstrated
prior to the issuance of an operating license.
Historical Trends in Standardization
On April 28, 1972, the Atomic Energy Commission issued the "Com-
mission Policy Statement on Standardization of Nuclear Power Plants,"
which essentially encouraged, supported and gave priority to greater
standardization (Ward, 1973). A subsequent policy statement was issued
in March of 1973 (Haass, 1974). Although these statements set out some
excellent ideals about standardization of design, fabrication, construc-
tion, testing, and operation, they did very little to make clear how
standardization was to be implemented. In fact, according to Ward (1973),
the policy statements did nothing more than restate the ideals which
industry organizations had been conveying to the regulatory bodies for
years. And for years, the regulatory bodies had "dutifully filed and
largely ignored" (Ward, 1973, p. 284) the many recommendations and top-
ical reports submitted by reactor vendors and other industry groups.
According to Mr. Ward, however, the regulatory efforts of 1972 and
1973 did appear to be sincere, and after some confusion the industry
and the regulatory agency began to work together. The American Nuclear
Society and the Atomic Industrial Forum were the vehicles of much of
the joint research.
Standardization Options
Currently, there are several possible means of establishing stan-
dardization in nuclear power plants. These possibilities, including a
reference system, duplication and a license to manufacture, will be
discussed below in somewhat more detail.
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The Reference System concept of standardization allows the design
of an entire plant, or of major systems in a plant, to be reviewed with
the intent of being standardized for use in subsequent plant applications
The second application would merely reference the first. The reference
system concept is expected to primarily benefit manufacturers of the
NSS system CMuntzing, 1973).
The Duplicate Plant concept provides for a single review of a plant
design when one or more utilities intend to construct several identical
plants. The plants may be at the same or different locations. This
concept has been employed in a project commonly referred to as SNUPPS.
The License to Manufacture concept provides for a licensing review
of several facilities that are to be built at a location different from
the site where the plants will operate. A follow-up licensing review
would be limited to site-related questions. This concept applies
primarily to proposals for off-shore, barge-mounted power plants
(Muntzing, 1973).
SNUPPS
The Standardized Nuclear Unit Power Plant System (SNUPPS) project
is one that employs the concepts of a joint venture and duplicate plant
design. As the project developed, five utilities joined in 1972 in a
venture to build six identical nuclear power plants. The utility par-
ticipants are as follows (Petrick, 1974)
:
Kansas City Power and Light Company -i . . . . .-
„ , „ „ J—one unit jointlyKansas Gas and Electric Company
Northern States Power Company—two units on the same site
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation—one unit
Union Electric Company—two units on the same site
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The basis of the SNUPPS concept is to design a standard power
block that would be reviewed by the NRC in a single process for
licensing. The standard power block includes the turbine building,
reactor building, auxiliary building, fuel building, radwaste building,
control building, and the emergency diesel generator building (Petrick,
1974).
The Bechtel Power Corporation was selected by the utilities as the
standard plant lead architect-engineer. Westinghouse was awarded the
contract for the nuclear steam supply systems, and General Electric was
awarded the turbine-generator contract.
The original SNUPPS agreement among the utilities called for each
utility to be capable of meeting financial and technical expertise
requirements for licensing. In addition, all costs under the agreement
were to be split equally among nuclear units. Decisions for the group,
and supervision of work was to be accomplished by a management committee,
with each nuclear unit represented by one vote on the committee.
The Bechtel Power Corporation has assigned a large project team to
the SNUPPS project, including a large number of construction engineers.
The high degree of success of these construction engineers in improving
the design of SNUPPS will be discussed in Chapter 6 of this report,
entitled "Precons true t ion Activities."
One significant question considered in the development of the
SNUPPS concept was the applicability of antitrust laws to the proposed
project. The details of this question are complex and legalistic, and
beyond the scope of this report. An excellent article on the "Anti-
trust Aspects of Nuclear Plant Procedures," particularly SNUPPS was
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written by Mr. Charles Bane for the September 27, 1973 issue of The
Public Utilities Fortnightly .
Summary
The design process of a nuclear power plant is one that is extremely
complex when it is first examined. In fact, the design is so complex
that the most experienced architect-engineers are still anxiously
trying to devise new means for controlling the process. Document
scheduling and control is a monumental task in itself , with the minimi-
zation of interferences probably still far off on the horizon. Stan-
dardization holds some hope for improvement, but a method to satis-
factorily solve the problems of new safety and environmental require-
ments, changing codes and standards and the reinterpretation of these
requirements, codes and standards has yet to be developed (Vann, 1973).
As the magnitude and complexity of the design phase present trem-
endous design control problems, so the magnitude and complexity of the
construction phase present tremendous control challenges. The major
problems and methods employed in the construction control process of a





A nuclear power plant project contains a myriad of items and
activities that impact directly upon the scope, duration and total cost
of the project. Although some of these items are strictly controlled
by external organizations, such as legislatures and regulatory agencies,
many more of these items are controllable by one or more of the parties
directly involved in the project—the owner, designer, constructor,
suppliers and vendors. The items that are controllable by the involved
parties can be grouped together as items of quality, cost or schedule.
Quality Control will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5. This chapter
will present a discussion of cost and schedule controls, as well as a
discussion of several of the various organizational approaches to
control of a project that are in use today.
This discussion of project control is presented from the utility
or owner's point of view. There are many other control factors, such
as those a large constructor or supplier would employ to control their
various work forces throughout the country, but these are beyond the
scope of this thesis. Many of the control functions discussed here may
be implemented by constructors, suppliers, or other parties, but the
general requirements and objectives must be defined by the owner.
The Project Control System
The process of planning, designing and constructing a major power
plant project is one that requires a sophisticated formalized control
system. Whether the system is computerized or not, it must include

70
standards, progress reporting, analysis of reported data and insure
that proper action is initiated and carried out (PP&L, 1975).
Control System Function
The basic functioning of a control system (PP&L, 1975) is based
upon the philosophy that standards of performance, such as a schedule,
budget, scope or target productivity, must be established. Work in
progress must then be monitored and compared to the developed standards,
and deviations must be identified. A thorough analysis of the deviations
regarding cause and impact on the project should then allow the proper
corrective and preventative action to be initiated.
As seen by General Public Utilities (1975) , the use of the above
philosophy in system development would produce a system whose specific
function would be to provide corporate and project management with a
mechanism to monitor cost and schedule parameters on a timely basis to
permit effective planning and control. In addition, the resultant
system should allow standardized reporting that will minimize communi-
cation problems, and should act as a tool for estimating and planning
the impact of delays on cash flow and total project cost.
In a similar fashion, Gilbert Commonwealth Associates (1975) has
listed the objectives of a project control system to promote timely
decisions, establish target dates, regulate responsibility assignments,
facilitate project communications, outline problem areas, resolve
project scope and motivate detailed planning. The first letters from
each of these objectives collectively spell the word "perform."
A key word in the functioning of any control system is the word
"timely." As will be illustrated in a later discussion of cost control,
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information must be gathered efficiently in order to identify trends
early enough that corrective action may be taken. Otherwise, the
control system will function only as a monitoring system, with little
justification for its existence.
Control System Design
The specific structure of any control system will depend upon
many factors. Some of the more critical factors are the corporate
philosophy, objectives, and in-house capability of the parent utility
involved. Corporate management will determine the degree of owner
participation desired in the project planning and control, and this will,
to a large extent, define the scope of the control system. The scope and
design of the control system will be developed in parallel to decisions
regarding organizational philosophy. To illustrate, a control system
for a project employing a construction management approach would include
a work package division of reporting. A project in which one engineer-
constructor was hired to design and construct the entire project would
include a vastly different reporting system. A detailed discussion of
the typical organizational structures and their impact upon the control
system will be included later in this chapter.
Control System Parameters
The management control system for a nuclear power plant is
characterized by a large number of reports, both hand written and com-
puter generated, which are used to evaluate progress and identify trends.
In order to illustrate the types of reports that are typically required,
the following list of management controls was provided for this report
by the Pennsylvania Power and Light Company. (This system of controls
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is the one in use by PP&L (PL) at their Susquehanna nuclear station.
Bechtel Power Corporation is acting as architect-engineer and constructor)
Cost Trend Report . The purpose of the Cost Trend Report is to
provide an early warning of changes that affect the cost of the
project through the continuous monitoring of design development.
This is then used to control scope.
Scope Change Report . The Scope Change Report gives both
engineers and management a running total of the number of scope
changes in each discipline each month and the dollar effect of
these changes. Each discipline's performance is measured with
respect to the goal of net zero dollars.
Scope Change Requests . Scope Change Requests are divided into
two categories. PL internally generated Requests and Bechtel
generated Project Scope Change Requests. PL Requests are required
for those design decisions initiated by PL in accordance with
Administrative Work Instruction A-l. Formal Project Scope
Change Requests are initiated by Bechtel as required by the
Project Procedures Manual and are processed within PL in accor-
dance with Administrative Work Instruction A-5.
Work Authorizations for Consultants . A formalized procedure
exists for handling the authorization of consultants working on
the project. This procedure, which is given in Administrative
Work Instruction A-2 applies to all consultants, regardless of
costs, except Bechtel Corporation and General Electric Company,
which are under separate contract.
Invoice Analysis . An analysis is made of all invoices for con-
sultants, with the exception of the Bechtel Field Costs which
are handled by PL's Construction Department. This analysis, which
includes deviations from prescribed work, amount of time worked,
budget comparisons and arithmetic checks, affords the means of
determining whether the amount paid is correct for the services
performed.
Manhour Budget Analysis for Bechtel and PL . Manhour budget analysis
are performed for both Bechtel and PL expenditures. For Bechtel,
the information presented on the Bill Review Form gives devia-
tions from the budgeted manhour s. In addition, special analyses
are frequently made on overtime manhours, subcontract and outside
services, travel expenses and the general manpower leveling on
the project. For PL manhour expenditures, budget comparisons are
made as well as studies of other expenses incurred.
Construction and Retirement Ledger . The Construction and Retire-
ment Ledger, which is issued by Financial Department, gives a
record of actual expenditures accumulated against approximately
115 codes being used for Susquehanna. These expenditures are
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then compared against budgeted amounts and deviations are brought
to the attention of the responsible engineer and management.
Quarterly Cost Report . The primary purpose of the Quarterly Cost
Report is to provide an analysis of selected cost data and to
recommend corrective action where appropriate. Tabular informa-
tion is presented summarizing the current cost status of the
project. Analysis and corrective action is given for all problem
areas and followup action is listed.
Procurement Budget Analysis . Budget comparisons are made for
purchase orders and subcontracts. Significant deviations require
explanation by Bechtel. PL Susquehanna Cost Engineering is noti-
fied of this with the attached form. Delivery dates are also
checked for conformance with the schedule. Estimates by bid
packages are also available based on dollars given in the Second
Preliminary Estimate.
PL Weekly Critical Items List . Provides status of the five most
important current items regarding Susquehanna Project.
PL Monthly Susquehanna Project Progress Report . Provides
management-oriented narrative of progress under headings such as
Engineering & Procurement, Cost, Schedule. Attachments include
critical milestones and decisions list for three months, estimated
project cost curve and total expenditures curve.
Milestone Summary Engineering-Procurement-Construction (EPC)
Schedule . Basis of Bechtel overall cost and schedule program.
Provides overall time frame for execution of the project.
Bechtel Monthly Project Progress Report . Similar to PL monthly
progress report but in greater detail and limited to Bechtel
scope, e.g., cost data reflects Bechtel not owner's costs. Some
data from this report is incorporated directly into PL monthly
report.
Bechtel has proposed to merge this report with the Project Status
Report discussed below.
Bechtel Monthly Project Status Report . This report was initiated
by Bechtel in response to J. T. Kauffman's letter to R. D. Allen
in August, 1973. It provides short and long term summary curves
of scheduled versus actual data contained in the Bechtel Drawing
Control and Procurement Status Report. It also provides analysis
of progress and reforecasts for work not accomplished on schedule.
Critical Action Items Report . This report is a tool used to:
• help expedite job activities which are running late and
• help set priorities.
It lists job activities which have less than 5.0 weeks of float.
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Procurement Status Report . The Procurement Status Report is a
monthly report listing all major purchase orders or subcontracts.
It lists 12 milestones in the procurement process, beginning with
"Issue Specification," and ending with "Delivery." The approved
schedule date, forecast date, and date the milestone was reached
are indicated to aid in monitoring progress. The type of order,
and the division of responsibility are also indicated.
Thirteen-Week Look-Ahead Schedules . These quarterly schedules of
engineering work to be submitted by Bechtel for PL review are
issued on a monthly basis. These schedules are provided for
drawings, specifications and bid evaluations.
Drawing Control Register . The Drawing Control is a monthly report
listing for all project drawings:
• scheduled and actual start dates,
• scheduled and actual complete dates,
• the revision that PL reviewed and the review letter and
• the revision number issue date for each revision.
The schedule dates appearing in the register were developed from
the project CPM.
Engineering Progress and Performance Report . This is a weighted
percent manpower planning and control report which utilized budget
manhours, expended manhours, and a physical engineering percent
complete to forecast manhours for each discipline and area of
responsibility within the discipline. Time varying plots for the
project are shown for:
• scheduled versus actual percent complete,
• performance index and
• manpower forecast versus actual.
P&ID Freeze Schedule . The "P&ID Freeze Schedule" is to assure
timely procurement and delivery of process piping and equipment
by freezing basic design so that related detailed engineering and
drafting can proceed in an orderly manner. The exhibit attached
is only a typewritten summary of the actual schedule.
Follow-Up Notes . The follow-up notes lists all unanswered
engineering correspondence for the Susquehanna Project. It is
issued monthly.
Engineering and Construction CPM Networks and Related Printouts .
The engineering and construction networks each consist of
approximately two thousand activities. The two networks can be
run separately or together using "tie" activities. The networks
are scheduled to be updated on a quarterly basis.
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Three-Month Construction Look-Ahead Schedules . These are field
prepared construction schedules. They are used to convert the
CPM schedules into detailed working tools for craft and area
superintendents
.
Bi-Weekly (or Daily) Construction Schedule . This is the most
detailed construction schedule. It indicates work during the
current week and the work schedule for the next two weeks. It
is issued weekly.
Duration Index . The duration index is a tool developed by PL to
help determine discipline performance with regard to procurement
cycle activities. It is based on data contained in the Procure-
ment Status Report. An index is computed for each discipline for
both Bechtel and PL activities. These indices are averaged to
produce an overall indicator for the project.
PL Goals Program . Project team and group goals provide the basis
for management of personnel.
General Electric Requisition Status (REST) Report . This is the
basic GE schedule document. It provides engineering and delivery
requirements for each GE furnished item of hardware or software.
It is usually issued on a monthly basis. Several other GE reports
(Purchase Order Status Report, Terminal Task Report) are abstracts
or sorts of the REST report.
General Electric ACR Impert Schedule . This is a CPM network of
about 225 activities prepared and updated by GE. It is the
primary tool for ACR scheduling and analysis.
Advanced Control Room (ACR) Action List . Detailed action list of
all interface activities among GE-PL-Bechtel regarding the ACR.
It lists action item, responsible group, due date and forecast
date. Usually oriented towards providing or responding to specific
letters or drawings.
Engineering Production Indices . PL has prepared and maintained
total engineering and discipline curves that indicate engineering
production. These curves show scheduled versus actual for:
• drawings started,
• drawings completed,
• specifications issued for client review and
• purchase orders issued.
Start-Up Milestone Schedule . This is a standard 63-week barchart
for BWR's which is tailored to each project and becomes the
basic planning tool for Start-Up.
In addition to the above, systems for construction schedule moni-
toring, engineering productivity and material quantity tracking
are under development for future use.
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The aforementioned description of the parameters of an actual
project control system clearly indicates the complexity and detail
involved in the control of a nuclear power plant project. The hours of
work involved in gathering data and developing the required reports are
staggering. More staggering, however, is the task of reading, under-
standing, analyzing, and developing corrective action for the situations
indicated in the project. The responsibilities of the project manager
are tremendous, and a large staff of reliable individuals is obviously
required. The support of this staff in the areas of cost and schedule
control will be discussed in detail.
Project Cost Control
In order to insure effective cost control measures, it must be
recognized that cost control begins at conceptual design and continues
throughout the life of the project. The most significant impact of the
cost control system can be felt in the very early stages of project
design. Figure 6 developed by the Ontario Hydro Corporation illustrates
the relationship between cost prevention, cost control, and accumulated
costs and commitments relative to project life. As indicated on Figure 6,
the ability to influence costs through prevention is maintained in the
concept phase. During the design phase, the ability to control costs
on the project is reduced very rapidly. At the point that the construc-
tion phase of the project begins, the total cost of the project is
determined, with relatively little potential left for cost control
influences. It is in the early phases of the project life that costs
can be controlled, and this is where the largest cost control emphasis


























Historical Capital Cost Trends
In the early 1960's, the average capital cost per kilowatt for a
new fossil plant coming on line was dropping slightly (Olds, 1974). In
the mid-1960's, however, as nuclear construction came into existence,
the trend for stable capital cost investments was destroyed. In fact,
most plants planned in the mid- to late-60's which went into service
in the early 1970' s were double and occasionally triple the cost of
the original estimate (Palmeter, 1975). A similar doubling of estimated
costs was witnessed for fossil plants, also, as indicated by Tables 9
and 10. It may also be noted from Tables 9 and 10 that the capital
costs of nuclear plants are significantly higher than fossil plants.
Capital investments in power plants are typically compared in
dollar per kilowatt figures. Table 11 is provided to indicate the
components and their relative magnitudes in developing such a figure.
The Nuclear Steam Supply System, the Turbine-Generator, and their
related equipment represent approximately 52 percent of the total cost
estimate.
In Tables 12 and 13, information is presented regarding the cost
and schedule estimates of the same nuclear power plants. Table 12 is
based upon estimates made at the time the contracts were let, while
Table 13 is based upon updated estimates made in 1974. It is important
to note that the average cost in dollars/kWe and the average schedule
duration increased significantly in almost every year. The data
presented in Tables 12 and 13 is plotted in Figures 7 and 8 in order
to illustrate graphically the sharply upward trend of nuclear plant
costs. The solid lines represent the average costs of the plants for
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Table 9. Capital Cost Ranges for 800 MWe Fossil Generating Plants
(from Power Engineering , June, 1972)
1965-67 1970-71 1975 1980
TOTAL CAPITAL COST
Dollars-Millions 70-100 145-190 175-240 260-320
Dollars-per
Kilowatt 85-125 180-240 220-300 325-400
CONSTRUCTION LABOR COST
Percent of
Construction Cost 25 30-35 30-45 35-55
Dollars-Millions 15-20 35-50 40-80 70-125
Dollars-per
Kilowatt 15-25 40-65 50-100 85-160
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Table 10. Capital Cost Ranges for 800 MWe Nuclear Generating
Plants (from Power Engineering , June, 1972)
1965-67 1970-71 1975 1980
TOTAL CAPITAL COST
Dollars-Millions 100-110 200-240 240-320 320-400
Dollars-per
Kilowatt 125-140 250-300 300-400 400-500
CONSTRUCTION LABOR COST
Percent of
Construction Cost 20 30 30-40 35-50
Dollars-Millions 15-20 45-55 55-100 85-150
Dollars-per
Kilowatt 20-25 55-70 70-120 105-190
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Table 11. Typical 1971 Nuclear Plant Cost Estimates (from




Nuclear Steam Supply System
Turbine-Generator
Balance of Reactor Plant and Turbine
Electrical and Miscellaneous Plant Equipment
Engineering, Construction Equipment and Spares
Contingency
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that year. The number below each bar is the number of plants contracted
for that year, while the number above shows the span of estimated plant
commercial operation dates.
Many other tables and figures could be presented, but the message
would remain the same—capital costs for power plants have increased at
an alarming rate. The average increase in estimated costs from 1965
($119/kW) to 1974 ($558/kW) represents an increase of over 18 percent
compounded annually. More alarming, however, is the fact that in 1970
this figure began to go up at a rate of 26 percent compounded annually
(Olds, 1974). One estimate (Business Week , November 17, 1975) for a
nuclear plant going on line in 1985 is as high as $1,120 per kW capital
investment.
Underlying Causes
The underlying causes of this alarming trend of cost overruns are
varied but often interrelated. These causes include, but are not
necessarily limited to, the following (Roe, 1972): (1) inflationary
increases in the labor wages and fringe benefits for construction
workers, (2) increased complexity of the construction technology
required over that which was anticipated, (3) a reduction in produc-
tivity of construction labor, (4) schedule delays during construction,
(5) more stringent standards for safety and quality assurance, (6) new
environmental and ecological requirements, (7) equipment and material
delays and shortages, (8) increased equipment and material costs,
(9) licensing delays, (10) new regulatory bodies to be dealt with,
(11) labor shortages, (12) higher interest rates, (13) increased
material and quality requirements, and (14) in some cases a poorly
developed estimate to begin with.
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Due to labor shortages and the fragmented structure of the con-
struction industry, this industry has experienced a drastic rate of
inflation in construction costs. Since 1969, the rate of increase of
construction costs has been twice the rate of the other general cost
factors in this country (Roe, 1972) . Coupled with inflationary wage
increases and labor shortages, there has been a noted decline in labor
productivity in power plant construction (Budwani, 1975). These factors
will be discussed in detail in Chapter 13 of this thesis, entitled "Labor
in the Power Industry."
Schedule delays will be discussed later in this chapter. It is
important to note at this point, however, that one almost certain result
in any delay is increased cost; whether in the form of material and
equipment cost increases, cost claim reimbursements for impacts upon a
related contract, losses due to delays in commerical operation, or in
the form of interest accumulating during construction.
The effects of increased safety, environmental and quality control
aspects on nuclear power plant construction are discussed in detail in
Chapters 3 and 6 of this thesis. One net result of the many complex
requirements that have come into existence is a dramatic increase in the
capital cost of construction.
To illustrate the effect of increased interest rates combined with
many of these other problems, the writer was provided cost information
by a utility cost engineer at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant.
TMI Unit I was completed in 1974 at a total cost of $406 million. The
most current estimate for Unit II is for that unit to be completed in
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1977 at an estimated total cost of $630 million. Of the difference
between the two cost figures, $85 million represents the increased
cost of interest on borrowed funds.
The writer feels that there are several reasons why the initial
estimates for so many nuclear power plants were incorrect. One of
these was the lack of a logical means for predicting the dramatic
changes in regulatory requirements which would be imposed as the power
plants grew in size and complexity. Unfortunately, this situation still
exists today. Further, there was no precedent set predicting the infla-
tionary state which the American economy assumed in the late 1960's and
early 1970' s when many of these plants were being estimated, designed
and built. Finally, conversations that the writer has had with utility
personnel have revealed that it is the nature of the boards of directors
of utilities to require conservative estimates excluding contingencies
when plans for future power plant construction are being developed.
The most significant fact to keep sight of when considering the
history of cost estimating for nuclear power plants is that the estimates
were made with impossible lead time constraints controlling them. During
the era in which many of the plants were built, it was probably only by
chance if a utility was able to predict with any accuracy. A similar
statement could probably be made regarding the final costs of plants
in an industry whose economic future is as complex as that of nuclear
power plant construction.
Future Cost Projections
Unfortunately, the problems identified above as the underlying
causes for past cost overruns have not been brought entirely under
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control. The current economic trend factors indicate an improved
economic climate in the next several years to come, but economic
improvement will not solve all the problems. In fact, economic improve-
ment within the utility industry may cause some labor and material
problems to become more critical. Although there is not sufficient
evidence to firmly support the following viewpoint at this time, it is
the opinion of the writer that a recommitment by the utility industry
to the several hundred nuclear plants already begun or planned in the
next several years will create a burden of manpower, material, and
expertise that the construction industry will be totally unable to bear.
The one result that is certain to occur is another series of inflationary
construction cost increases.
In support of this opinion, it is noted that skilled welders,
pipefitters, boilermakers, steamfitters and electricians are already
in critical supply throughout much of the country. Lead times for
materials and equipment are already several years in length in many
cases. To the writer's knowledge there is no organized effort underway
to reduce training time, increase craftsman resources or develop the
manufacturing resources necessary to meet a dramatically increased
demand for nuclear component production.
In addition to the above problems that may hinder contemporary
cost estimators, the nature of regulatory and environmental scope
changes has not been brought under control. The net result is a present
situation which is very similar to that of the mid-1960's. It is now
known that costs will continue to rise, but no one can predict the
magnitude of the change.
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Probably the best estimate available is that a 1,000 MW nuclear
power plant design by today's standards which is scheduled to go on
line in 1985 will cost $1,120 per kW in capital costs for construction.
That figure represents a sizeable increase over the $500 per kW
(Mctague, 1972) anticipated for a similar plant now under construction
to go on line in 1980.
Cost Control in Design
The most important concept to understand about cost control for a
nuclear power plant is that control must be first instituted during
the conceptual and design phases of the plant and then maintained
throughout the rest of the process. Figure 6 illustrated this point
very clearly. The major factor which affects sound cost control
measures is the limitation of the scope of the plant during the concep-
tual design phase, and the control of changes during the detailed design
phase through value engineering and configuration management.
In order to limit the scope of the plant during the conceptual
design phase several concrete decisions must be made. Initially, the
utility must decide whether they are going to build (1) a generation
station of comfort and convenience for the plant operators with generous
consideration for the outward appearance of the plant, or (2) a simple
kilowatt factory. This decision is essential in order to establish
priorities for autmoation, architectural appearance, and habitability in
regards to space availability and building sizes. Once the decision has
been made, the total material requirements and complexities of computer
technology can then be predicted.
Further, once decisions about the major components such as the
Nuclear Steam Supply System, the turbine, cooling towers and other
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environmental and safety considerations are made, a detailed develop-
ment of the balance of plant conceptual design can be undertaken. Some
major changes of scope may occur beyond the conceptual design phase, but
these can seldom be anticipated or controlled.
Value engineering in design is a carryover from scope considera-
tions determined in the conceptual design phase. In essence, it is
analogous to insuring that the plant fulfills its originally stated
mission. This is done by weighing initial cost of any proposed change
against its maintenance cost, and by combining these economic factors
with any company goals that might be affected. One such goal that was
revealed to the writer was to essentially "freeze the design" after
initial approval with the exception of items required for licensing or
concerning the safety of the plant. This goal was designed to eliminate
"nice to have" system additions that were not really necessary, and
often quite expensive.
Configuration management is employed in design to insure that
proper attention is given to the interrelationships of the various
disciplines. The intent is to reduce interferences and minimize conflicts
of interest. Obviously, this effort must begin at the very earliest
stages of design.
A further detailed description of the functioning of the project
design cost control system for a nuclear power plant is not within the
scope of this thesis. It should be noted, however, that the system is




Construction Cost Control Characteristics
It has been noted above that the largest portion of the cost
control effort for a nuclear power plant occurs during the conceptual
design and detailed design phases. The cost activities which occur
during the construction phase on the other hand can probably be more
correctly called a basic cost monitoring system. There are, however,
certain costs of construction of lesser magnitude that are of real
concern to a utility and must, therefore, be controlled. This concern
is often major when a constructor is constructing the plant on a "cost-
plus-a-fixed-fee" basis, which is the most common form in use today.
This type of contractual relationship will be discussed in detail later
in this chapter.
The overall effort of a utility in construction cost control is
to insure that fulfillment of the letter of the contract and related
documents is accomplished in the most economical fashion. Cost aware-
ness on the part of all site personnel is critical if this is to be
accomplished. The constructor must be forced to run a "tight ship" or
large amounts of utility money will be wasted as direct cost items. An
example related to the writer, for instance, concerned a constructor
who wanted to purchase new trucks for each of his 12 field superintendents,
100 walkie-talkies for "key" personnel and a decorator's assortment of
plush office chairs, all at the utility's expense. In addition, con-
structors have been known to purchase or rent extra cranes, flatbed
trucks, and other heavy equipment in order to minimize scheduling and
storage problems. Typically, the equipment is paid for by the utility.
In addition to these types of construction cost control items,
there are also items that can be controlled through increased awareness
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and methods alterations. In another example related to the writer, a
supervisor of temporary facilities was appointed by a constructor at
the utility's urging to exercise control over the use of heat, water,
light, electricity and consumables in the many temporary buildings at
one nuclear site after the utility became aware of soaring costs.
A significant reduction in the cost of these services resulted. The
use of conveyors for moving concrete and the use of machines to bend
pipe in order to reduce welding requirements are common examples of
methods improvement that are being used to reduce construction cost.
Considering all of the above factors, it should be noted that the
goal of any utility in establishing its cost control system for con-
struction should be to identify trends as early as possible in order to
allow corrective action to be taken before it is too late.
Construction Cost Control System Parameters
The construction cost control system is based upon the timely
gathering and evaluation of basic cost data, usually developed as a
cost per unit of work. These unit costs are developed from daily and
weekly work schedules, progress reports, and payroll records maintained
by the constructor. Tables 14, 15 and 16 illustrate sample unit cost
data provided by General Public Utilities Service Corporation from their
Three Mile Island nuclear station, Unit 2.
The unit cost information shown on the previous tables is then
entered into the overall management control system, described earlier
in this chapter, to assist in identifying trends, measuring progress,
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costs are typically recorded using the cost code system required for
utility reporting of expenditures to the Federal Power Commission (FPC)
.
As indicated by the unit cost information presented in Tables 14,
15 and 16, cost data is recorded in a very detailed fashion. In
addition to FPC reporting requirements, this data is used to provide
a data base for future estimates and evaluations of critical cost
activities. In order to coordinate utility interests in cost engineering,
a group of utilities have joined together in what is known as the
Utility Cost Group.
The Utility Cost Group
The Utility Cost Group was formed by a small group of utilities
about three years ago, and at latest count had grown to over 50
participating members. The prime purpose of this group, represented by
cost engineers from each utility, is to provide a forum for information
exchange on the capital cost of construction of power plants. Detailed
cost data for projects planned and under construction is exchanged on a
semi-annual basis. This information is then analyzed to determine how
certain utilities are cutting costs. The individual utilities may then
choose to adopt similar cost reduction procedures.
Certain problems have surfaced during the first few meetings of
this group which must be recognized by anyone attempting to analyze power
plant costs. The major problem is in attempting to clearly define the
activity for which a cost has been collected, so that comparisons will
not be made between two dissimilar activities. This is not easy to do
because of the differences (Budwani, 1975) due to: (1) accounting
methods, (2) the extent of planned overtime and shift work, C3) design
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philosophy, (A) quality and licensing requirements, C5) access and
working conditions, (6) material availability, (7) strikes, (8) extent
of supervision, (9) site conditions, (10) weather, (11) geographic
location, (12) material types, and (13) interpretation of Regulatory
Guides. Even within a single utility, it is difficult to compare
costs from one project to another because of variations in each project.
Construction Cost Control System Implementation
Typically, for a nuclear power plant construction project a
utility will assign a project team of anywhere from 10 to 30 people
who will be responsible to maintain the utility's interests and super-
vising the constructor on site, as well as to provide technical informa-
tion where required. Usually one member of this staff acts as a cost
and scheduling engineer. Usually the cost and scheduling engineer's
responsibilities would include a review of the constructor's schedule
and projections, development of budget and cash flow projections, and
development of time contingencies for future work. The cost and
scheduling engineer must concern himself with detailed productivity
information from a cost aspect, as well as broadly based production
information from a scheduling aspect.
In a utility-constructor relationship the utility cost and scheduling
engineer will often act as liaison between the constructor and the
utility project site manager in controlling expenditures. Utility
approval through the site manager is the typical means employed to
control the types of unnecessary spending mentioned earlier in this
chapter. To illustrate, one site visited by the writer has established
the requirement for advance utility approval of any "sole source"
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purchase over $500 and any competitive bid purchase over $5,000.
Some examples of necessary sole source items might include safety belts,
other safety related equipment, or special pumps. These needs are
defined by experience.
The constructor organization on site will typically employ a
person in a similar role of cost engineer. Understandably he will have
a large staff of recorders and other personnel to develop the tremendous
volumes of detailed data necessary for a nuclear power plant. Quite often
the constructor will require that the cost engineer maintain records of
more information than that required by the utility, and he may well be
required to classify costs under more than one cost code system.
Construction Accounting
The role of construction accounting within the constructor's
organization is to receive, audit, analyze, distribute and report all
costs. In addition, accounting personnel assist in the smooth flow of
information at the points of interfaces between the various field
disciplines regarding comparative cost and forecasts. Finally, con-
struction accounting is responsible for the proper disbursement of
funds (Gilbert/Commonwealth, Inc., 1975).
Typically, costs are monitored by purchase order, contract, and by
account number. Costs are reported by account, by construction category
as well as by special selective groupings, such as buildings. The
composite gathering of this reporting is the basis for the development





As noted earlier, the major objective of project management is
to insure that the power plant is built in accordance with specifica-
tions, within costs, and within the allotted time period. In the case
of nuclear power plants enough case histories exist to indicate that
in general the objective of completing construction within costs has
not been achieved. The discussion below will center on the role
scheduling has played in the cost overruns of previous years, and will
define certain measures necessary if schedule control is to be
established and maintained.
Historical Scheduling Trends
One of the major causes of the alarming cost overruns identified
earlier in this chapter has been as equally alarming magnitude of
schedule slippages on nuclear power plant projects. Table 17 indicates
the nuclear power plant additions that were planned by the various
utilities as of January 1969. The arrows, shaded areas and cross
hatches indicate schedule slippages and cancellations. An updated
version of this table was presented in the November 1973 issue of Power
Engineering , however, the magnitude of the further slippages were too
complex to reproduce for this report. Table 18 provides a summary of
the information presented in Table 17. It is significant to note in
Table 18 that the progressive slippages of schedules represent
changes over a period of only three years.
Figure 9 illustrates the tremendous change in predicted nuclear
capacity growth for the United States. The June 1973 prediction line
represents a considerable schedule change of two to three years by 1977
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Commercial No. of MWe Total No . of MWe Total No. of MWe Total
Date Plants Capacity Plants Capacity Plants Capacity
Pre-' 68 9 1,800 9 1,800 9 1,800
1968 2 1,240
1969 6 3,022 7 3,229 3 1,660
1970 9 6,105 8 6,136 6 2,766
1971 15 12,526 12 9,158 12 9,179
1972 14 10,954 14 11,997 19 15,968
1973 21 18,746 18 15,711 13 12,745
Sub Total 76 54,393 68 48,031 62 44,118
1974 15 12,851 15 12,696 13 10,938
1975 17 14,756 10 8,094 8 7,544




Figure 9. Nuclear Plant Growth Curves (from
Power Engineering , November, 1973)
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It is sufficient to note at this point that major schedule
slippages, often several years in duration, have occurred on almost
every nuclear power plant originally planned since the mid-1960' s.
Underlying Causes
The underlying causes of the dramatic schedule slippages witnessed
within the nuclear power industry are in many cases identical to those
that caused the cost overruns. These include: (1) increased technolo-
gical complexity, (2) reduced productivity of construction labor,
(3) labor shortages, (4) more stringent standards for safety and quality
assurance, (5) new environmental and ecological requirements, (6) equip-
ment and material delays and shortages, (7) licensing delays, (8) new
regulatory bodies to be dealt with, (9) increased material and quantity
requirements, (10) prolonged lead time extensions, and (11) in some
cases a failure to develop a realistic schedule at the outset.
Although the utilities have generally been forced to bear the
responsibility for these problems, they are in fact only partly
responsible. Additional responsibilities (Olds, 1973) should probably
be assumed by the American public and their legislatures that permitted
the regulatory requirements under which the utilities operated to
escalate in a seemingly uncontrolled manner. (This aspect was discussed
in Chapter 3 of this thesis). It was generally concluded by Olds (1973)
that the direct effect of this country's "ecological binge" was a
catastrophic alteration of nuclear power plant schedules.
The most recent, and possibly the most significant, cause of
schedule slippages has been the economic crisis that affected the
utilities along with the rest of the country in the early 1970 's. Due
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to the high interest rates that existed, many utilities were forced to
cancel or postpone indefinitely their nuclear projects, while others
continued to build, but on a dramatically reduced basis. Even to date,
scheduling for many of the nuclear power plants is defined primarily
on a cash flow availability basis!
It is the writer's opinion that the economic crisis did much to
alleviate other problems, however, including labor, equipment and
material shortages. These problems will doubtless become more critical
as more and more projects are returned to full activation.
Future Scheduling Projections
As in the case of cost overruns, the future for dramatically
reduced scheduling slippages does not look bright. The continued
increases in the operating costs of coal fired fossil plants would
indicate a continued shift to nuclear powered generation (Patterson,
1971). Although the prospects for licensing delay improvements appear
bright, as discussed in Chapter 3, there are no apparent solutions for
the critical shortages of labor, material and equipment. As lead times
for these items grow longer, the potential for significant slippages
continues to grow.
In order to adequately evaluate the possibilities for the future,
it is necessary to analyze the current scheduling parameters which
affect an 1100 Ml*? nuclear power plant.
Typical Project Schedule
The presentation and discussion of a detailed schedule for a major
nuclear generation station is beyond the scope of this thesis. It is
important, however, to analyze the major phases of such a schedule and
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to become aware of the fact that the total schedule may encompass a
10-year period. Figure 10, provided by Gilbert Associates, indicates
a broad 11-year schedule for an 1100 MWe nuclear power plant. Figure 11
indicates a typical five-year construction schedule for a similar
plant.
In 1971, Mr. R. W. Patterson of Sargent and Lundy made the
following recommendation for the scheduling periods illustrated in
Figures 10 and 11 for a nuclear plant:
1. Specify, bid, order NSSS 6 months
2. Prepare PSAR 6 months
3. Licensing 24 months
4. Post-permit construction
and testing 42 months
5. Fuel loading, power testing 6 months
6. New site environmental review 6 months
Total for new site 90 months
With the possible exception of the licensing period, which might be
reduced to 18 months, this estimate remains valid today.
Types of Schedules
As might be expected for a project of the magnitude of nuclear
power plant there are several types and levels of schedules that are
developed for the use of various parties involved in the project. The
Main Event Time Scaled Schedule is the initial schedule developed in
the conceptual design phase. This schedule is used as a basis for all
of the other schedules that are developed. The Official Project
Schedule is a detailed computerized schedule which incorporates all
essential engineering, procurement and testing activities. The develop-
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architect-engineer's input concerning design and engineering, the
constructor's input concerning construction activities and the utility's
input concerning overall scheduling goals.
The project schedule can be further broken down into various levels
depending on the level of complexity in the scheduling system being
used. The highest level of these being a main event schedule, which is
followed by milestone schedules, activity schedules and task level
activity schedules.
Scheduling Control Parameters
The basic scheduling parameters that are typically employed on a
nuclear power plant include logic networks, bar charts, production and
productivity reports, expediting reports, manpower reports and surveys,
and cash flow budgets (Palmeter, 1976).
The basic principle behind the scheduling of a nuclear power plant
on an activity basis is that of the Critical Path Method (CPM) . Since
a detailed description of this method is not within the scope of this
paper, it will be assumed that the reader is already familiar with CPM
scheduling. It is significant to note, however, that a CPM network for
a nuclear power plant will contain many hundreds of activities and nodes,
the number of which is far in excess of that found in conventional
construction.
The computerized CPM schedule can be generated at any level desired,
and it was common at the project sites visited by the writer to generate
weekly schedules that listed daily task activities by crew or individual.





One of the most critical items in establishing schedule control is
to get firm control of material and equipment procurement. There must
be a high degree of coordination between the utility, designer and
constructor regarding the development of contracts, purchase orders,
and the handling of material deliveries. A clear delineation of the
rights, duties, privileges and responsibilities of each of these parties
in these matters is critical. Gilbert/Commonwealth, Inc. (1975) has
developed the following list of recommendations regarding procurement
control:
1. Conduct contractor and supplier capability studies before
issuing invitations.
2. Issue invitations and concise, accurate contract documents
to qualified bidders.
3. Award contracts and purchase orders to responsive bidders
on a timely schedule; interfacing such contracts to meet
the best scheduling objective toward meeting the overall
completion date.
4. Monitor and report construction and supply contract activity
throughout the term of such contracts.
5. Develop contractual relationships so that the total project
implementation team will function effectively and efficiently
while affording the owner contractual protection.
Scheduling Control Implementation
As indicated earlier in this chapter, the cost and scheduling
responsibilities for both the utility and the constructor will usually
fall under one position within each respective organization. The
responsibilities of the persons assigned to these positions would
include the development of schedules and the gathering, analysis and
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distribution of production and productivity information. Assistance
is provided for the smooth interfacing of field disciplines, and
attempts are made to identify trends as early as possible.
Typically, scheduling personnel will be required to coordinate
sequencing with manpower availability and material constraints.
Schedule changes and slippages are the primary concerns of scheduling
and cost control engineers and their staffs.
Project Organizational Control
As indicated in the opening paragraph of this chapter, the items
within a nuclear power plant project that are controllable by one or
more of the parties directly involved in the project may be grouped
together as items of quality, cost, or schedule. The broad groups of
cost and schedule control items have already been discussed in this
chapter. Quality control will be discussed in the next chapter. In
relation to the topic of controllable items it should be recognized
that there are a number of different organizational approaches that are
currently being used by utilities and their agents to effect project
control. These varying organizational approaches are the subject of
the following discussion. This discussion will be divided into two
parts. The first part will deal with the various contractual relation-
ships that can exist between the utility and its agents. The second
part will deal with different ways that a project team rather than a
functional organization can be used within the organizational structure




There is a tremendous variation from project to project with
regard to the division of responsibility and authority between the
involved parties during the construction phase. Although there are
many minor variations, these divisions of responsibility and authority
may generally be grouped into four types of major project contracts:
(1) Engineering, Procurement and Construction, (2) Architect-Engineer
and Constructor, (3) Utility Force Account, and (4) Construction
Management.
The Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) type contract
is one of the two most common methods used by utilities today. In
this type of arrangement the utility contracts all of the design,
purchasing and construction of a nuclear plant to one organization.
The EPC organization will then subcontract the portions of work that it
does not desire to accomplish itself. This type of contract is let
exclusively on a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee basis, as it is impossible to
accurately predict the total cost of a contract such as this since the
project, as noted earlier, will not be concluded for 10 or more years.
The advantages of an EPC contract lies primarily in the knowledge
that detailed coordination between the design and construction efforts
should be easier to obtain when both units are within the same organi-
zation. A second advantage for utilities involved in their first
nuclear project is that the utility need not necessarily provide the
extent of manpower support and technological expertise that may be
required for another type of contract.
The disadvantages of an EPC contract are primarily those of a
control nature. With less information and participation required from
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the utility, it can be more difficult for the utility to establish and
maintain detailed control of the project. This is particularly true
with respect to expenditures.
Additionally, there are very few organizations in the United States
that are capable of assuming the role of an EPC contractor. To the
writer's knowledge the organizations are limited to Bechtel Power Cor-
poration, United Engineers and Constructors, Sargent and Lundy, and the
Stone and Webster Corporation. Although this concentration of expertise
is good in some ways, there are disadvantages with this type of contract
in that there is currently a drastic lack of competition.
A utility may alternatively choose to contract separately for an
Architect-Engineer and a Constructor
,
the second type of contract in
common use today. In this type of contract, the design responsibilities
are assumed by the architect-engineer while the constructor is responsible
for the construction activities. The builder is referred to as a con-
structor, rather than as a contractor, because, as in the earlier EPC
case, the contracts are let on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis. This is
necessary because the constructor begins work with the design only
partially complete. To the writer's knowledge, at least one variation
on this method of payment is being tried, however: that of a cost-plus-
a-fixed-fee with an incentive fee based upon a target manhour figure
contract.
The obvious advantage of this type of an organization is that it
provides the utility with the opportunity for a little more control of
the construction process. It also widely expands the number of firms
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capable of assuming one of either of the two major contracts. There-
fore, the element of competition is dramatically improved.
The disadvantages of having a separate A/E and a separate constructor
are many, including the larger staff and higher degree of technological
input required from the utility. There are many conflicts of interest
and coordination problems at the interfaces between the A/E and the
constructor, in which the utility must act as a mediator. Procurement
responsibilities are typically split, with the A/E responsible for major
components and the constructor responsible for minor components and
material.
Typical organization charts for the utility, A/E, and constructor
involved in a three-party relationship such as described above are
provided as Figures 12, 13 and 14.
A Utility Force Account situation exists when a utility accomplishes
the design and construction aspects of the nuclear project primarily
through the use of personnel employed by the utility itself. This type
of project organization is limited to a very few utilities in the United
States, primarily the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Duke Power
Corporation.
Advantages of force account work include a high degree of control
over the details of design and procurement as well as those of construc-
tion. The priorities of the project personnel can be very closely
aligned with utility priorities. Secondly, there can be a cost saving
in that no profit is paid to another organization for performing the
work. There can also be savings in labor productivity. These will be
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The disadvantages of a utility force account system are significant,
in that few utilities project the consistent construction volume
necessary to justify the additional overhead manpower and training require-
ments necessary to build such plants. Further, a utility that chooses this
path might exclude itself from the expertise through experience that the
nationally known constructors and architect-engineers have gained.
The method of Construction Management is the final contractual
method to be discussed. In this method, one company, either the utility
or his agent, acts as construction manager for the project. In its purest
sense, the project will then be divided into many small work packages
that will be contracted on a competitive bid fixed -price basis.
The advantages of this method are obvious in that under a fixed
-
price bid a contractor has the burden of minimizing expenditures placed
upon himself. Furthermore, the smaller work package contracts allow a
great many more companies in the United States to bid on the work.
In practice, the construction management philosophy has not been
utilized on nuclear power plants. This has been true for two reasons.
One of these reasons is that the design of a particular plant is usually
never complete enough at the point of beginning construction to provide
enough information for a clearly defined package that can be bid on a
fixed-price basis. Secondly, the fluctuating state of regulatory require-
ments would make contractors and utilities alike reluctant to set a
fixed price for a contract. This approach would probably result in a
considerable amount of negotiations about additions to the contract.
The construction management approach is being used for the first
time on a fossil plant, General Public Utility's Homer City Unit 3
project, and the industry will doubtless pay close attention to the
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success of the program there. GPU also has plans for obtaining some
fixed- price bids on the Forked River Nuclear Station scheduled to begin
construction in 197 7 or 1978. Gilbert/Commonwealth has similar plans
for the Perry units they are designing.
Many of the architect-engineers around the country are developing
construction management programs for power plants. Figure 15 indicates,
for instance, the proposed construction management organization chart
for power plant projects that Gilbert Associates has produced.
The primary factor in a utility's decision about which type of
contracts to use is probably which method will result in the lowest
final cost for the particular project under consideration. With the
continuous variation in plant requirements, it has, up until now, been
impossible to make a general statement about which method is best. They
all can work, and all of the first three have been used effectively.
Functional Organizations and Project Teams
Regardless of which responsibilities are delegated to which party
in the contractual relationship, there is an organizational split
within the individual companies defining how the responsibilities for
individual work items will be divided. On the one hand, a company may
maintain functional divisions of authority, while on the other, authority
for all work may, on a project, be given to a project team.
Functional organizations are those in which authority and responsi-
bility is divided by functional discipline, such as engineering or con-
struction, and civil, electrical or mechanical within each of those.
This type of organization is traditional in the power industry, and






























































discipline is maintained in one area. In this way, the learning process
over the years is optimized.
In the case of nuclear power plants the utility involved as well
as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission will require that there be one
person in each company with whom they can ultimately deal concerning
the project. Some of the disadvantages of a functional organization
that develop because of this are (Middleton, 1967, p. 20):
1. No one in a functional organization besides the company or
division manager is entirely responsible for project costs
and profits. Functional department executives are concerned
only with doing specialized work within budget.
2. Functional departments often are jealous of their pre-
rogatives, and fight to promote and preserve their
specialties rather than work toward a unified project
objective.
3. The total perspective of a project is lost among functional
departments. They can be guilty of "tunnel vision"—that
is, a concern for only their own portions of the task with-
out regard for the impact of their actions on the company
and on the project.
4. More and faster decision making is required on a new project,
and it is slowed by passing interdepartmental problems to
the top through all levels of functional departments. This
process often delays important project decisions or prevents
them from being made.
5. Functional departments performing repetitive tasks often
lack the flexibility and responsiveness necessary to cope
with new and rapidly changing project requirements.
The project team approach found its origins in the competition of
major American aircraft manufacturers for large governmental aircraft
contracts in the late 1950's and early 1960's (Middleton, 1967).
Typically, the project organization is characterized by a project manager
who is assigned and is totally responsible for personnel with skills in
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all the disciplines necessary for successful project completion. For
example, the designer responsible for structural steel design would
submit his work, to the project civil engineer who would be responsible
to the project manager through a project design engineer. In a functional
organization the same information would flow through an engineering
department head who would be at least on an equal managerial level with
the project manager. The project manager in the latter case has no
direct authority over the structural steel designer.
The advantages and disadvantages of the project team concept
include (Middleton, 1967, p. 20, 21):
Advantages
:
1. Better control of the project
2. Better customer relations
3. Shorter product development time
A. Lower program costs
5. Improved quality and reliability
6. Higher profit margins
7. Better control over program security
8. Better project visibility and focus on results
9. Improved coordination among company divisions doing
work on the project
10. Higher morale and better mission orientation for
employees working on the project
11. Accelerated development of managers due to breadth
of project responsibilities
12. The project organization can provide the arrangement,
emphasis, and control necessary to counteract any weak-
nesses, functional or otherwise, that could impair
successful completion of the project
Disadvantages
:
1. More complex internal operations
2. Inconsistency in application of company policy
3. Lower utilization of personnel
4. Higher program costs
5. More difficult to manage
6. Lower profit margins
7. Tendency for functional groups to neglect their job
and let the project organization do everything
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8. Too much shifting of personnel from project to project
due to priorities
9. Duplication of functional skills in the project
organization.
It is the writer's opinion, after extensive conversations with
industry personnel, that the industry is moving as a whole toward
project organizations. Tradition within the industry leans toward the
functional approach, but the complexities of technology are slowly being
outweighed by the complexities of reporting responsibilities within
the project.
Summary
Satisfactory project control for the construction of a nuclear
power plant is a goal that is continually on the horizon, and yet
never fully realized. This is primarily because of the fluctuating
environmental and regulatory environment, as well as yet unresolved
labor, equipment and material supply problems. The basic tasks that
must be accomplished in order to achieve control are clear, but there
are many organizational structures and divisions of internal authority
that are being employed by various utilities, architect-engineers and
constructors to approach these tasks. As yet, no data is available to
indicate which method or combination of methods is best, and no change
is apparent for the future.
In this chapter the major aspects of cost and schedule control for
a nuclear power plant were examined. In the next chapter, an analysis
of the third major phase of control, Quality Control, and the




It is important at the outset to distinguish the difference
between "Quality Assurance" and "Quality Control." One who is not
familiar with the importance and complexity of their application is
often caught using the two terms interchangeably, and is easily
Identified as an outsider to the inner elite of nuclear construction.
Quality Assurance can be defined as:
All those planned and systematic actions necessary to provide
adequate confidence that a structure, system or component will
perform satisfactorily in service (10CFR50, Appendix B, p. 1)
.
Quality Control is found within the framework of these actions, and can
be defined as:
Those quality assurance actions related to the physical character-
istic of a material, structure, component, or system which
provide a means to control the quality of the material, structure,
component, or system to predetermined requirements (10CFR50,
Appendix B, P. 1).
The Need for Quality Assurance
In the latter 60's, as more and more utilities began to build
nuclear power plants, it was recognized that many of the utilities were
unaware of the difficulties, complexities, rapid development, uncertain-
ties and economic risks that such a direction entailed. These problems
were the subject of a talk presented by Mr. James T. Ramey (1968), then
Commissioner of the Atomic Energy Commission, at a luncheon of the
American Power Conference in 1968. In his talk, Mr. Ramey pointed out
the urgency of these problems due to the unprecedented and unanticipated
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nuclear power plant commitments by the utilities. The Shippingport,
Yankee Rowe, and Dresden facilities were complete at that time, and the
San Onofre and Connecticut Yankee plants were under construction, but
he felt the new generation of larger size nuclear plants that were on
the horizon would provide a multitude of even more complex problems.
These problems included a higher concentration of power, closer siting,
new processes such as desalting and process heat, as well as the con-
ventional problems of turbine difficulties and fires, welding problems
and piping leaks.
Inadequate design attention was probably one of the reasons for
the concern about these problems. The natural resources to cure this
problem, i.e., knowledgeable reactor plant suppliers, equipment vendors,
architect-engineers and constructors, however, were in limited supply.
Possibly more alarming was the rapid trend toward a shift in management
arrangements within the power plant construction area. The industry had
moved from turnkey fossil fuel projects to projects with many partici-
pants. Although this shift improved competition tremendously, it
increased the potential for errors and omissions and major problems where
two or more participants interfaced. Mr. Ramey (1968) expressed grave
concern for the thrusting of project responsibilities upon inexperienced
organizations.
An understanding of the situation in the late 1960's will indicate
that the primary reason behind the evolution of a well defined quality
assurance program since that period has been to insure safety on nuclear
power plant construction projects. In addition, however, it has been
demonstrated over and over again that safety, reliability and economy
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are all interdependent. Generally, a plant that is designed and built
according to sound engineering practices and tested and operated in the
same fashion, will perform efficiently and reliably in service. It is
felt by many that a quality assurance program that assists in achieving
this goal will easily pay for itself in plant availability, let alone
prevention of accidents and licensing delays.
The intent of quality assurance in its early developmental stages
was to assure that the design met the defined requirements, that con-
struction was accomplished in accordance with design, that the tests
which were performed confirmed the design, that the procedures which
were used proved suitable, that operators were capable, that in-service
operations were safe, and that maintenance was in accordance with
accepted and established practices (Ramey, 1968).
Establishing the Requirements
In March of 1969, the Atomic Energy Commission published Appendix B
to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10CFR50) , entitled
"Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants." The text of
this guideline was published in the Federal Register , Volume 35, No. 125,
June 27, 1970. This document established the basic requirements and
responsibilities of the applicant, (usually a utility or group of
utilities, who were referred to as the owner or owners). The fact that
it was indicated that the applicant retained the responsibility for
quality assurance, regardless of how or who he selected to establish
and execute the quality assurance program has had a significant impact
on the organizational structure and multiparty relationships evidenced
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on nuclear sites since 1969. Since that time the owners have been
forced to take a much more active and authoritative role in engineering,
procurement, and construction in order to protect their investment and
deal on a day-to-day detailed basis with regulatory bodies concerning
permits, licenses and items of nonconformance. These impacts were
discussed in depth in the chapter dealing with project control.
The requirements and responsibilities of 10CFR50, Appendix B are
delineated in the form of 18 criteria, each point of which deals with
a specific area. The 18 points include the following: (1) organization,
(2) quality assurance program, (3) design control, (4) procurement
document control, (5) instructions, procedures, and drawings, (6) docu-
ment control, (7) control of purchased material, equipment and services,
(8) identification and control of materials, parts and components,
(9) control of special processes, (10) inspection, (11) test control,
(12) control of measuring and test equipment, (13) handling, storage
and shipping, (14) inspection, test and operating status, (15) non-
conforming materials, parts or components, (16) corrective action,
(17) quality assurance records, and (18) audits. Mr. Charles M. Trammel,
III, of Public Service Electric and Gas of New Jersey, has submitted the
philosophy that "these criteria, when simplified and stripped of embel-
lishments, are nothing more and nothing less than good common sense" (1974,
p. 292). In order to explain his philosophy, Mr. Trammell developed
the restatement of some of the criteria. For example, Mr. Trammell
states that the criteria for control of purchased material might be
restated, "Make sure that what you ordered is what you received. Don't
use it until you have proof in hand it's what you ordered" (1974, p. 292).
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The criteria for a QA program might be summarized:
Establish a written QA program so all concerned know what they
are supposed to do and how they are supposed to do it. Do more
for important things, less for others. Train your people so
they know what they are doing. Review your program regularly
to be sure it is doing what you want (1974, p. 292).
The basic premise that the 18 criteria of 10CFR50, Appendix B are
nothing more and nothing less than common sense is a valid point. To
leave the subject without further mention, however, would imply that
application of the criteria to the project is a simple matter of employing
common sense. This could not be futher from the truth, however, as will




An initial reading of 10CFR50, Appendix B reveals that although
the criteria may be classified as common sense, the limits and details
of implementation are open to a wide field of interpretation. The
differences in these interpretations have proven themselves to be drama-
tic, not only between utilities, suppliers, architect-engineers, con-
structors and the regulatory bodies, but also among individuals within
each of these groups. As a result, it soon became apparent in the
industry that although 10CFR50 existed, there was still a pressing need
to provide clarification of acceptable interpretations in order to
insure the continued success of the nuclear construction industry.
Clarification has come since 1970 in the form of: (1) Regulatory
Guides, (2) standards developed by the American Society of Mechanical
Engineers and the American National Standards Institute's (ANSI)

134
Committee N45.2, and (3) dramatically increased regulation. In this
thesis, Regulatory Guides and code development are discussed separately
in Chapters 3 and 11. Suffice it to say at this point, however, that
almost without exception, clarification has assumed the strictest, most
conservative interpretation possible, with the result that an ever
increasing volume of requirements and toughened implementation criteria
have been developed.
For anyone desiring a detailed view of how a quality assurance pro-
gram might be set up and operated, the first step after a thorough
review of Appendix B of 10CFR50 would be an in-depth analysis of
WASH-1283 (June 1973), an AEC publication entitled Guidance on Quality
Assurance Requirements During Design and Procurement Phase of Nuclear
Power Plants and of WASH-1309 (May 1974) entitled Guidance on Quality
Assurance Requirements During the Construction Phase of Nuclear Power
Plants . I ncluded in these publications is a discussion of the need for
augmented efforts in the development of quality assurance standards as
well as a description and status of ANSI 45.2 Standards. Included, also,
is the entire text of applicable Regulatory Guides with their endorsement
of ANSI 45.2 Standards. In WASH-1309, for example, Regulatory Guides
dealing with the following subjects are included: QA Program Require-
ments (RG1.28, N45.2); QA for Instrumentation and Electrical Equipment
(RG1.30, N45.2.4); QA for Cleaning Fluid Systems (RG1.37, N45.2.1);
QA for Packaging, Shipping, Receiving, Storage, Handling (RG1.38,
N45.2.2); QA for Housekeeping (RG1.39, N45.2.3); QA for Protective
Coatings (RG1.54, N101.4); Qualifications for QC Personnel (RG1.58,
N45.2.6); and QA Terms and Definitions (RG1.74, N45.2.10).
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A highlight of recent ANSI QA standards in the areas of Procurement
Control (N45.2.13), Structural Concrete (N45.2.5), Mechanical Equipment
and Piping (N45.2.8), QA Records (N45.2.9), and Design (N45.2.11) was
presented at the winter meeting of the American Nuclear Society,
November 11 through 15, 1973, in San Francisco.
Quality Classifications
Regulatory Guide 1.26, "Quality Group Classifications and Standards
for Water- Steam- and Radioactive-Waste-Containing Components of Nuclear
Power Plants," provides a method for determining acceptable quality
standards for safety-related components containing radioactive material,
water or steam. Safety standards are divided into four safety categories,
labeled Groups A, B, C and D. Group A standards reflect the highest
available national standards as described in Article 50.55a of 10CFR50.
Covered by Group A standards, for instance, are rules governing the
design, fabrication, erection and testing of all the components of
the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
The specific quality requirements which apply to each of the
remaining safety-related components containing radioactive material,
water or steam may be determined by application of the method described
in Regulatory Guide 1.26. Table 19 indicates what the requirements are
for each group once a particular component is categorized. Group B is
Class 2 of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, while
Group C is Class 3 of the same Code. Group D is a composite of the































































































































































































































CO CO CO CO
4-J CO H H
3 cu a
CU > •H cu CU
3 S-i 60 00 00
O cu CU CO •H CO
g, u J3 H CO U
B 3 60 CO 3. O (X O
o CO 3 CD CU CO 4-1 4-»
u CO •H 3. > o co LO CO
cu 3- 6 iH s rH
u •H 3 CO 4-1 APm P-i Pi > <

137
The method of determining which quality group applies to a partic-
ular system or component involves a process of elimination by working
from Group A down to Group D until the component in question fits
properly into the requirements and exclusions of each group. The group
under which a component or system will be placed is directly related
to its impact upon emergency core cooling, postaccident containment
heat removal, reactor shutdown, postaccident containment atmosphere
clean-up, or residual heat removal from the reactor and spent fuel
storage pool.
The QA Program
Successful quality assurance on a major power plant project
requires detailed planning of all activities. The significant aspects
of development, implementation and organization of this planning effort
are examined in the following discussion.
Development of an Operational QA Program
The primary ideal to be sought in developing an operational QA
program is that the program should be straightforward. All organiza-
tions, responsibilities, procedures and requirements should be founded
in sound engineering and management principles and described in writing
in a clearly understandable and interpretable manner. The objective of
compliance with the 18 criteria must be maintained foremost in the minds
of the program's authors. For a utility inexperienced in the nuclear
field to attempt to develop their own program would probably be rather
difficult. The detail and magnitude of expertise which is required for
such a program development dictate the employment by the average utility

138
of one or more consultants. Many of the large A/E-Constructors are
capable of providing this service along with the design function. There
are, however, consultants who specialize in this type of work. Either
route has proven successful in the past by utilities.
In 1967, prior to the issuance of 10CFR50, as Metropolitan Edison's
Three Mile Island (TMI) project began, goals for the TMI QA program
included the following: (1) provide for preparation, review, and use of
specifications and procedures to control the procurement of equipment
and performance of construction work; (2) require suppliers and con-
structors to have a separate and independent group in their organizations
whose primary responsibility is conducting quality inspections of their
work; and (3) provide for a system of audits and surveillance to assure
that the specifications and procedures are complied with, and that the
required independent inspections are properly performed. These goals
have remained valid even with the issuance of 10CFR50, Appendix B and
its resulting clarifications. This reflects astute insight and fore-
thought on the part of the developers of the TMI QA program. Relatively
minor changes in the program have resulted from clarifications and
toughened policies, but the basic program still appears to be valid.
A good QA program must allow specifications writers to include
QA provisions which incorporate at least one independent review for
quality assurance requirements. Selection of manufacturers and con-
tractors is dependent upon their capability to design, manufacture and
provide quality control for their product. Two questions which must be
asked are: (1) "Is the company capable?" and (2) "Are the individual
personnel with the required level of competency available for this project?"
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Monitoring of manufacturing and construction should include review
of procedures, inspections of equipment and audits of suppliers. This
monitoring phase to insure compliance with QA stipulations would typically
be performed by the primary contractor and would be in addition to the
inspections and audits which manufacturers and contractors typically
perform. The underlying concept that the owner, by himself and through
his agents, has the responsibility for providing quality assurance should
be emphasized at this point. The NRC monitors the owner's QA program
and its operation. Typically, the owner himself will audit on a spot
check basis the QA programs of the Nuclear Steam Supplier, the
architect-engineer, the construction manager and their subcontractors
and suppliers to assure himself that the QA program is functioning as
desired.
In summary, then, a QA program should include a review of all
specifications pertaining to the nuclear portion of the plant with respect
to QA provisions, selection of suppliers, fabrication of components and
final erection and installation. Typically two independent QA programs
are implemented during fabrication and erection—one by the manufacturer
or the constructor, and the other by the prime contractor. Both of
these programs are monitored by a third group, the owner.
A description of how this three-level QA program works at Three
Mile Island will illustrate this principle. The first level, Quality
Control and Inspection, involves inspections of materials, fabrication,
and site work performed by equipment manufacturers or site contractors.
The second level, Quality Assurance Surveillance, involves a review of
specifications and procedures as well as surveillance of the first level
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quality control performed by the appropriate main contractor (A/E,
Constructor, NSSS). The third level, QA auditing, involves periodic
spot checks performed by the utility and its consultants of the first
and second level QA/QC programs. Figure 16 shows this three-level QA
relationship for the NSS System.
Mr. Charles M. Trammell* III, mentioned earlier in this chapter as
the author of the "common sense" approach to the 18 criteria, has
several good suggestions about how to judge a proposed QA program.
Initially, the program document should say something concrete and be
prepared and approved prior to the development of lower tier instructions
and procedures. The program should set minimum requirements, con-
straints and standards, as well as designate and assign responsibilities.
Additional suggestions include those related to mechanisms for writing
procedures, a useful numbering system, a specified review and approval
plan for the QA document, and procedures for insuring that the most
current revisions of test procedures are used. The suggestion of
establishing a technical library at the site to assist in the complexities
of document control is valid. Finally, the program should be written by
the person most interested in compliance with the program. It should
be kept as simple as possible. Achieving simplicity may well be the most
difficult task of all. If these procedures are written and implemented
properly, however, site management at all levels would hopefully be
converted from production-oriented to quality-oriented managers.
To summarize, an operational QA program for a nuclear power plant must:
(1) be based on a clear understanding of the 18 criteria of Appendix B
and C2) must set forth the requirements and procedures for meeting
them (TMI QA, 1975).
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Figure 16. Three Levels of Quality Assurance
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Implementation of an Operational QA Program
Assuming the task of developing the QA program has been completed,
the most awesome task, that of implementing the plan, usually is the
next step. It must be realized at the outset that the job of implemen-
tation will not be complete until construction is complete. And then
the process of motivating, directing and sometimes forcing the individuals
directly involved with the work to comply with the QA program require-
ments is at best a long and agonizing one. Evidence (Wilson, 1975)
is available that not only will production people not cooperate in
implementation, but they will openly resist implementation. The problem
is actually easy to understand. It is very difficult to convince a
skilled craftsman, for instance, that he must now perform a job for
which he has been trained in accordance with a set of procedures that
have not only been written by someone else but may not even be similar
to the set of procedures he normally employs. The job of convincing
him is hard enough if technically sound procedures are promulgated.
It is extremely difficult if an attempt is made to implement a program
or procedure that is technically deficient or inconsistent. When the
QA approach was first initiated, many manufacturers and contractors were
not accustomed to such rigid controls, and in fact it appears that very
few, percentagewise, have been able to gear up to meet the requirements.
In conjunction with the above, it should be noted that the supervising
personnel on site must also normally undergo a major adjustment in
attitude. Under the QA approach, which is unlike that used in other
types of construction, there are no field changes to the design. On-
the-job decisions are no longer valid in themselves. All such changes
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must now have written approval from the A/E prior to installation. The
format of such changes is discussed in Chapter 7 of this thesis. Gen-
erally, however, changes include A/E consideration and may also include
constructor consideration, owner's economic evaluation, and input
from the QA group concerning specifications, testing, and material
certification. Obviously, a mechanism for change of this type tran-
slates into lost time. Time means money, and it is safe to say that
a good justification for a proposed change is required before it will
even be considered.
Several suggestions can be made to minimize problems in QA program
implementation. First, the number of QC inspectors employed by the
constructor on site must be sufficient to insure that construction
progress is not unnecessarily delayed while the crafts wait for the
arrival of an inspector. The level of competency and knowledge of the
inspectors must be sufficiently high so that the production workers can
be convinced of the value and validity of their judgment and decisions.
Many sites have witnessed an actual confrontation between QC inspectors
and production supervisors. In most cases, this occurs because neither
the experienced supervisors nor the young inspectors were educated in
the philosophies and procedures of the other. Confrontations can
probably be minimized by the use of seminars to educate individuals,
reorganization of the QC attitude, and by firing individuals who refuse
to yield personal views for the good of the site.
Choosing the right men for key positions in the QA organization is
also critical to the success of the program. A qualified QA man should
have a sound technical knowledge of his subject with a respect for the
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craft viewpoint. He should be able to work well with people. Further,
he should be able to yield when the situation calls for it, and he
should anticipate problems before they occur. The area of anticipation
is the hardest area to fulfill, and has been most sorely overlooked
in the past.
The writer was made aware of the creation of a new position which
has proven most effective at the Three Mile Island construction site.
The job title is QA/QC-Construction Interface, employed by the con-
structor, and the function of the position is to relay QA/QC management
philosophies to individual crafts concerning specific problems. The
position also functions as a funneling point for information from crafts
to QA/QC management. With the right man in this position, great strides
can be made in fostering cooperation, insuring accuracy of transmitted
information, and building a unified spirit. It is apparent, however,
that attempting to use this type of system without considering the
personality of the man that will fill the position may be tantamount to
inviting disaster.
Another aspect of the QC organization at Three Mile Island that
is worthy of close examination is that of owner management of the con-
structor's site QC organization and vendor surveillance group. The
management had originally been in the sole hands of the constructor,
but discrepancies in audits and reduced implementation of the QA program
proved symptomatic of an inability on the part of the constructor to
properly manage the implementation of the TMI-QA program to the owner's
satisfaction. As a result, the owner now employs the site QC manager
and is directly involved in hiring of all constructor QC employees. In
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this way, the owner has been able to successfully insist on and obtain
compliance with procedures and specifications.
QA Organizational Structure
Criterion one of 10CFR50, Appendix B states:
The authority and duties of persons and organizations performing
quality assurance functions shall be clearly established and
delineated in writing. Such persons and organizations shall have
sufficient authority and organizational freedom to identify
quality problems; to initiate, recommend or provide solutions;
and to verify implementation of solutions. In general, assurance
of quality requires management measures which provide that the
individual or group assigned the responsibility for checking,
auditing, inspecting, or otherwise verifying that an activity
has been correctly performed is independent of the individual or
group directly responsible for performing the specific activity
(10CFR50, Appendix B, p. 1).
The reasoning behind this requirement is clear. The quality assurance
organization must be independent of design, procurement and construc-
tion to insure that QA personnel are free to determine if the proper
quality has been attained. They should not be under pressure to pass
marginal performance in order to meet a schedule or remain in the good
favor of a particular production supervisor. Experienced utilities,
suppliers, and architect-engineers have found that true independence
is achieved only by elevating the quality assurance manager to a position
of equal authority with either the project manager or the functional
managers of engineering and construction. This point can be illustrated
by reviewing the organization charts shown as Figures 17, 18 and 19.
Figure 17 is the project organization chart for General Public
Utilities' Three Mile Island Nuclear Station. At this site, General
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for three utilities, acts for the owner in matters of design, procure-
ment, construction and testing. In this organization, the Manager of
Quality Assurance reports to the GPUSC Vice-President of Design and
Construction. The Project Manager, however, must report to the Manager
of Projects, who in turn reports to the same Vice-President of Design
and Construction. Figure 18 illustrates the organization of the System
Power and Engineering Department of the Pennsylvania Power and Light
Company (PP&L) . As in the case for GPU, the Manager of Nuclear Quality
Assurance reports to the Vice-President of Power Plant Engineering and
Construction. Figure 19 shows a breakdown of the PP&L Project Group
for the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2.
Figures 17, 18 and 19 illustrated QA organizations for two dif-
ferent utility cases. The designer, constructor, suppliers, and
vendors for each site will have similar organizations, all of which must
communicate and function together to provide the multi-level assurance
discussed earlier. Quite plainly, this communication and functioning
together is not simple, and in fact can become quite complex. Figure 20
illustrates a simple view of communications under normal conditions at
PP&L's Susquehanna Station. The major parties involved are PP&L, the
Bechtel Power Corporation as engineer and constructor, and General
Electric as Nuclear Steam System supplier. A further breakdown of the
functional QA organization within the Bechtel Power Corporation is shown
in Figure 21.
Additional detailed analysis of organization and information flow
within the constraints of a particular management philosophy and
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Impact on the Crafts
In the early years of quality assurance, the crafts and many
individuals within the power industry reacted either in apathy or in
open resistance to what in fact was the introduction of fundamentally
sound concepts. Not all of this reaction was the fault of the indi-
viduals, however, as communications and understanding often did not
play the integral role now played in implementation of quality assurance.
Common misconceptions were that quality assurance meant "gold plating,"
an unattainably high degree of perfection, or an unnecessary monetary
extravagance (Ramey, 1973). The writer feels that a more constructive
and objective attitude is present throughout the industry today, but the
battle for acceptance and support of quality assurance and quality control
standards by individuals on the site is far from over. The typical
construction worker, before working on a nuclear site, is taught to
direct his work activities toward meeting the requirements of the
specifications and drawings. On a nuclear site the added requirement of
working to a procedure is imposed, as well as a dramatically intensified
surveillance and inspection of his work. The net effect can be a
serious reduction in the morale and personal pride that the individual
skilled craftsman derives from his work.
The need for well-defined procedures describing the exact method of
construction in order to insure consistent, quality construction in
accordance with the design may be obvious to a design engineer. It is
not necessarily as obvious to the skilled craftsman who has been
performing that particular phase of construction for 10 or 20 years.
The craftsman, however, can probably not be criticized unduly for his
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confidence and personal satisfaction in his work. The design engineer
may be equally unconvinced that there is a need to develop a procedure
that defines the exact method to be used in the design of components
that he has been designing quite competently for years without the
procedure. Procedures are intended to standardize and simplify opera-
tions, but acceptance of the procedure approved by the craftsman is
vital to the successful implementation of QA procedures in the field.
An example of the type of problems that can develop was indicated
to the writer by field personnel in relation to a Cadwelding operation
on the Three Mile Island project. (Note: the Cadwelding process is
discussed in detail in Chapter 8 of this thesis). On this operation,
three Cadweld crews were working, with two of the crews being signifi-
cantly more productive than the third. The less productive crew was
audited by the constructor in order to determine the difficulties they
were having with the objective of also increasing their productivity.
The audit revealed that the third crew was operating in accordance with
approved procedures and that no significant improvement could be made.
Further investigation, however, revealed that both of the more produc-
tive crews were neglecting a relatively minor but time-consuming step
in the Cadwelding procedure. The net result was that the two more
productive crews were slowed down in order to insure that they were
completing the work in a proper fashion. One Cadwelding supervisor was
so upset by the results and directive to slow down and follow the
procedure that he finally quit his job. Although personalities and
attitudes played a major role in this incident, the changed attitude
from simply production to quality production was the underlying cause.
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The requirement for a change in attitude among field personnel
has already been mentioned. As noted earlier the concept of a "field
change" in the traditional sense does not exist on nuclear jobs. This
requirement is absolutely essential, however, if the owner is to be
able to assure himself and regulatory bodies that the plant which has
been built is safe and operable. At the same time, however, frustra-
tions may develop in the field. Often, when a design is as complex as
these designs are, there will be inconsistencies and inefficiencies
appearing in the specifications, drawings and procedures which are
provided to the field construction personnel. Although a solution may
be obvious to the craftsman or foreman, and may in fact be a satis-
factory solution, work on that item must cease once a problem has been
identified until the designer has provided replacement engineering in
accordance with acceptable procedures. Delays in providing replacement
engineering, in the form of change orders or some other mechanism, has
the effect of slowing production, as well as having a negative influence
on the worker's morale, concern for the job, and resultant productivity.
Another impact of quality assurance on the attitude and productivity
of the crafts comes into play when incorrect or insufficient engineering
is revealed and work must be torn out and done over. For example, a
craftsman may install conduit in accordance with procedures, drawings
and specifications only to find out later that minimum separations were
not properly engineered into the drawings, and the conduit must be moved.
(Note: separations are discussed in detail in Chapter 9 of this thesis).
This problem is similar to, but not as significant as, the morale
problem that develops when major engineering changes necessitate the
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removal and reworking of completed construction items. That particular
problem is discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
The positive aspect of quality assurance is that, if the program is
properly implemented, it will provide a finished product that has been
designed, fabricated, and constructed in accordance with current
acceptable practice. Although it may be a negatively based motivation,
the craftsman on a nuclear power plant project quickly becomes aware of
the fact that if he tries to cut corners he will be caught. He, there-
fore, becomes reluctant to intentionally violate procedures. In this
regard it should be noted that QC data in many fields, such as welding,
is maintained on an individual crew or craftsmen basis, and consistent
rejections or non-compliance may, therefore, result in the loss of
employment for the party at fault.
Although quality assurance has been accepted in concept within the
industry, translation of concept into accepted and supported practice
continues to be a major battle. In order for quality assurance to
function to its ultimate capability, all parties involved, particularly
skilled craftsmen, must believe in quality assurance.
Example of Quality Assurance Activities
As has been shown, many steps and checks are involved in fabrica-
tion, procurement and installation of each nuclear component of the
plant. The QA organization of GPU at Three Mile Island CTMI QA, 1975)
for example has listed the following steps as the minimum required for
the procurement and installation of a typical nuclear valve: (1) prep-
aration of the valve specification and formal internal review by the A/E
or NSSS, (2) review and approval of valve specification by GPUSC,
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(3) evaluation and qualification of prospective suppliers for the valve,
(4) evaluation of bids followed by placement of the order, (5) review
and approval of drawings, procedures and material specifications,
C6) inspection and surveillance during fabrication of the valve, C7) final
inspection, including a check for cleanliness and a QA documentation check
prior to release of the valve for shipment, (8) site receipt inspection
of the valve and a check to ascertain that the QA documentation is
available, (9) storage of the valve under controlled conditions until
its installation, with QC monitoring of the valve storage conditions,
(10) installation of the valve in accordance with A/E drawings and site
construction and QC procedures, with QC inspections of cleanliness,
welding, nondestructive testing and other important areas, (11) periodic
inspection of the valve after its installation to assure there has been
no degradation, (12) turnover of the valve to test group for testing,
(13) testing that the valve operates correctly, with necessary QC
inspections, prior to system functional testing, (14) final inspection
and turnover for functional testing and operation, and (15) functional
testing of the system which includes testing of the valve. In addition
to fulfilling the auditing and testing requirements, the owner is
required by law to be able to provide objective evidence of quality.
In practice, what this means is that careful records must be maintained
and made available to demonstrate that correct materials were used,
fabrication was properly completed, and that the proper tests and
inspections were performed and satisfactory results were obtained. For
the nuclear valve above, it would be expected that the following records
would be available: (1) radiographs of castings or welds, (2) records
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of other nondestructive tests, (3) material certifications, (4) inspec-
tion records demonstrating that the valve was installed per drawing and
was properly tested, and (5) hydrostatic test records.
QA/QC Personnel
Regulatory Guide 1.58, which endorses ANSI 45.2.6, 1973, establishes
the basic qualifications for inspection, examination and testing personnel
on a nuclear power plant. Included within certification of persons who
verify conformance of the work activities to the quality requirements
are stipulations regarding training, proficiency testing, evaluation of
performance, and details regarding the format of the certification. Three
levels of capability for certified personnel are established to define
the minimum qualifications for performance at the various levels of
verification. Qualifications are based upon educational background and
experience as well as physical and technical capabilities. Records of
personnel qualifications are also considered.
At the present time it appears to be difficult to hire qualified
QC people. In addition to being technically capable, the man must be
somewhat of a politician and a diplomat. Although he cannot lose his
autonomy and impartiality, he must be able to get along well enough with
people to avoid or minimize confrontations and promote understanding.
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the QC inspector must respect the
craftsmen for who they are and what they are capable of doing. An
inspector who is antagonistic toward the crafts in his approach to his
work is a severe liability to an entire site. Furthermore, the egotistical




Conversations that the writer has had with personnel from utilities,
A/E's and even the NRC have revealed a universal feeling that the role
of the QC inspector has not been properly handled in the past. Some
of the fault lies with the fact that specifications have often been too
stringent and, therefore, have been difficult to enforce; or, they have
been written so poorly that they have been subject to various levels
of interpretation. These items are discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis
In many cases, however, the problem has been with the inspector himself.
An inspector can easily become inconsiderate or unaware of the require-
ments of production people. If a QC inspector is required to check a
foundation just prior to the pour, he should probably not wait until the
last minute or show up late. From the production point of view, a
considerable amount of time and money can be lost if an inspector is
unable to adequately meet his commitment. The consequences involve
attitudes as well as schedules and costs.
Another example of problems caused by inconsiderate inspectors might
occur in the welding field. If the inspector is required to spot check
a welder in the middle of a welding operation, a superior attitude can
easily cause wide-spread bitterness. It is important to note that there
is a fine line between an inspector being cognizant of field difficulties
and ignoring an activity being done wrong.
It appears that on the sites which the writer visited, management
has become aware of these problems and great strides are being made
in this area. Methods discussed earlier in this chapter in QA imple-
mentation are one approach being taken. Another is an increased effort




As might be expected, individual QC inspectors cannot perform their
responsibilities unless they have some clear and firm guidance. This
guidance comes in the form of QA/QC procedures for the project. The QA
or QC procedure specifies the job that must be done, it indicates when
it will be done, it provides step-by-step details of how the job will
be done, it iridicates the equipment that is necessary, and it specifies
the documentation that is required. The development of procedures for
QA is a natural result of the desire within the quality assurance concept
to provide consistent quality in all aspects of the project.
The volume of QA/QC procedures that is needed in light of continuous
changes and revisions can become a document control problem in itself.
Periodic indices of current procedures and status of changes is one way
to help minimize confusion.
Magnitude of the Quality Assurance Effort
The effort in terms of manhours and documentation that are involved
on a nuclear quality assurance program is staggering, at the least. It
is estimated that the total cost of safety-related quality assurance
activity at Three Mile Island, Unit 2, an 850 MWe nuclear power plant, will
be $40 to $50 million at the time of commercial licensing. This represents
almost 10 percent of the total capital cost of that unit. In order to
illustrate the impact of personnel increases and documentation required,
Tables 20 through 25 provide information on the scope of Quality
Assurance/Quality Control activity at Three Mile Island, Unit 2. The
information presented was obtained from Mr. Joe Wright, site QA manager
for GPU, in July of 1975.
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Table 20. Three Mile Island Unit 2 QA/QC Manhours
Hours during
Group Hours on Site Mfg.—Off site
ConAm
PTL
UE & C QA/QC
GPUSC QA
B & W Const.
Other Site Contractors
(as a group)
B & W NSS Supply
TG Supply
M.J. Doyle (Pipe)














Table 21. Three Mile Island Unit 2 Primary Site QA/QC Procedures
Group No. of Procedures Estimated No. of Pages
UE & C Site QC
B & W Construction
































































Table 23. X-Rays at Three Mile Island Unit 2
Group Number
Field Radiographs to Date 5,400
Shop X-rays Delivered to Site 13,200
B & W Construction 1,500
B & W-NSSS Retained 45,000
Piping Contractor X-rays 12,000
Miscellaneous Mfgers. X-rays 4,000
81,100




Table 24. Total Number of QA/QC Pieces of Paper at
Three Mile Island Unit 2
Group No. of Documents
QC documents generated in field
- Structural 44,000





Estimate to complete 80,000
TOTAL 175,760
Average pages per document = 3; Total number of pages = 527,280 (field)
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Table 25. QA/QC Inspections at Three Mile Island Unit 2
Group Number
On Site - Piping
- Concrete
- Electrical










Impact on Safety and Reliability
Statistical data is not available which would allow a numerical
value to be assigned to the increased margin of safety or reliability
that might be attributed to quality assurance practices in nuclear
power plants. It is clear, however, that through the employment of
quality assurance standards in the past 10 years, the net product of
design and construction has been more closely controlled to produce
the desired end result. This fact, along with the outstanding safety
record maintained by the nuclear industry, indicates that the quality
program has been successful in fulfilling its mission of insuring safety.
When considering reliability, many factors in addition to quality
assurance become significant. Building volumes, the degree of automa-
tion, operator convenience, and detailed design variations all play a
major role in plant reliability. Data is only recently becoming
available which will allow a comparison to be made of reliability with
several of these factors acting as common denominators. It is obvious
to the writer, however, that adherence to quality assurance standards
produces a product far superior to the one that would be produced if
such standards were not required or adhered to. Utilities have realized
this, since a number of them have chosen to adopt QA standards in areas
such as fossil fuel plant construction where they are not even required.
Fossil Application
The application of quality assurance standards to fossil power
plants is a topic on which industry people have a widely varied opinion.
Before considering various applications, however, it is necessary to
determine what the basis of the system should be. As previously mentioned,
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the basis for a nuclear QA system is safety. The basis for a fossil
QA system should be to improve plant performance by insuring increased
availability. One measurable aspect to use as a guideline in system
development is increased reliability.
Obviously, adoption of a program as extensive as the nuclear
program for fossil application is not justifiable. If the QA activities
at TMI, Unit 2 were expanded to include all non-safety related activi-
ties, the total cost would easily run above $80 million. At the present
time there is probably no way to economically justify a reliability
increase that costs $80 million to attain. No reasonable person would
accept this kind of cost increase without a greater justification of
return.
Initially, a fossil QA program could eliminate a large degree of
the documentation required on a nuclear site. This is true because
there is no longer a need to provide objective evidence of quality to
an outside agency. What is required is the introduction of a quanti-
fied reliability program. The causes of reduced availability and current
problems in construction must be clearly identified and quantified.
Once this is done, the QA system should focus on items that are identi-
fied as quality related.
Unfortunately, data is not available to provide the information
necessary for a good fossil QA system. It is known, for example, that
at least 50 percent of the availability problems on fossil plants today
are related directly to the boiler. Structural and tube failures are
documented, but the causes of the failures are not known. Tube failures
could be the result of overheating due to unstable flame conditions in
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the boiler, thermal stresses during heating and cooling, flow isolation
problems, or many other factors. Information is not available to
analyze these types of failures statistically.
On thing is known, however. Most reliability problems in fossil
boilers are due to poor-quality engineering rather than poor field
erection quality. The answer, then, will lie only partially in increased
field quality. Better engineering on the part of equipment suppliers
will provide the most significant availability improvements. Data must
be gathered to clearly identify the causes of availability problems,
and quality assurance standards must be selectively applied at the
source of those causes.
Development of this type of data-based system will take several
years, and most of the development remains to be started. In the
interim, however, several utilities have increased their QA programs on
fossil plants in areas that are easily identified as needing improve-
ment. One such program is currently in use at GPU's Homer City, Unit 3.
The QA program at Homer City 3 is composed of activities that
provide assurance that the manufacturing, construction, and startup
operations are consistent with the engineering design and specifications.
It is clear that this area of consistency with engineering is not the
only area of concern to GPU, but it is the area for which a viable
system has been adopted. The five major divisions that characterize the
Homer City QA program are increased vendor surveillance, on-site
contractors' quality control and construction manager's surveillance,
increased site procedural control and documentation, controlled plant
test and turnover, and improved owner documentation package. Activities

169
addressed within the QA program include construction, receiving,
handling, storage, calibration, documentation, welding, nondestructive
testing, vendor compliance, purchasing and internal audits.
As previously mentioned, certain components impact more directly
upon reliability than others. Because of this, the QA program at
Homer City is directed only at the following components: the boiler,
mechanical equipment, heaters, fans, critical structural steel, trans-
formers, switchgear, electrical equipment, piping classes 4 and 5,
valves, tanks, ash handling and diesel generators.
Summary
It was recognized in the very early stages of nuclear power
development that safety and environmental considerations related to
this type of plant demanded a significant improvement in the technological
capability and product of the power industry. The requirements and
description of these improvements appeared, initially, as rather general
and often vague statements with respect to the type of goals and ideals
that the industry was to be striving toward. Quality assurance in
design, procurement, and construction was brought into formal definition
with the issuance of Appendix B of 10CFR50 in 1969. Since that time,
clarification and the detailed description of requirements and recom-
mendations have been provided, through the medium of Regulatory Guides
and ANSI Standards. Further clarifications continue to be produced even
today, with no end as yet to the changes which could be made.
It has been clearly demonstrated that safety, economy and relia-
bility go hand-in-hand in a project that is properly engineered and
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constructed. A clearly developed and properly implemented quality
assurance program will go a long way toward insuring economy and relia-
bility, as well as safety, in the final product. Despite large fi-
nancial and personnel costs in employing such a quality system, it is
hoped that a properly developed and implemented QA plan will pay for
itself over the entire life of the nuclear power plant. In support of
this belief, several utilities are adapting QA standards to fossil
plants.
When adapting quality assurance standards from nuclear to fossil,
it must be recognized that the basis of the program changes from
assurance of safety to developing increased reliability. As yet, the
primary activities that might be controlled in order to bring about the
largest increases in plant reliability have not been quantified to the
point that they may be logically approached. Data is being gathered,
however, to begin this task. In the meantime, certain progressive
utilities have begun to adapt QA standards to activities that are
approachable at this time.
In order for any QA program to be effective, it must be clearly
defined and understood by all. Furthermore, the persons involved must
believe in the basic philosophy and concepts underlying the program.
Proper development is an awesome task, but implementation remains the
most difficult and frustrating problem to be faced. Because of this,
a good QA manager can often be the most valuable, and most highly under-
paid, employee on the site.
After numerous visits and conversations at various locations in
the Northeastern United States, is it the writer's conclusion that the
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designers, constructors, and utilities of the American power industry-
have accepted the challenge of nuclear quality assurance in a highly
positive and commendable manner. They display professionalism in
never ceasing to ask why, while at the same time refusing to compromise
on any item relating to safety. Nuclear limits and standards have been
developed for the industry by the industry. It appears that the goal
of assuring safety to the public and the environment is shared




Due to the tremendous capital outlay and the complexities en-
countered during an extended construction cycle, such as that which
occurs when a nuclear power plant is being built there is a great deal
more effort spent in off-site preparation for on-site construction work
than might be spent under normal conditions. Responsibilities must be
defined, the site plan and construction plan must be developed in detail,
licenses and permits must be secured, procedures for individual work
processes must be developed, and labor requirements must be determined
and provided for. The key to any successful project is found in the
degree and accuracy of planning that takes place prior to commencing
construction. This chapter will discuss the planning that is typically
required for a nuclear power plant.
The Project Plan
Before detailed planning and execution of procurement and construc-
tion can be properly coordinated, evaluated, and integrated, the persons
involved in any individual aspect of the job must develop an understand-
ing of how his part or sequence fits into the overall project. This
understanding is made possible by the development and publication of a
consolidated project plan. The purpose of this plan is to define
clearly the scope of the project, indicate a schedule for design and
construction, and delineate the accounting system that will be used to




In order to provide the information on scope, schedule, and account-
ing required; a good project plan may include, but is not limited to the
following items: (1) project description, (2) project charter, (3) list-
ing of plant criteria, (4) reference to the management control system
for the project, (5) schedule of main events, (6) cost estimates,
(7) budget and expenditure forecasts, (8) contract breakdowns, (9) pro-
jected staffing requirements, (10) training requirements for projected
staff, (11) project organization and responsibilities information, and
(12) a thorough explanation of any management methods or policies which
will vary from the company's standard methods and policies (GPU, 1976).
Provision must also be made for changes to the plan.
Plan Development
The project plan is developed by the owner and his agents in sever-
al stages and requires the input of many individuals and organizations
in order to be accurate and reliable. The initial steps in developing
the plan will be taken by senior project management. Using experience
and historical data from similar projects, management is able to develop
a schedule of main events, a milestone schedule, contract breakdowns,
cost and budget estimates, as well as an overall labor forecast. These
broad elements will be separated and defined in detail by the individu-
als and groups who will be involved with the development of the plan on
the activity level (GPU, 1976) . The parties involved on the activity
level will be the contractors, consultants, and suppliers who are re-
quired by their contracts to submit planning details to the owner or
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his agent. Inconsistencies between the management plan and the de-
tailed plans will be ironed out in a manner previously agreed upon by
the parties involved.
A typical approach to the detailed plan analysis is to break the
work into definable units, assigning a title, cost code, and respon-
sibility for planning and execution of that unit to specific organiza-
tions and individuals. The units are then clearly defined and planned
in detail, specifying schedule requirements for duration, manpower,
equipment, and materials. A start date is specified and the plan is
submitted for approval. Changes to the plan are handled in a similar
fashion (GPU, 1976).
Planning Limits
When dealing with a five-year construction cycle, it is not
feasible or economical to attempt to plan at the outset of the project
the detailed activity level of every work item. It is necessary, how-
ever, to define at the very earliest point all the individual work
activities that are anticipated during the life of the project, and to
indicate how the activities fit together. This is accomplished by
senior management of the project in the initial stage of plan develop-
ment through the formation of schedules, contract breakdowns, cost and
budget estimates, and a labor forecast. These work activities are then
used as yardsticks and reference points as detailed planning occurs
during the project. A good rule of thumb suggested to the writer for
activity level planning is to establish and maintain a detailed plan




Once issued, the project plan becomes the primary tool that in-
dividual activity managers employ to insure coordination and proper
integration. Through this document, or group of documents, each indivi-
dual in the management team is able to learn exactly what he is expected
to do, and when and where his responsibilities begin and end. In ad-
dition to this, he has information available as to the persons involved,
pertinent contract information, and definitions of responsibility and
obligations for those work activities with which he must interface. An
understanding of the projected normal flow of information may also be
gained, and directives concerning the dissemination of information under
unusual or emergency situations may be established.
Construction Interaction with Design
It has long been the opinion of many in the construction industry
that design firms are guilty of producing designs that are very often
impractical to construct. This remains true for the largest of the A/E
firms, and even for the engineering side of the country's largest
engineer-constructors. To illustrate this point a group of 30 senior
design members of a nuclear project design team were recently taken on
a tour of a similar project under construction. Among the group, almost
75 percent had never been on a nuclear power plant site, and over 50
percent admitted that they were awed at the massive dimensions and
physical complexities of the very components they had been designing
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3for years. It is important to note that this group of designers was
employed by one of the leading engineer-constructors, and reflects the
existence of tunnel vision that has been common throughout the entire
industry.
Fortunately, the solution of this problem, once recognized, is
easily begun. The answer has been found by several firms within the
industry by the integration of a skeleton crew of construction experts
into the design team from the time when the preliminary conceptual
design begins. The constructability review has long been a part of the
design process, but it usually followed design rather than influenced
the design throughout all of its phases. The large engineering firms
have accepted the integrated design team with varying degrees of en-
thusiasm, but the degree of success in the development of improvements
to the design resulting from this interaction of ideas has been signi-
ficant and readily measurable.
Interaction Activities During Conceptual Design
Construction input is vital from the beginning in the development
of the initial plant layout. What may look very orderly and compact to
the designer can easily result in congestion and unnecessary construc-
tion headaches for the construction supervisor. There should be a de-
sire on the part of the designer to develop a layout that will afford
some degree of flexibility for installation and repair of equipment.
3
Mr. John Theriault, Manager of Construction Contracts, Bechtel Power
Corporation, Gathersburg, Md., in a personal interview, March 1, 1976
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Site access for men, materials, and equipment must be optimized, as
well as insuring that system accesses for various crafts will be suf-
ficient to minimize interferences that will impact upon cost and sched-
ule (Gilbert Associates, Inc., 1975).
It is at the concept stage that many materials are selected, and
construction personnel should be influential in these determinations.
The use of concrete block walls and structural steel instead of struc-
tural concrete, wherever possible, will afford tremendous savings in the
net cost of the plant. In addition, construction expertise is valuable
in the various special studies that are initiated, particularly in the
nuclear, such as Nuclear Steam Supply System selection, type of con-
denser tubing and type of containment to be used (Gilbert Associates,
Inc., 1975). Changes to a design, once approved, are time-consuming and
costly. It is important at the outset, therefore, to be fully aware of
exactly what the designer is committing the constructor to produce.
Interaction Activities During Design Sequencing
Since much of the detailed engineering of the plant will be ac-
complished during the same time frame that early phases are being con-
structed, it is necessary to establish a general sequence of phases for
construction so that design priorities may be identified. The designer
will be more accurate in establishing the sequence and time frames in-
volved if he has construction information regarding the methods which
will be used in the field. Construction personnel can also assist in
identifying intermediate milestones and dividing the project into de-
finable work packages that will be easily contracted and controlled
(Gilbert Associates, Inc., 1975).
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Further assistance can be provided by construction personnel to
the design team in developing the temporary facilities plan for the
site itself. Field experience can best dictate the type of service and
location for sewage treatment, water, power, offices, storage, warehouse,
and shops. These items have in the past often been left to the decision
of the designer, who will at a later date be involved with their usage
(Gilbert Associates, Inc., 1975).
Interaction Activities During Detailed Design
Construction personnel can have a tremendous impact on the de-
tailed design of the power plant. Initially, the design will vary de-
pending on the types of cranes and their locations on the site. The
scheme for heavy rigging operations is of critical concern and will
impact heavily on design (Gilbert Associates, Inc. , 1975) . An obser-
vation made to the writer by one construction manager, who had just
moved from 20 years of fossil plant construction to his first nuclear
plant, was that the major visible difference in fossil and nuclear con-
struction is the drastically increased use of cranes on the nuclear site.
Sizing and location of construction openings and accesses is
necessary, as well as identifying the need for imbedments (such as
welding pads or hooks, special foundations for equipment, and bolting
data for structural steel) . It is common to use modeling studies for
especially critical or complex areas to insure that the design can be
constructed as expected. Construction personnel can also be valuable
in identifying components that would be candidates for prefabrication
(Gilbert Associates, Inc., 1975).
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Lastly, construction personnel must continuously review all phases
of the detailed design drawings and specifications to insure construct-
ability. With an average of 100,000 drawings and 450 primary speci-
fications for an 850 MW nuclear plant (TMIQA, 1975), this is no easy
task, and one that cannot be taken lightly.
Interaction Activities During Construction
During the construction phase itself, the construction group of the
design team continues to remain active. Design interferences and incon-
sistencies must be identified and dealt with in a speedy manner. Scope
changes must be evaluated with regard to impact upon construction, and
claims from the contractors for changes and extras must be acted upon.
The construction group can maintain a schedule of what drawings are due
to the field at which time and identify drawing delays before they occur.
Finally, the construction group can compile information regarding pro-
blem areas, for use in future projects (Gilbert Associates, Inc., 1975).
Planning by Design Models
One technique that is rapidly expanding in the power industry is
the use of models as an aid to design. Modeling has been in use for
many years, particulary for sequencing and conceptual design. The chemi-
cal industry has used modeling, however, to actually design a plant and
then develop drawings from the model. This type of detailed modeling has
recently also become popular in the power industry, and is having a sig-
nificant impact upon design with several firms.
The example of the use of modeling presented below is not intended
to delineate all the possibilities and applications for modeling in
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design, but rather to show how a construction group within a design
team might use models to enhance their value to the team. To do this,
4
a few examples from the SNUPPS design of the Bechtel Power Corporation
are mentioned. The SNUPPS project itself is discussed in detail in the
chapter on standardization.
Very simply, a skeleton crew of construction experts has been
assigned to the SNUPPS project team. There are three models being used
by the project team, two of which have proven valuable to the construc-
tion group. Initially, a 3/16-in. scale (3/16-in. = 1 ft.) model of the
entire plant was built. This model is used to verify sequencing and
to check the computerized CPM schedule for the plant. The second
model was built to a 3/8-in. scale and included all cable trays and
piping for the plant. It was then determined that the 3/8-in. model
was not adequate to provide the detail desired, so a 3/4-in. model is
currently being constructed in conjunction with the production of design
drawings. The 3/4-in. scale model shows not only trays and piping, but
the hangars for these items. As we discussed in chapters on piping and
electrical construction, the interference of piping and electrical
work and details of hangars are a critical problem in the field
.
The 3/16-in. model has been used to size and lay out construction
accesses. As a result, in the auxiliary building, horizontal and verti-
cal shafts the entire length and height of the building have been left
open to allow access to the other areas of the building. These areas
Mr. John Theriault, Manager of Construction Contracts, Bechtel Power
Corporation, Gathersburg, Md., in a personal interview, March 1, 1976.
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will later be used as pipe space. Traffic patterns become critical on
a job with 1400 craftsmen, their supervision, and the required QA support
The model was therefore used to identify routes to be followed during
various operations.
Equipment installation procedures are vital to the design and costly
to the owner. By use of the 3/16-in. model, the SNUPPS team determined
that the capacity of the polar crane in the reactor containment vessel
could be beefed up for the heaviest component that would have to be in-
stalled. The employment of a special rigging contractor could be eli-
minated. This reflected a tremendous savings in time and money over
previous projects. It was also found that if a second bridge crane was
installed in the turbine building, the two could be used together to in-
stall the 500-ton stator and the moisture separator reheater. This had
previously required an independent rigging contractor, also. In addition
to saving in the price of the additional contract, however, it was found
that the components could be installed through a hatch instead of through
the side of the turbine building. Lastly, the existence of the second
bridge crane left a crane available for use by the constructor while the
turbine installation monopolized the use of the first crane. These rig-
ging problems are problems the designer has not always been aware of in
the past.
Another example of model use came when the entire turbine building
sequence was changed. The old method called for erecting the turbine
pedestals, constructing the building, and then fabricating the conden-
ser external to the pedestals and sliding it into place. Modeling re-
vealed that a new truss design could eliminate the shoring that had
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previously prevented construction of the turbine building floor above
the condenser. It was therefore felt to be possible to begin the fabri-
cation of the condensor, in place, at an earlier time in the sequence.
The larger 3/4-in. model is currently in use so that drawings can
be checked prior to their issuance in the field. Misalignments and
interferences become a physical reality for the design team, and less
problems arise in the field. In addition to reduced interferences and
misalignment, a more economical use of material is possible. Spooling
of piping, for example, can be consistently more accurate, with less
wasted material.
Modeling is also used in conjunction with experience when the con-
struction experts wish to demonstrate recommended changes to design
personnel. For example, the fuel building, as originally proposed, con-
sisted of structural steel with a two-foot concrete wall around the
steel. Construction personnel suggested that the design be changed to
a three-foot concrete wall with no structural steel. The designers
favored concrete floor slabs where as construction people saw the possi-
bility of steel decking, at a tremendous savings to cost and schedule.
At the time of this writing the problem has not yet been resolved.
Site Layout
Site planning begins at the very earliest stage in the project,
often before a project has been fully identified. Regulations govern-
ing siting are strict, particularly for a nuclear plant, and work on
environmental impact studies and seismic data begins long before the
conceptual design stage. As siting relates to construction, pertinent
information is readily available to the construction team to begin site
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planning. Location, hydrology, weather patterns, soil data and other
historical information can be studied to get a familiarity with the con-
ditions that will be encountered. Transportation considerations are
primary in the original siting study, since many of the large components
are prefabricated and shipped to the site. Information regarding prob-
able transportation routes must be studied in relation to site layout.
Accessibility of the site will have a large impact on construction
costs, as well as access within the limits of the site itself. Sound
engineering judgment and common sense will minimize problems in locating
permanent roads, temporary roads, and rail lines. Traffic patterns must
be established for men, materials, and equipment. In addition to acces-
sibility, the site must be planned to provide proper security through
fencing, security guards, and controlled access for men, materials and
equipment
.
The site layout itself must take into consideration the prevention
of erosion, air pollution, noise pollution, water pollution, thermal
pollution and disturbance of the wildlife balance. The original site
study must take these factors into account, but location of site roads,
temporary facilities, and permanent plant facilities may also impact
upon these factors.
In the layout of the plant, the decision about the location of
temporary facilities is as important as the decision about the location
of permanent facilities. Each contractor must be provided with office
space and its inherent power and water, Laydown areas, sanitary facili-
ties, and parking must be as convenient as possible. Often a site that
has a hastily planned layout will experience low productivity and result
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in a continual movement of facilities, which is disruptive to job
continuity.
Borrow and fill areas for each phase must also be identified.
Noise control, dust control on roads, fire protection, drainage, and
trash collection must be established. If the demand for concrete
dictates a batch plant on site, it must be sized, located and included
in material and equipment traffic plans. Warehouse and storage areas
for aggregate, material, machinery, and waste for a project of such
magnitude can require acres of land, and must be located properly in
order to optimize the efficient utilization of these facilities during
the construction cycle. A great deal of experience is required in de-
termining the size of the laydown space and assembly area that will be
required for each phase of the job. Therefore, the total definition of
what will be needed is a sizeable problem.
Table 26 is a listing provided by the Bechtel Power Corporation of
the types of facilities commonly considered in a typical nuclear power
plant project. To provide an appreciation for the order of magnitude of
the facilities discussed, Table 27 indicates a comparison between an
80 MW oil/gas fired power plant and two 1500 MW nuclear units.
With regard to site storage, one method which has been used ef-
fectively at the Three Mile Island construction site is the extensive
use of the trailer half of tractor trailer rigs. The utility discovered
that trailers which are no longer road worthy are available for less than
$1,000. They therefore purchased a number of them in order to provide
excellent weather protection, security and mobility at the site.

185
Table 26. Types of Facilities Commonly Found at




























Permanent Plant and Appurtenances
ACCESS ROADS AND HEAVY HAUL FACILITIES
Access Road
Railroad
Barge Canals and Landings




















Table 27. Facilities Comparison—Fossil Versus Nuclear Units
Gross Areas
Minimum Maximum








































































The process of licensing by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is
discussed in detail in Chapter 3, entitled Regulation and Licensing. In
addition to NRC requirements, however, there are a great many more
licenses and permits that must be secured from various local and national
commissions. The number and description of these permits varies from
state to state and location to location. Table 28 provides a listing of
the permit requirements for projects in New Jersey. Similar lists could
be presented for each of the 50 states.
The Construction Plan
The development of the construction plan has been mentioned as a
requirement for developing the project plan. It is mentioned again at
this point to emphasize the need for the advance planning of detailed
construction methods in order to insure the success of the project. A
power plant project is so big that, unless proper attention is given to
details in advance, the project may very easily run "out of control."
A number of milestones and intermediate milestones must be defined
and methods must be evaluated and sequenced in a very exacting manner.
Manpower requirements must be accurately estimated so that the correct
numbers of each craft will be available when they are required. This
process is described later in this chapter under the heading of Labor
Requirements.
A vigorous program of methods review and improvement must be con-
tinuously in operation in expectation of moving ahead of schedule, or
as is more often the case, trying to make up for areas that are behind
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there remains the potential for significant improvement in both methods
and productivity. This has been convincingly demonstrated to the writer
by the Bechtel Power Corporation constructability team assigned to the
SNUPPS project, which was discussed earlier in this chapter.
Once the work item, method, and schedule of construction have been
defined, there is still a large job remaining. This is the job of in-
suring that the right men, tools, materials and equipment get to the
right place at the right time and perform the job as planned. Control
of performance is still the area that causes the most concern, as in-
dicated by the work sampling data presented in Chapter 13 of this report.
Development of Plans and Procedures
Contained within, and in addition to the construction plan there are
a great many plans and procedures that must be developed prior to the
initiation of construction activities. Many of these plans are require-
ments of the PSAR, which was discussed in Chapter 3 entitled Regulation
and Licensing, the use of these plans was discussed in Chapter 5 entitled
Project Control. Several of the more important plans are briefly
mentioned below, however, in order to indicate the type of items are
included in each. Typically, these plans are prepared jointly by the
owner, AE and constructor.
Administrative Plan
The administrative plan must delineate administrative procedures to
be followed on a day-to-day and month-to-month basis. This plan should
describe the mechanics of the functioning of the project control system.
Which management controls are to be reported, to whom, by whom, in what
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fashion and at what frequency should be clearly discernible. Normal
routing of information and reporting procedures for daily work should
also be included.
The development of the administrative plan, as well as any of the
other plans mentioned, is not as simple or clear cut as these descriptions
might indicate. Coordination of the tremendous volumes of information
that must be transmitted between the 15 to 50 parties representing the
simultaneous effort of many thousands of individuals is a complex task
that requires foresight and a great deal of experience.
Document Control
As mentioned previously, a typical 850 MW nuclear power plant pro-
ject may include well over 100,000 engineering drawings and over 450 pri-
mary specifications. These documents are in a continuous process of
generation and revision throughout the project duration. Common sense
and regulatory requirements dictate that all work must be done in ac-
cordance with the very latest available change. It has become a monu-
mental task to insure that every man or supervisor in the field has the
most recent change to the applicable drawing in hand as he begins his
day's work. In many cases, it can be difficult to identify what the
number of the latest change is, not to mention insuring that it actually is
being implemented.
To aid in this process, constructors and utilities have developed
detailed procedures and accounting for the generation and distribution
of engineering documents. Initially, a master file of all drawings must
be established at the site. This master file will typically be in the
hands of the constructor or construction manager, who will be responsible
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for distribution to the field. In addition to this file, many utilities
maintain a copy of all drawings in their own site files, as well as draft
copies or microfilm cards in the home office. Updating this master file
is a continuous job of tremendous importance.
The writer has become aware of one addition to document control that
is used by the Pennsylvania Power and Light Company which should prove
very valuable to future planning within the company. At various stages
of the Susquehanna Power Plant, Berwick, Pennsylvania, an exhaustive techni-
cal report is developed that describes in detail the scope of the project at
that point. Included with the statement of scope is a deck of computer-
ized file cards, each of which contains a microfilm copy of all of the
latest drawings to date. These statements and drawings can be studied at
a later time to provide scope impact trends as well as to augmenting in-
formation for cost and schedule control.
From the master file, drawings must be distributed to the field.
A procedure must be established which describes how the decision pro-
cess which determines who shall receive certain drawings, and in what
manner they will be issued them. The number and location of each draw-
ing is maintained at the master file. This is done in order to insure
accountability in the return of all drawings at the end of their use by
individuals or at the issuance of a revision to that drawing.
New copies of each drawing in use are often generated on a monthly
basis to be exchanged for drawings that have become worn, ragged or
otherwise hard to read by use in the field. In addition to this, weekly
or biweekly updates listing the latest change to all drawings are gener-
ated so that individuals can insure that they were not overlooked or
missed a recent distribution.

199
Further checks for the document control system include spot checks
by in-house QC personnel, as well as by the NRC during its regular visits.
Material Procurement and Transportation
Items that are safety-related, or otherwise included as "Q material,"
will be controlled as described in the QA/QC documents relating to them.
There are many other items, however, that do not fall under this control,
and a plan must be developed to describe procurement and handling of
these items. In addition to contract development, which has already
been discussed, the procedure on-site for receiving, documenting, trans-
porting, and storing material and components must be clearly identified.
There must also be a plan that indicates how a supervisor insures that
the material will be in stock and available on time, as well as the
procedure that will be used to insure that the delivery of the item is
made to the work location on the day that it is needed. The severe
shortage of storage space in the crowded work locations on most power
plants makes timing and coordination of material delivery a critical item.
Construction Procedures
As mentioned previously, procedures are developed which define in
detail exactly how an individual construction job is to be accomplished.
The number of craftsmen, tools, equipment, sequence of events, testing,
inspection and documentation required for that job or job phase must be
clearly included in these procedures. NRC Regulatory Guides as well as
ANSI standards, applicable codes, common sense and craft experience all




The philosophy and development of the QA/QC plan cannot be over-
emphasized. Quality Assurance requirements literally control a nuclear
power plant construction site. The details of the QA plan were discussed
in Chapter 5 of this thesis, entitled "Quality Assurance."
Safety Plan
In addition to the requirements for safety related to the potential
hazards of nuclear accidents, which are governed by the NRC , construction
safety must be considered from a conventional point of view. Industrial
safety falls under the requirements of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970. An explanation of the application of this law to construc-
tion may be found in "Construction Safety and Health Regulations," The
Federal Register
, Volume 39, No. 122, Part II, June 24, 1974. In general,
requirements have been established by most utilities and contractors to
insure that proper training, indoctrination, supervision, inspection,
equipment, practices, and emergency care are present or in use at the
job site.
As in other types of construction, the description of a good safety
program is only the first step to ensuring the safety of all site per-
sonnel. Trying to insure that the personnel involved actually follow the
procedures is often a thankless and never-ending job. It is not uncommon
to see men working on a power plant construction job without hardhats or
proper eye protection. Cranes lifting and swinging overhead directly
over a group of men, unsafe congestion, etc., are all prevalent symptoms
of an improperly implemented safety program.
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It appears that the degree of safety awareness is a function of two
factors. Initially, it Is a function of the personal concern of top
management. If the senior people on site are safety conscious, and
consistently rigorous in their demands for compliance, the entire site
will become more safety conscious. This may occur through positive
motivation or simply as a response to the desire to prevent the reoccur-
rence of chastisement from top management.
The second factor in safety awareness is the current safety record
for the site. If there has been a recent fatality or series of serious
accidents, everyone will become more aware of their own safety. The
latter factor usually has only a temporary effect, however, since people
generally forget and return to their carelessness soon after the shock
has passed. A study by Gilbert Associates, Inc. (1975), revealed the
following accident statistics on large projects: for every serious or
disabling injury there are about 29 minor injuries, 30 property damage
accidents of all types, and 600 incidents with no visible injury or damage,
Although the types of safety violations witnessed on power plant
projects may be similar to those which occur on conventional construction,
the potential impact of them is much more serious. This is simply be-
cause the number of individuals who may get hurt is vastly increased in
a power plant situation and because of the high cost of replacement of
nuclear- type equipment. Because of this, comprehensive training programs
for all personnel are an absolute must.
Site visits and conversations with industry personnel have revealed
to the writer that industrial safety varies tremendously from site to
site, and from phase to phase in construction. Some sites appear neat
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and orderly throughout their life, while others are cluttered with scrap
material, leftover cable, disassembled packaging, and items awaiting
installation. Congestion and poor housekeeping are primary safety
deterrents at these latter sites. It is of great concern to note that
OSHA has not, as yet, had as significant an impact on power plants
(particularly on nuclear plants) that it has had on the remainder of
the construction industry. According to one NRC inspector, this was due,
in part, to the fact that the unions have not been outspoken in request-
ing that OSHA inspectors regularly visit their projects.
The following incident experienced by the writer should illustrate
the degree of change that is needed. At one nuclear power plant that
was visited, workmen were in the process of placing some small reactor
components within the stainless steel containment of the reactor. To do
this, the components were attached with shackles to the large polar crane,
lifted above the containment, and lowered into place. The operation took
several hours, and apparently required that several individuals cross
back and forth across the containment opening. To facilitate this
crossing, a two-by-six plank was laid across the opening. No handrails
or safety nets were employed, and everyone watching, including the
constructor's supervisors, held their breath each time a workman balanced
his way across the plank.
Labor Plan
The very large numbers of craftsmen that must be located, trained
and controlled on a nuclear plant present a formidable problem for
utility and constructor planning. Details of the requirements and




For purposes of cost control, cash flow planning, and the account-
ability of the utility to the Federal Power Commission, an efficient and
effective accounting plan must be developed. Details of this type of
planning are discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis entitled "Project
Control."
Security and Traffic Plan
A plan or group of plans must be developed in order to control
access to the site during construction and to the plant during operation.
Fencing and a security guard force are a necessity, and their functioning
must be clearly defined. The flow of authorized personnel, material,
and equipment must be carefully coordinated to minimize congestion and
confusion.
Insurance Plan
Development of insurance limits and requirements is vital to licen-
sing, and is a very serious matter when dealing with the tremendous
accident potentials to the public and sums of money commonly encountered
in the power industry. The insurance plan is directly related to the
development of the safety plan, as many of the fire and industrial safety
requirements will be regulated by the appropriate insurance company.
Emergency Procedures Plan
A set of emergency procedures is developed to delineate actions and
responsibilities in the event of man-made or natural catastrophe. A
typical set of procedures would include a Bomb Threat Plan, Fire Pro-
cedures Involving Outside Agencies, an Off-Site Emergency Call List,
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an On-Site Emergency Call List, Evacuation Procedures, an Emergency
Action Plan, and a Civil Disobedience and Riot Control Plan. These plans
are very similar in nature to what might be found on a military installa-
tion or any industrial security site.
Mobilization
Immediately prior to commencement of construction, the actual
mobilization of the site task force begins. Hopefully, each phase and
area of the site have been carefully detailed in advance, and the work
of setting up the site will proceed with minimum delay and confusion.
Roads, buildings and facilities are prepared for use, and individual
contractors begin moving their trailers and equipment onto the site.
Site mobilization is usually accompanied by an extensive public relations
effort on a local level. This effort is undertaken in order to allow
local leaders to get to know the site management, and to open channels
of communication which might be needed if future problems should arise.
Lead times for initial material requirements as well as major com-
ponents should be carefully reviewed prior to mobilization. Security
and coordination become important from the outset, and a smoothly flow-
ing mobilization goes a long way to setting the precedent for future site
activities.
Summary
To a large degree, the initial success of a power plant project is
governed by the degree of detail and accuracy involved in preplanning
site activities. The scope of the project must be clearly defined, and
various degrees of authority and responsibility among the parties involved
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must be determined and understood. Interaction of design and con-
struction personnel is vital at the very earliest conceptual stage.
Layout of the site itself involves preplanning the location and
flow of men, material and equipment for an extended period of construc-
tion. Often this must be done with only a minimum amount of information
available, and it requires a large degree of experience and accurate
anticipation. Prior to construction itself, plans and procedures for
every administrative and work phase of the project must be developed.
This preplanning is a process that appears, at first glance, to be
far too expensive. Experience has shown, however, that dollars spent
in detailed preplanning will result in savings that far exceed the cost




The technical aspects of the civil engineering construction
effort as well as the management functions related to this effort will
be discussed in this chapter. The civil engineering aspects of a
nuclear power plant represent a complex combination of extensive
engineering and unusual standards of precision and cleanliness. The
problems that must be dealt with are commonly magnified by significant
alterations to the design during construction (Bradwell, 1963). In
addition, there must be an ingrained concern on the part of the
utility for the aesthetic value of the civil engineering product. The
civil engineering construction effort on a typical nuclear power plant,
including excavation, foundations, concrete work, structural steel,
5
and nuclear containment represents half of the total field effort.
Civil Engineering Technical Aspects
The technological areas of civil engineering have a significant
influence on the overall project from the very earliest stages of
conceptual design. Soil investigations, topographic surveys, hydro-
logical information and transportation considerations are among the
major critical factors that must be analyzed in the original siting
process. Site layout, accessibility for construction and operations,
security and aesthetic considerations for the plant are also processes
that require civil engineering input at the very earliest stage. Civil
Mr. Earl Miller, Cost Control Engineer, General Public Utilities
Service Corporation, in a personal interview, March 16, 1976.
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engineering expertise is also required in design sequencing and con-
struction methods determinations long before site work actually begins.
In the following discussion, the magnitude of the civil construction
effort will be illustrated by itemizing the material and equipment
requirements for a typical nuclear power plant project. A detailed
analysis of the technical activities of civil work, including earth-
work, concrete structures, conventional structural steel structures,
and cooling towers will then be presented.
Civil Engineering Material Requirements
The first civil engineering aspect that may be considered is the
overall quantity of materials that are used. On a typical single-unit
1150 MWe nuclear power plant, the following quantities (Budwani, 1975)
are to be expected:
Material Quantity
Concrete 125,000 to 175,000 cu. yd.
Rebar 13,000 to 18,000 tons
Structural Steel 5,000 to 8,000 tons
Containment Liner (PWR) 900 to 1,200 tons
Fuel Pool Liner 140 to 160 tons
Embedments (Iron) 1,000 to 1,200 tons
Formwork 1,250,000 to 1,750,000 sq. ft.
Railroad Tracks 40,000 to 60,000 lin. ft.
Grating and Flooring 225 to 350 tons
These quantities illustrate clearly that a nuclear power plant is an
extremely complex project simply from the magnitude and work involved.
These quantity figures do not, however, even begin to indicate the
complexity that is involved in the project due to the addition of safety
and the quality assurance requirements. These requirements within the
civil phase will be discussed later in this chapter.
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Major Equipment Required During the Civil Phase
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, nuclear power plant
construction often involves a great deal more lifting equipment than
conventional construction projects. The presence of a large number of
cranes and several heavy rigging contractors is not uncommon. To
illustrate, there were 28 cranes of one type or another operating at
the Susquehanna Nuclear Generation Station in June of 1976. The work
in progress at that time, which was reported to be about 75 percent civil
work, demanded 2,251 craft people and 452 non-manual employees on the
site, just 300 short of the projected peak craft load of 2,575 for
August of that same year.
In addition to the need for a large number of cranes, there is a
proportionate increase in the number of other types of major equipment
that are required on a nuclear power plant project. Earthmoving equip-
ment and transportation haulers are plentiful. Also present is a large
fleet of personnel vehicles, such as pickup trucks, for small hauling
jobs and for use by the supervisory staff.
Although some equipment may be rented, it was pointed out to the
writer that it is more typical for a utility to purchase equipment for
the site, and maintain utility ownership of the equipment throughout
the life of the project. This is brought about primarily because of
the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee type of contract (discussed in Chapter 4) that
is common between utilities and constructors.
Earthwork
The excavation work for a nuclear power plant is essentially
identical to excavation work in conventional construction. Probably
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the only important difference is that the depth of excavation is often
great, to depths of 45 feet or more below existing grade (Brown, 1957).
There is a tremendous difference, however, between the backfilling
and compaction process for nuclear power plant projects and that which
occurs in conventional construction. In general, on nuclear work quality
assurance requirements provide that the borrowed earth must be traceable.
There must be documentation for source, consistency, handling and com-
paction of each cubic yard of earth. Because of the uncertainties
involved in soils engineering, and due to the high cost of QA documenta-
tion, it appears to be accepted practice to use what is commonly referred
to as a seal mat or a mud mat of unreinforced concrete instead of a
layer of compacted earth directly beneath the foundation.
Foundation Mats
Regardless of which type of containment is being employed for the
reactor, reinforced, prestressed, or a combination of the two, the
foundation mats for all concrete containments in the United States are
of reinforced concrete. This is primarily due to the fact that in a
prestressed-concrete mat CSteigelmann, 1969, p. 166):
1. The resultant membrane forces in a slab are not significant
compared to the moments and shears, and prestressing in a
slab and a shell is not so efficient as in a beam to counter-
act the bending moment.
2. The presence of a deep sump for an instrumentation tunnel
near the middle of the mat would complicate the prestressing
arrangement.
3. Friction between the foundation mat and foundation material,
e.g., soil or rock, presents a dilemma, since it is desirable
to eliminate the friction to reduce the absorption of pre-
stressing force by the foundation material, but it would be




4. The use of prestressing may also require that the stressing
of the tendons be done prior to any significant construction
of the walls due to the slab moments created by the added
dead load
.
5. The cost of a prestressed slab would be higher than the cost
of a reinforced-concrete slab.
In certain foreign countries where plastic containment liners are used
instead of steel, prestressed-concrete mats are used to prevent cracking
and insure leaktightness.
Usually, the foundation mat is sectionalized horizontally and
vertically for sequencing of the pouring operation. Shrinkage is
minimized by pouring alternate horizontal sections (Steigelmann, 1969).
Keys are used to insure a good bond between adjacent lifts.
Reinforcing Steel
The placement of reinforcing bar for the containment of a nuclear
power plant is a particularly time-consuming and expensive job.
Initially, the primary bar that is in use is a 60-ft.-long 2.25 in.
nominal diameter No. 18S reinforcing bar weighing 816 lbs. Placement
of one of these bars typically requires the services of a crane and
several craftsmen. The placement of the bars must be exact, and is
carefully inspected by quality control inspectors. The secondary bars
in use are typically No. 11 reinforcing bars, smaller but equally
difficult in terms of handling, precision and inspection.
For the containment vessel of a Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)
,
which is typically made of reinforced concrete, No. 18 reinforcing
bars are placed longitudinally, horizontally, and diagonally or
helically for the structure. The net result is a design that is very
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complex and congested, particularly at the base mat. Because of the
complexity involved, a number of firms have developed scale models of
this portion of the civil work. For example, the reinforcing steel
placement for a BWR has been modeled in detail by the Bechtel Power
Corporation, and according to both utility and constructor field per-
sonnel involved in use of the model, it was one of the best invest-
ments Bechtel has ever made.
Although a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) containment is usually
prestressed, resulting in far less reinforcing steel, there are still
some major congestion problems involved with bar placement. This is
due primarily to the presence of the prestressing tendon sheaths around
which work must be performed. The most critical congestion often
occurs at the location of the equipment access. There is usually one
circular equipment access of 24 to 35 ft. in diameter in the contain-
ment (CBI, No. 8511). The prestressing tendon sheaths and reinforcing
bar must be bent around this opening, and condensed into a very small
area.
Traceability of reinforcing steel is required for assurance of
quality. This is usually provided by Milcerts, which certify the
source, heat numbers and tensile strength of the bars. The splicing
of No. 18S bars which is required when reinforcing bars are placed is
also a lengthy and expensive process. The process employed is referred
to as Cadwelding. Cadwelding is an exothermic welding process in which
the two bars that are to be joined are placed end to end and surrounded
at the joint by a mold. This process is illustrated in Figure 22. The
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mold is filled with a high energy powdered mixture which is then ignited.
The heat emitted from the burning powder fuses the two bars together.
Cadwelding is required for No. 18S bars because overlapping and
tying the bars becomes bulky, inefficient and uneconomical. Cadwelders
and the Cadwelding process must be qualified and certified in a process
similar to the welding qualification process that will be discussed in
Chapter 9 of this report. Cadweld quality and strength is controlled
by removing in a statistical selection process some of the actual joints
and strength testing them in a laboratory.
Regulatory Guide 1.15 provides guidance for the "Testing of
Reinforcing Bars for Category I Concrete Structures." Basically, the
guide suggests that either one or two test specimens (depending on the
variation in size of the bars) from each heat must be tension tested
according to designated ASTM procedures.
Concrete Production and Placement
Concrete production and placement for a nuclear power plant is a
process involving vast quantities of concrete (as noted earlier this
may be as high as 175,000 cu. yds.) that must be placed and verified
to a degree of precision far beyond the experience of conventional
construction. As a result there is a need for a more thorough planning
analysis for both production and construction placement. The quantities
and quality requirements of a nuclear plant dictate initially that an
on-site concrete plant tailored to the needs of the project is absolutely
required (Mollenbeck, 1972)
.
The development of the design mix for Category I concrete structures


















































mix at the Three Mile Island nuclear station was an eight-bag mix with
a compressive strength (fc') of 6250 psi. This mix was used in order
to insure that all of the concrete would have a compressive strength in
excess of 5Q00 psi.
Cement, sand and aggregate sources must be analyzed very closely,
and a close scrutiny must be maintained in order to insure the detection
of any changes in the properties of materials that are being delivered.
Transport and storage of raw materials is closely controlled and docu-
mented to assist in this effort.
The most critical aspect of concrete work on-site, however, does
not concern the design mix; it concerns the placement of the concrete
itself. The closely spaced bars present in a nuclear containment make
the concreting process a slow and tedious one CSteigelmann, 1960)
.
Special care must be taken to insure that concrete with proper aggregate
size, consistency and slump is provided to well-trained craftsmen in
order to insure that no voids are left in the structure. Placement of
the concrete is commonly done by pumping, but conveyors can also be
used for some work. The use of concrete pumps often creates a need to
increase the slump from a desired 4 in. to 6 or 7 in. (Tabler, 1959).
This increased slump results in potential shrinkage problem situations.
In addition to the problem created by close bar spacing, other
placement problems are encountered, particularly on the last lift of
the containment structure. It is often necessary for the concrete on
the final lift to be immediately against the roof of the shell being
filled. In this case, special procedures must be developed to allow
for the type of exact fit that is required (Tabler , 1959).
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Regulatory Guide 1.55, "Concrete Placement in Category I Structures,"
provides guidance concerning the assurance of quality in design control,
material control, special processes control, inspection and test control.
The discussion portion of this guide cites the fact that although
many standards for concrete exist, there continues to be improper place-
ment of concrete on nuclear power plant projects. The following items
are identified as applicable to the respective parties listed in
regard to the placement of concrete for Category I structures on nuclear
power plants (Regulatory Guide 1.55, p. 2):
1. Applicant . The applicant's quality assurance program should
ensure that early and regular communication is established
between the designer and constructor. Rapid access to the
designer should be possible for the constructor in the event
that a field condition requires Immediate consultation with
the designer, such as relocation of a construction joint or
an embedded item while placing of concrete is in progress.
Conversely, the designer should have rapid access to the con-
structor in the event that late revisions must be made in the
field because of changes in design. Under the provisions of
Appendix B to Part 50, the applicant's quality assurance
program should also ensure the implementation of Sections C.2
and C.3 below.
2. Designer .
a. The designer should check the design and shop drawings
for practicality of:
(1) Placement of reinforcing bars—continuity, congestion,
interference, non-planar geometric bending and placing
requirements, splice locations and their effect on minimum
bar spacing.
C2) Location of embedded items—feasibility of placing
concrete completely around the item, considering congestion
and interference from other embedded items and reinforcing
as well as the type of concrete to be placed (slump, aggre-
gate size, whether preplaced aggregate is used, etc.).
(3) Locations of construction joints—locations of accept-
able construction joints should be noted, as well as any
"windows" in congested reinforcing patterns needed for placing
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the concrete. Followup coordination and revision with the
constructor is essential. Factors for consideration include:
type and quantity of concrete to be placed; shrinkage and
creep; accessibility; cleanout capability before and after
placing the concrete; and acceptability from a strength or
functional point of view. Alternative joint locations should
be available to the constructor in the event that concrete
placement cannot be completed as planned and started.
b. In addition to checking the drawings as noted above, the
designer should assist the constructor as necessary in pre-
planning placement of reinforcement, embedded items, and con-
crete as well as the sequence to be followed in placing con-
crete. The designer should also follow the construction while
it is in progress, including, if necessary, occasional site
visits, and be available for assistance in resolving unantici-
pated field placement problems that might affect the structural
or functional integrity of the structure. Field generated
revisions should be approved by the designer.
3. Constructor . In addition to the coordination noted above,
preplanning by the constructor is necessary for:
a. Cleanness—assuring cleanness of formed area prior to
and during concrete placement, including access provisions
for inspection and cleanout operations.
b. Installations—installations of reinforcing bars, splices,
embedded items, formwork, and construction joint barriers
should be checked prior to placing concrete.
c. Placement layout
—
practicality of construction joint
locations, venting of potential air pockets to prevent voids,
access to congested or confined areas, sequence of placement.
d. Equipment—availability of proper equipment in good operating
condition and in sizes and quantities needed (vibrators, chutes,
etc.). Sufficient spares (parts or equipment) should be
readily available so that loss or breakdown of equipment will
not interrupt the placing of concrete and result in unplanned
cold joints.
e. Personnel—sufficient training and experience in the
proper use of all equipment (especially vibrators) involved
in the placing of concrete. Also sufficient supervisory
knowledge and experience to enable the concrete placement to
be completed in accordance with specifications.
An extensive testing program for concrete is required for assur-
ing quality in the final product. Typically, a testing agent will be
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contracted to do all compression testing, and assist in the major
structural tests that are required. The structural acceptance tests
for concrete containments are goverened by Regulatory Guide 1.18.
Reactor Containments
There are three primary systems of reactor containments in use in
the United States today. These include: (1) full-pressure containment,
(2) Pressure Suppression Containment, and (3) Pressure Relief Contain-
ment (Steigelmann, 1969). The full-pressure containment system shown
in Figure 23, is essentially a reactor building designed to withstand
a postulated accident causing a pressure of 60 psi and a temperature
of 275°F. All external live and dead loads projected for the life of
the containment are used in its design. Most PWR plants have the
full-pressure type of containment.
The pressure-relief containment system was developed by the
General Electric Company and is used for all BWR plants. As shown in
Figure 24, this type of containment contains a suppression pool which
allows steam to condense in the event of an accident, and minimizes
pressure buildup in the dry well.
The pressure-release containment system, shown in Figure 25, is
based upon the concept of releasing pressure that builds up as a result
of an accident. The major design considerations for this type as well
as the other two types of containment, in addition to a nuclear accident,
include protection from missiles, earthquakes and tornadoes.
For the three systems of containments mentioned above, there are
three types of construction for each. The types include: (1) a Rein-
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Concrete Containment Vessel (PCCV) , usually dome and cylinder shaped,
(3) a Reinforced Concrete Containment Vessel, Axially Prestressed.
Comparisons made by Mr. William H. Steigelmann and Mr. Chen Pang Tan
(p. 160) in 1969 revealed:
1. There are nearly equal numbers of PCCV's and RCCV's.
2. The internal design pressures of PCCV's are about 10
to 20 psi higher than those of the RCCV's of equivalent
electrical generating capacity.
3. The wall thicknesses of RCCV's are generally about 6 to
12 in. greater than those of PCCV's of equivalent electrical
generating capacity.
The standard features of each of the three types of containments
were summarized in 1969 by Steigelmann and Tan (p. 160, 161) as follows
Reinforced-Concrete Containment Vessel . Generally the basic
features of this type of containment are:
• Hemispherical dome
• Wall thickness of 3-1/2 to 4-1/2 ft, for the cylinder and 2-1/2
to 3-1/2 ft. for the dome
• Main reinforcement bars placed axially and circumferentially
• Seismic reinforcement bars placed helically at an angle of
45 degrees with the horizontal, in both directions in the wall
of the cylinder
• Stirrups or diagonal bars provided in the lower portion of the
cylinder to resist radial shear
• Thermal insulation provided on the inside for the bottom 20 ft.
or so of the cylindrical portion of the containment, so that the
stress contribution from thermal effects is kept to a minimum
at the junction of the wall and base slab
• Studs used to anchor the linear to the concrete wall.
Prestressed Concrete Containment Vessel . In the United States
(in 1969) there are about 16 PCCV's, either being built or being
planned. The basic features of these containments are nearly
the same. The wall thicknesses are about 3-1/2 ft. for the cyl-
inder and 2-1/2 ft. for the shallow dome. All the containments
are provided with a steel liner for leaktightness , and the liner
is anchored to the concrete by continuous angle or channel anchors.
The conventional concrete construction method is used. The
prestressing tendons are either bonded or unbonded. The pre-
stressing force in the cylinder is attained by prestressing the
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tendons in the circumferential and axial directions in all
PCCV's except the one at the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Power Station,
where the prestressing tendons are placed helically.
Prestressed- and Reinforced-Concrete Containment Vessel . In this
type of concrete containment, the concrete in the cylindrical
portion is prestressed axially and reinforced circumferentially
,
whereas the concrete in the hemispherical dome is simply reinforced,
Some basic premises of this concept are that axial prestressing
will enhance the shear resistance of concrete across a horizontal
plane of the cylinder wall and that it may greatly reduce the
amount of axial reinforcing steel needed. Because of the reduced
reinforcement required, the thicknesses 6f the vessel wall are
reduced to the values used in the containment at Diablo Canyon.
In current designs the whole cylinder liner is insulated with
PVC foam plastic material covered with a stainless-steel sheet to
limit the liner temperature during the worst hypothesized accident
and thereby to maintain the liner stresses within design limits.
Diagonal reinforcing steel is provided at the bottom portion of
the cylinder to resist the radial shear stress resulting from
the discontinuity at the base of the wall.
Although the information presented by Steigelmann and Tan was gathered
in 1969, it accurately reflects the state of containment construction
today.
Since a steel liner is required for all reactors by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, concrete placement for reinforced concrete
structures has been done exclusively by conventional methods employing
fixed forms. Slip-forming methods are not generally attractive when an
inner form is already present. The subject of prestressing is still a
relatively new one in the power industry, and will be discussed in detail
in the next section.
Prestressed Concrete Construction
Pres tressed-concrete containments are employed on PWR's primarily
for economy in meeting aircraft impact requirements. The second major
advantage of prestressed-concrete is found in meeting the 60 psi
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pressure requirements of a PWR in the event of a "Loss of Cooling
Accident (LOCA)." Aircraft impact design requirements for a PWR
limit the projected damage resulting from the direct crash of a 707
aircraft to hairline cracks and spalling in the immediate area of impact.
The forces anticipated upon impact were determined by actual impact of
an aircraft into a test wall.
Using a prestressing system, walls can be 3 to 3-1/2 ft. thick,
limiting hairline cracks to allowable 6-ft. intervals. Without pre-
stressing, walls would have to be 6 to 8 ft. thick with allowable cracks.
A steel containment would require an uneconomically large amount of
stress relieving of the steel.
The PCI Post-Tensioning Manual (1972) provides an excellent summary
of the prestressed post-tensioned systems available for nuclear contain-
ment vessels. In addition, it is an excellent guide for design and
construction of post-tensioned members.
In general, prestressing tendons may be installed in either horizon-
tal and vertical rings, or helically. Helical installations eliminate
the requirement for circumferential prestressing anchorages, and reduce
interference between the prestressing crew and other work in progress.
Dimensional control of the tendon ducts and large friction losses asso-
ciated with helical installations offset the advantages, however.
The installation of the tendons themselves is very closely controlled.
Tendons are installed, tensioned with hydraulic jacks using a protector
Mr. Jim Wright, Lead Civil Engineer, GPU Service Corporation, Three
Mile Island Nuclear Station, in a personal interview, September 18, 1975
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plate and tensioning wedges, and anchored in an anchorage plate with
anchorage wedges. The force in the prestressing tendons is measured by
gages on the jacks and calculated using elongation data. The tendon
duct is then filled completely with grease, wax or grout to prevent mois-
ture damage. Typically, the contractor is permitted seven days from
start of tendon installation to completion of grouting without a tendon
inspection. Fifteen days is allowed with an interim inspection.
There are a very limited number of companies capable of providing
prestressing steel, and, as in so many of the nuclear power disciplines,
there is not an abundance of competition. The prestressing process is
well defined, however, and as a result, prestressing will often be
accomplished on the basis of a fixed- price contract.
Structural Steel and Conventional Buildings
Construction of conventional buildings not considered Category I,
such as the turbine building of a PWR, is accomplished in a manner
identical to conventional methods. Structural steel with steel, aluminum
or precast concrete siding are commonly used. This type of construction
is straightforward and is not governed by nuclear construction procedures.
Cooling Towers
There are two types of cooling towers in use today—the mechanical
draft tower and the natural draft tower. These two types of towers
can be further categorized as having counterflow or crossflow drafts.
The basic principles of these towers are illustrated in Figures 26 through
29. The Natural Draft Hyperbolic Tower, shown in Figure 29, is the type
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The materials used in the construction of cooling towers include
wood, metals, concrete, plastic, and asbestos cement board. The use of
wood has been severely limited on nuclear plants, however, because of
the dangers of fire, particularly during construction.
The construction process for cooling towers for power plants saw
some significant improvements in the early 1970' s (Electrical World , 1973)
The two most important improvements were the development of methods to
allow on-site precasting of the foundation support "X"-struts and the
use of jump-forming for the concrete tower shell.
The "X"-struts of the foundation support are shown on the Natural
Draft Hyperbolic Tower shown in Figure 29. A typical "X"-strut (Electri-
cal World
, 1973) weighs about 55 tons, is 70 ft. high and has a 23 ft.
spread at the top. These are precast on site and then bonded to the
foundation.
The struts are used to support a 3 ft. wide by 8 ft. high ring
beam that forms the base for the tower shell. The shell itself
(Electrical World , 1973) is constructed in 6 ft. lifts using collapsible
forms that are self-raising and adjustable for the various lift diameters.
The cooling towers themselves are not required for the safety
shutdown of the nuclear reactor. As a result they are not safety-
related, or seismic I, and are governed strictly by conventional codes.
Cooling tower construction is interesting and unique, but can generally




Civil Engineering Management Aspects
Due to the extended period of construction and the unusually large
number of craft manhours required for a nuclear power plant, the process
used to manage large work forces for extended periods of time is of
vital interest to the power industry. The following discussion will
center on the civil construction manpower requirements for a nuclear
power plant, as well as the responsibilities of the civil engineering
management for the project site.
Craft Requirements
The growth in size of nuclear power plants from 200 MW to 1100 MW
in the last 15 years has brought about an accompanying increase in
building volume requirements. The craft manhours required to support
such building volume increases has quite naturally grown significantly.
One might expect, however, that this increase in building volumes would
also permit an increase in labor productivity due to increased possibili-
ties of standardization and improved training. Increased productivity
would reduce the overall growth of craft manhour requirements from what
would be necessary to meet the building volume growth without a change
in productivity. In fact, the exact opposite has occurred. Because of
increased safety and environmental requirements, increased technological
complexities, and the severe impact of quality assurance, construction
manhours for nuclear power plants have risen from 4 mh/kWe in the mid-
1960' s, to 11 to 12 mh/kWe for power plants scheduled for commercial
operation in the 1980' s (Budwani, 1975). The details of this trend will





In 1975, Budwani suggested that a 1200 MWe nuclear power plant
scheduled for commercial operation in 1982 would require 12 craft
manhours per kWe. Of this figure, the civil related crafts of laborers,
carpenters, operating engineers, millwrights, painters, teamsters,
cement finishers, bricklayers and sheet metal workers represent
3.86 mh/kWe, or almost one-third of the craft manhours. This represents
a total of 4.6 million craft manhours, a tremendous manhour requirement
by any standards.
Although there appears to be no severe shortages of these crafts
at this time, the writer feels that there is a very real need to main-
tain sufficient training and development programs to meet the needs of
the future. In addition, construction management techniques must be
applied to assist in the reduction of the total mh/kWe figure. This
figure, of course, is a function of a great many factors, including:
(1) construction management techniques, (2) types of contract, (3) open
shop versus union, (4) labor productivity, (5) quality assurance and
quality control requirements, (6) design changes, (7) weather, (8) mate-
rial, (9) equipment delivery, and (10) timeliness of information.
Civil Engineering Management
The management of the civil construction discipline on-site is
very similar to that for any of the other disciplines. Each of the
major parties, utility, constructor and A/E, will have a lead civil
engineer who is supported by a large or small staff depending upon the
role of the party he represents at that period in the construction cycle.
Probably the most significant difference for the lead civil, however,
is that he is on-site first, long before any of the other discipline
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lead engineers. As a result, he is called upon to watch over the
interests of all the disciplines in the early stages of the project.
Another effect of his early arrival, is that the lead civil can
be called upon to act as an administrative head or a technological
administrator who might be called a "lead lead." To illustrate,
United Engineer's job engineer and administrative assistant at the
Three Mile Island nuclear station is a civil engineer. He also acts
as lead civil, surveying head and coordinator of interference resolu-
tion between the various disciplines.
Regardless of which party the lead civil represents, his responsi-
bilities may be summarized as follows: (1) see that the plant is built
in accordance with drawings and specifications, (2) review bid packages
within civil discipline, (3) originate or review extra work authoriza-
tion requests, (4) coordinate with the various other parties in the
civil areas and with other disciplines, (5) coordinate civil work for
changes, such as openings that must be provided for equipment that
arrives late, (6) act as contact point for the NRC, (7) coordinate on
long lead-time items that must be ordered, and (8) field observations.
The role of coordinating with other parties and disciplines requires
that the lead engineer develop a high degree of personal respect and
credibility as well as technical expertise. The functions of the lead
civil for either the utility or the constructor do not include design
alterations. The lead civil for the A/E has total authority in this
area. This situation, one of absolute design control by the A/E, is




Impact of Quality Assurance
The impact of quality assurance upon the civil discipline, as
well as all of the other disciplines of a nuclear power plant, has been
significant. Primarily, the impact has been twofold. Initially, there
has been a direct increase in the work load requirement for any particu-
lar work activity due to the magnitude of the project. Secondly,
however, and possibly more significantly, has been the resultant dramatic
requirements for documentation to support the work activity being
accomplished. The following examples are provided to illustrate this
dual impact of quality assurance on the civil engineering discipline
of nuclear power plants.
Construction and QA Procedures
All construction related to safety-related, or Category I, struc-
tures is typically conducted through the use of construction procedures.
These procedures provide in detail a listing of the steps that will be
taken in the proper performance of any work activity. Further, the
inspectors o f the work activities are governed by quality control
procedures which detail the steps to be taken when inspecting any
Category I work. The documentation required for the development of
construction and quality control procedures is extensive. In addition,
there is a quantum jump in documentation, since quality assurance require-
ments dictate traceability of materials, assurance of materials and
procedures, and detailed records of destructive and nondestructive testing,
Earthwork
The sources of borrow areas to be used for backfills of Category I
structures must be precisely documented. Further, the placement and
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compaction methods for base courses and backfills must be precisely
defined, followed and documented. Because of the uncertainties and
problems of moisture and density control, almost all base courses and
foundation bases have been replaced by the use of seal or mud mats of
unreinforced concrete. The net cost of reduced headaches and documen-
tation is significant.
Reinforced Concrete
The concrete batch plant for a nuclear power plant must be pre-
cisely controlled. Material traceability and proper mix formula are
vital, as are the proper transport procedures. The facilities are
closely checked, with a full-time quality control staff typically
assigned to the batch plant.
Reinforcing steel must be precisely placed, and formwork is
inspected closely for Category I structures prior to any pour. Quality
control inspectors measure reinforcing steel placement with a tape and
other information such as air temperature is checked within the form
itself. All specifications and construction procedures must be carefully
adhered to, or work will be halted by quality control inspectors.
Traceability for reinforcing steel is required through milcerts.
Further, quality is assured through a statistical system of destructive
tensile tests of the bars themselves. Bar splices, overlapped in
smaller bars and Cadwelded in larger bars, are carefully controlled.
Cadwelders and Cadwelding procedures must be qualified, and extensive
documentation is required. As many as 18 signatures are required for
some Cadwelds. In addition, Cadwelds are controlled by a statistical
system of destructive tests on the Cadwelds.
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Placement of concrete in the complexly congested forms of con-
tainment structures is a very difficult task. In addition to
procedural qualifications and on-site inspection of work in progress,
radiography is used to insure that no voids are left in the finished
work. The density of the in-place concrete is very carefully controlled,
as is the strength of the concrete.
Prestressed Concrete
The applications of prestressed concrete to nuclear containments
is still relatively new, and extensive testing and surveillance programs
are still in progress. Full-scale models of actual prestressing
systems using actual materials were developed for the Three Mile Island
test program for the prestressing system. The net result of that test
program was the decision to use fully grouted tendons, as opposed to
the fully or partially greased tendon system previously used within the
industry. This decision was primarily based on the conclusion that a
fully grouted system provides more adequate moisture protection.
Various strain gages and displacement monitoring devices are
used in the tendon system to study general behavior during the initial
pressure test, and to verify the analytical design of the structure.
In addition, the following surveillance programs are required for each
of the appropriate tendon systems (Steigelmann, 1969, p. 171):
Waxed or Greated Tendon System
1. Lift-off measurements to verify the tendon in one set of
hoop shell tendons, three vertical shell tendons, and three
dome tendons
.
2. Removal of tendon wires (extras intentionally included for
this purpose) to check for evidence of corrosion.
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3. Testing of removal wires to detect any significant changes in
physical properties.
4. Periodic sampling and testing of the tendon protective wax.
Fully Bonded Tendon System
Some destructive examination is required for monitoring, the
surveillance specimen typically consists of a full-size tendon
encased in a concrete block detached from the containment structure
but subjected to the same environment.
Nuclear Containments
Whether the nuclear containment structure be of reinforced concrete
or prestressed concrete, it is always surrounding a steel liner. In
the case of a serious reactor accident, the integrity of the steel
liner depends upon the strength of the concrete containment. As a
result, the entire structure is subject to strength tests and leakage-
rate tests (Steigelmann, 1969). Of particular concern are minute holes
or cracks at welded joints and penetration connections.
Summary
The civil engineering aspects of a nuclear power plant are complex
and extensive. The transition from conventional civil work to nuclear
civil work is a significant quantum jump in technological expertise and
documented procedures, brought about primarily by increased requirements
for safety and environmental concerns, and the need to provide documented
assurance of quality in the finished product. In the next chapter, it





Unless one has visited a major power plant at a late stage in con-
struction, it is difficult to visualize the magnitude of the electrical
work that is required. In addition to staggering volumes of wiring,
conduit, cable and tray, there is the realization that all of this is
installed in an extremely small group of buildings. Interferences becomes
a key word, as the task of attempting to include all circuits and at the
same time compete for space requirements with the ventilation, piping
and equipment systems becomes mind-boggling. When the additional
requirement that it must be done as economically as possible is added,
the task at first seems to be impossible. In fact, there are very few
organizations within the country with the ability to assume such a task.
This chapter will attempt to highlight the more significant aspects
encountered by those companies who do attempt this specialty type of
work on power plant construction projects.
The major phases of electrical work to be discussed in this chapter
include electrical design, procurement, installation of cable tray and
conduit, installation of equipment, cable pulling and cable termination.
The impact of quality assurance requirements on each of these phases
will also be discussed.
Circuitry
Types of Circuitry
In general, there are three major types of circuitry involved in
power plant design. A power circuit is one which transmits power to
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a component, such as to a motor via a cable. A control circuit is
used to control contacts, such as the wiring required for a pressure
switch. Thirdly, instrumentation circuits are present, such as
wiring required to a resistance thermal device on the shaft of a motor.
The technology of installation of each type of circuit will be discussed
in this chapter. The actual calibration of instrumentation is accom-
plished within the mechanical discipline and will, therefore, not be
discussed in this chapter.
Major Electrical Systems
A grounding system must be installed throughout the subsurface
area of a power plant. In addition to electrically grounding the
above-ground systems and components, subsurface pilings and steel are
grounded for cathodic protection. The grounding grid systems typically
employed can include as much or more than 25,000 lineal feet of No. 4/0
wire and 500,000 circular mil copper ground cable.
The drain system is of major importance to electrical work.
Generally, this system is designed by civil personnel, and its installa-
tion is nearly complete before electrical personnel arrive on site.
Water damage to equipment during a later stage of construction may well
result in major cost and schedule overruns. As a result, electrical
personnel must insure that the drain system is properly designed to
meet their needs, as well as assure themselves that the system was
installed correctly.
The temporary power system for a major power plant is far different
from that found in normal construction. On a power plant the term
"temporary" may mean that the system will be in use for five or ten years.
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Because of this, the design is similar to that of a permanent system.
The capacity of this temporary system will vary from 5000 KVA at a
fossil plant to 12,000 KVA at a nuclear site (Bankston, 1976).
Support systems such as telephones and public address systems on
a power plant are also major items by conventional standards. There
may be a requirement for 150 to 450 phone stations, and 75 to 150 public
address facilities. The magnitude of these systems requires that con-
sideration be given in advance to insure that long-term temporary instal-
lations will not interfere with permanent installation and other con-
struction requirements.
Electrical requirements for construction welding systems have
changed significantly with recent improvements in power sources for
electric welding processes such as the shielded metal arc and the inert
gas-shielded processes. Solid state static rectifiers are used to
supply the required constant potential DC bus, and an extensive
electrical system is required to transmit this power. Operation and
maintenance of permanent plant equipment requires certain welding
processes, and as a result, permanent welding facilities are installed
early in the life of the project so that they may be used for construc-
tion purposes.
Generally, an 80 volt DC supply unit is supported by a distribu-
tion bus system and variable resistor units for adjusting voltage and
current. A fossil plant might have the requirement to provide power for
225 to 250 welders while a nuclear plant could require up to 450 or
500 welders.
The total requirements for cable, conduit, and tray on a typical
power plant is staggering. A typical single unit 1150 MWe nuclear plant
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may require 3,250,000 to 4,500,000 lin. ft. of power and control cable.
For this, 60,000 to 90,000 lin. ft. of cable tray and 325,000 to
550,000 lin. ft. of metallic conduit is required (Budwani, 1975). An
additional 100,000 lin. ft. of non-metallic conduit may also be required.
Separated into systems, a typical nuclear plant will have a total number
of electrical circuits well in excess of 15,000.
Electrical Design Requirements
Quality of Design
As in all disciplines of construction, the initial requirement for
success is quality engineering. The fate of good engineering is then in
the hands of field personnel, with whom experience is the trademark of
success. In order to provide quality engineering, then, the design
team must include individuals with design and construction experience,
as well as an organization with a seasoned work load experience. In
nuclear construction particularly, the drawings dictate not only what
is to be built but also how it is to be built.
Codes
Specific code applications are discussed in Chapter 10, entitled
"Power Codes." It is worthy of note, however, that by law compliance to
the National Electrical Code is not required for power plants. In a
sense it is applicable, however, if one considers that this code
establishes good construction practice. This fact is discussed further
in Chapter 10 and in the section on insurance later in this chapter.
Circuit Paths
Circuit paths are determined by computer. This is necessary because,
as mentioned previously, the total number of circuits on a nuclear plant
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can be in excess of 15,000. Generally, during cable work, a weekly
review of computer runs is made. The data includes circuits run to date,
pull slips generated, and tray loading. Pull slips will be discussed
later in this chapter.
Computer logic is complex to say the least, but two major bits of
logic can be identified. Initially, it is often decided that no single
run of cable from Point A to Point B should have a running length that
is greater than an arbitrary percent, often 150 percent, of a straight
line run from Point A to Point B. The purpose of this requirement is
obviously economical.
Secondly, tray loading must not exceed a certain fraction, often
50 percent, of full loading. This is required because the cables that
will fit into a tray in theory will not necessarily fit in practice.
Various orders of pulls and the tying skill of electricians will cause
variation in the capacity of an individual tray.
Additional information provided on the computer run includes the
totals for cable types, number of circuits and total linear feet. This
data is helpful in cross-checking purchase orders and stock.
Cable Separations and Color Coding
One nuclear regulatory requirement that drastically increases cost
and difficulty in design is the requirement that power, instrumentation,
and control cables be separated so that each type is run in separate
groups of trays. In addition, a primary safety system must be separated
from its redundant system.
One method used by designers to visualize the separation is to
color code safety systems. Generally, safety systems are coded green,
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while redundant systems are coded red. Throughout the entire plant no
green cable can come within 6 in. of a red cable. Trays and conduits are
also marked green and red.
A recent innovation in color coding circuits came with the use of
permanent tape to mark the circuits' colors. In the past, temporary
tape was employed during installation, with painting of color coding
completed later at a tremendous cost.
The origin of the cable separation requirements was the fire at
the Brown's Ferry nuclear generation station. In that fire, safety and
redundant systems were destroyed side-by-side in the same duct bank. The
direct results of the investigation of the fire were the requirements that
fire retardant cable be used, that a change be made in testing procedures
that caused the fire, that systems be separated, and that fire barriers
be installed.
Logic Diagrams
One method employed by several architect-engineers to check the
completeness of their circuits is a logic diagram. A list is made for
every valve, motor or other components of the electrical requirements
which are needed to start it, what is required to stop it, and what
interconnections are required between other valves, motors or components.
Using this list, a schematic may be systematically reviewed to insure
that it is complete.
Organizations who have not yet adopted this system must resort to
a technique of tracing each system by means of schematic drawings to
check that all the information is present.
Mr. Pete Karish, Instrumentation Engineer, General Public Utilities




The major difference between conventional and seismic design is
that the hangers are bigger and more plentiful. This can be translated
into more money and manhours for construction. The Approved Design Concept,
which will be discussed in the next section, applies to hangers which are
used in safety related systems. Each hanger must be designed and included
on a drawing prior to installation. Attempts are being made to employ
"typical" designs for many hanger areas, but this procedure has noc been
widely accepted as yet. As a result, almost every hanger must appear in
a drawing of its own.
Generally, the constructor designs the hanger, subject to A/E
approval. The design also includes reference to location, too, and as
a result many interference problems occur. The role of modeling in this
design process is discussed in Chapter 6 entitled "Preconstruction
Activities." A/E approval should minimize interferences, but in fact it
very seldom does. A delay in approval by the A/E may result in serious
schedule slippages.
Contemporary designs for seismic requirements have led to massive
bracing systems and hangers in order to insure that the supported system
will move at the same rate of acceleration as the building which houses
the electrical system. This is perhaps the main reason that electrical
hangers and bracing have become so massive. The writer feels that in
view of this, serious thought should be given to the development of a
support system that will be connected to the building through acceleration




Miscellaneous wire and cable, conduit, tray and everyday con-
sumables are generally ordered by field personnel in order to meet the
scheduled workload. Major items, such as motors, transformers, switch-
gear, and control panels are usually ordered by the organization respon-
sible for the engineering of the project (Budwani, 1975). All purchases
are governed by the specifications developed with the design.
Material Estimates
The determination of the number of major electrical items which
are required is fairly straightforward, in that there are a limited
number of them when compared to the quantity of cable and conduit required
In addition, the technical requirements for the electrical items are
clearly defined in the design. The determination of the magnitude of
conduit, cable, tray and consumables is, however, not so easily
identified. Generally, large orders are placed using gross volumes
estimated from the drawings. The responsibility for ordering the correct
quantity of materials required is not an easy one because of the detailed
complexities of the job, and because much work is in progress with large
portions of the engineering effort in full-scale production.
To illustrate this point, conduit became an extremely critical
item on one nuclear site in late 1975. Apparently, an updated estimate
of conduit requirements revealed that the early estimate was only half of
what was really required. Although procurement of additional conduit
did not pose a problem, installation seemed certain to impact upon
scheduled completion dates. The solution was found by working a
second shift of electricians solely on conduit installation.
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The actual cause of this problem was a poor estimate in the early
stages of design. Yet it was made by an organization in a position of
respect and seniority in the industry. And it was not discovered by
any of the other parties involved. Errors of that magnitude clearly
demonstrate that the art of building a power plant is at this point in
time far from being a science.
Traceability
The term "traceability" is a common one throughout the industry,
and it refers directly to materials. Traceability is required for
materials that are part of a safety-related system. Safety-related
systems are those systems which are judged to be essential to the safe
shutdown of the reactor system, and may be found in the reactor building,
the auxiliary building, the intake structure, fuel building, and the
control building.
The purpose of traceability is to insure that a system is inspec-
table by internal and external organizations. Records of sources of
material, manufacturing processes, transportation, storage, installation,
and testing for each material or product are required for inspectability
.
This documentation is intended to provide independent evidence of quality
in every system.
Receiving
The specifications for each electrical item provide the information
regarding what is required and what quality standards must be applied.
Unfortunately, even the best purchase order can result in a delivery
that varies from specifications. Because of this, each electrical item
must be carefully checked upon receipt for damage, conformance to
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specifications, and it must be determined if it carries with it the
required quality assurance documentation.
Even with several checks, there are still occasional items which
slip through. Almost invariably, the slipup is caught during the
installation stage, since construction procedures require strict con-
formance to the drawings. For example, work will stop on a termination
if the electrician opens the control box and finds the internals even
slightly different from the drawings the vendor and A/E provided.
Unfortunately, when such an occurrence takes place at this stage a con-
struction delay is virtually guaranteed.
Storage
Most electrical components require protection from moisture and
dust, it is therefore necessary for the contractor to provide space for
storage. Many motors and other items are shipped and stored with a
nitrogen purge. Assurance through inspection and documentation is
required to meet safety regulatory requirements for shipping and storage.
Initial electrical receiving and storage may be accomplished by a
general receiving group, but eventually an electrical receiving group
must be established to insure that all of the details are properly
considered.
Vendors
Although many suppliers throughout the country may be capable of
producing acceptable material, far fewer have the capability of providing
the required quality assurance documentation. As a result, the number
of vendors who compete for purchase orders on nuclear power plants is
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greatly reduced from the number of firms that compete on fossil plants.
Because of the tremendous expense involved in developing and implementing
a QA program from the beginning, it is not expected that competition
sources will increase drastically in the next several years. This
situation will continue to impact adversely upon delivery slippages.
Installation of Electrical Equipment
Conventional problems of handling and installation are complicated
by the requirement for increased safety and documentation. Many electrical
components are very susceptible to dust and moisture damage, and care
must be taken to avoid these problems. Nitrogen purges must often be
maintained on electrical equipment. To insure the equipment has received
proper care, an electrical resistance check, called meggering, is used
to check motor insulation resistance.
Additional problems are encountered with respect to electrical
equipment because of seismic requirements for completed foundation
drawings, seismic attachments, special welding processes and specific
torque requirements for bolts. In many cases, inadequate consideration
of these factors will result in removal of equipment and reinstallation
by adding more bolts or an imbedment plate.
Installation of Tray and Conduit
A cable may be run in one of two ways: via conduit or via cable
tray. The architect-engineer makes the desicion as to which cables
will be run in tray (often called a raceway) and which will be run in
conduit. Obviously, tray is more economical in terms of material and
space, while conduit provides increased protection. In general, it
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has been found that installation costs also favor tray, but not by as
o
large a margin as might be expected. This is true because conduit does
not have the same engineering requirements in regard to the Approved
Design Concept and individual drawings. As a result, interferences are
not as big a problem as in raceway.
In terms of space, however, it would be impossible to employ all
conduit, and so the use of raceway in power plant design is often maxi-
mized. The actual use of conduit varies, but at many sites all safeguard
9power is in conduit, while all other cables are in tray.
The Approved Design Concept
The Approved Design Concept has been alluded to several times in
this chapter. Basically, it relates to the fact that all phases of
safety-related construction will be in exact accordance with the
engineering drawings and specifications. This is intended to guarantee,
from a safety point of view, that the plant that is built is identical
to the one specified in the approved design. As a result, there are
no field changes to the installation.
Generally, the Approved Design Concept employs drawings to transmit
the design to the crafts. This takes a great deal of time and money,
and often work that could be accomplished is delayed because drawings are
not available. Many feel, however, that the actual cost of using this
system is more than recovered in the resultant reduction in errors.
Q
Mr. Joe Stout, Electrical Engineer, General Public Utilities Service





The biggest problem with this concept is that interferences and
problems take longer to correct that in conventional construction. If
a craftsman is to install a hanger in a specific location, and he finds
a pipe there, he cannot simply move the hanger over a bit. He must
request a change order and wait for A/E approval.
Installation of Trays
As discussed earlier, every tray has its own engineering document,
and every tray is numbered for use in routing and inspection. Even when
the tray might be considered 100 percent engineered, the total number
of trays is so large for the plant that some trays are invariably missed.
Piping interferences with cable tray routing can also cause major
problems, particularly since large bore piping is typically not completely
installed prior to the start of tray work. On most plants large bore
piping has priority of location over all other items, and it is not
uncommon for the electricians to incur considerable expense in tray
removal in order to free up space for pipefitters to work. Upon comple-
tion of the piping, the tray may even be put back in the same location.
The second major source of interferences with cable tray location
results from heating and ventilation. Communication and coordination
must be established between the electricians, designers and the ventila-
tion duct work subcontractor.
It is possible to minimize some interferences if Design lays out
the tray after the piping is designed and keeps up-to-date on changes.
Complications often arise, however, because detailing of large bore
piping and ventilation duct work are items that are almost always sub-
contracted to a specialist. This provides the schedule and communication
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problems. The use of models in design presents the potential for
solving many of the interference problems that exist today.
Installation of Conduit
Installation of conduit usually begins when the tray installation
is about 25 percent complete. As mentioned previously, the engineering
requirements are not as stringent with conduit, and interferences are
typically not as big a problem. Seismic qualified hangers, where
required, must still be designed, however.
Installation of Hangers
Unlike the installation of hangers for piping, installation of
permanent hangers in electrical work is accomplished during the initial
construction effort. The use of temporary hangers and backfitting with
permanent hangers is not common in electrical work, and as a result, many
hanger interference problems similar to those discussed in Chapter 10
are not a problem in electrical work.
Cable Pulling
Cable Pulling Procedure
In order to pull cable, a pull rope, often polypropylene, is fed
by the electricians through the tray path to be followed. This rope is
connected to the cable by means of a swivel, and to the pulling device
at the other ends. Cables are then fed off the reel and pulled through
the tray or conduit. Pulleys and rollers reduce friction and damage in




As mentioned earlier, the total length of cable on a nuclear plant
can be in excess of 3 or 4 million lin. ft. In order to remain on
schedule, pulling must proceed at a rate of 60 to 90 thousand ft. of
cable per week. Cable pulling, at its peak, is, therefore, a full-time
job for 60 to 100 electricians (Bankston, 1976).
Pull Slips
Every cable has an exact computer-developed route that must be
followed. In order to insure compliance, a procedure which uses pull
slips is often employed. For every circuit laid out, a pull slip is
generated which details the beginning of the run, the end of the run,
and the type cable to be used. Also listed are the identifying numbers
of the cable trays through which the cable must pass.
The pull slip must be generated and approved prior to the start
of work, and no variation is permitted. In fact, it is common practice
that if a tray is itemized in the slip and not yet installed (regardless
of how short the distance may be to the next tray) the pull cannot
proceed past the missing tray.
Generation of pull slips can become a critical activity if the
pulling crew is working at a fairly productive rate. It can be very
frustrating for management and craftsmen alike to be delayed when the
computer lags behind the work force.
Group Pulls
Economics in cable pulling is totally dependent upon the practice
of "group pulls." The goal is to complete all tray and interfering
work in one area, and pull all the cable for that area in groups of
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similar and identical cable paths. If this is possible, significant
savings can be made in terms of both time and money for both pulling and
support facilities such as crafts.
Two factors have impacted negatively on the prospects for group
pulls. Initially, it has been difficult to plan far enough ahead in
order to allow an entire area to be totally free from all interferences.
Secondly, there is almost always someone clamoring for a specific cable
so that a specific task may begin. It often becomes necessary, therefore,
to proceed with pulling that cable without waiting for information on
other cables within that group.
Identification of groups would be a logical next step for the
computer program that generates runs and pull slips. Unfortunately, it
appears that the industry is so far from advanced planning to the level
of detail that the necessary computer programs have not even been
developed. This is an area in design and construction that appears
to be ripe for improvement.
Terminations
Termination slips, similar to pull slips, are required before any
safety-related cable can be connected at either end. This is to insure
that it is connected in the proper manner. Circuit information is
provided by computer, but the detailed description of which color wire
goes to which terminal is often developed manually.
Recent advances have allowed for the introduction of large scale
usage of plug-in type, rather than terminal type, connections at com-
ponents. The advances are only being employed on projects under
Mr. Peter Karish, Instrumentation Engineer, General Public Utilities
Service Corporation, in a personal interview, September 13, 1975.
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Within the organization of the Resident Project Manager, or his
equivalent, would be the position of Electrical Superintendent. The
responsibilities of this position include direction and coordination of
all electrical field activities, and the coordination with other
disciplines in areas of joint responsibilty or conflict situations. The
Electrical Superintendent's organization may include Assistant Electrical
Superintendents, Electrical Supervisors and their assistants, and
Electrical Technicians. The specific titles of these individuals will
vary from organization to organization.
Craft Requirements
The demand throughout the industry for qualified electricians
is second only to that for pipefitters and welders. For a two-unit 1100 MWe
nuclear plant the peak requirement for electricians can vary from 450
to 550 each day, while on a fossil plant this number is significantly
smaller. Obviously, the task of finding, hiring, qualifying, assigning,
and supervising 500 electricians is no minor matter. Inefficiencies can
be very costly, and shortages will impact severely on the scheduled
completion date.
The number of skilled electricians required on a major power plant
has increased significantly with the increased complexity of the design.
Currently, the number of electrical craft manhours for each kWe of power
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in a plant being constructed ranges from 0.90 to 1.20. This figure is
surpassed only by those of laborers and pipefitters, and it is expected
to climb to 1.75 for a plant scheduled for operation in 1982 (Budwani,
1975).
Craft Organization
Within the electrical craft there are two divisions, those of
lineman and electrician. Linemen do electrical work on substations and
transmission lines, while electricians do the work at the generating
plant itself.
As with other crafts, the organization is headed by a General
Foreman who reports to the staff of the Electrical Superintendent.
Assistant General Foremen or Area Foremen may be required, as well as
Small Job Foremen, depending on the size of the work force. Standard
ratios for these positions are 50 men for each Area Foreman, and 10 men
for each Small Job Foreman. Additional information on craft organizations
is provided in Chapter 12 entitled "Labor in the Power Industry."
Tools
Tools to support the work of the electricians are a major expense
in today's power plants. In addition to the responsibility for providing
all the tools which 500 electricians might need to do their job, the
constructor must provide a source of tools which is convenient and
efficient in order to reduce the impact on productivity of constantly
issuing and collecting tools. In addition, adequate security and account-
ability for the tools must be provided to reduce losses due to theft. It
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is not uncommon for a utility to budget $20 million for the life of
the nuclear plant project to cover small tools.
Specialized Electrical Work
Many problems can develop if regular construction electricians are
permitted to perform specialized work such as computer interconnection
wiring. Often, union agreements require that their people do all of
the electrical work. In many cases, therefore, a computer system will
be officially turned over from construction forces to operating forces
before it is complete. Then, since construction jurisdiction has ended
on that system, the operating department for the utility can subcontract
the specialized work to whomever they desire to do the work.
Electrical Safety
As in conventional work, it is of the utmost importance that a
safety system be in use to prevent accidents and fatalities due to men
working on live circuits. An effective tagging and blockout system for
work on all circuits is mandatory. This item is subject to QC inspection
in safety-related systems.
Personal safety equipment such as gloves, hard hats and goggles
are also required in accordance with Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) directives.
Fire Protection and Insurance
For a typical 1000 MWe nuclear power plant, standard fire equipment
requirements usually include 300,000 gal. of water in storage, a source
11
Saxon B. Palmeter, Manager of Construction, General Public Utilities
Service Corporation, in a personal interview, July 23, 1975.
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that can replace that quantity in 24 hours, a 1500 to 2500 gpm fire
pump, with either a standby source of electrical power or diesel power,
and an 8-in. distribution main (Bankston, 1976).
Generally the Nuclear Energy Property Insurance Agency (NEPIA)
provides insurance for the owner at the site. As a result, they
determine the Imposed regulations regarding electrical and fire safety.
It is through NEPIA that the National Electrical Code, which is not
enforceable as such on power plants, is identified as standard practice
and used as a guide. Conformance to specified requirements is verified
by NEPIA inspectors who regularly inspect the entire job site.
The site inspections can be quite detailed, and can somewhat
resemble an NRC inspection if problems develop. In addition to house-
keeping and the progress of the permanent fire system installation,
inspectors look in detail at procedures in use and specific design
criteria. It was pointed out to the writer, for example, that during
one NEPIA inspection at a nuclear site it was pointed out that the
battery storage and recharge building contained conventional wiring
systems. The potential for a buildup of hydrogen gas made this situation
extremely unsafe, and for a few hours it appeared as though a more suit-
able system would have to replace the conventional one, at great expense
in time and labor. Further research revealed, however, that the
battery shop was equipped with a ventilation system specifically
designed to prevent a buildup of hydrogen gas.
This example illustrates that the inspectors are very thorough,
and require the attention and cooperation of senior electrical personnel
at the site. Secondly, however, this example illustrates the difference
between an NRC inspection and a NEPIA inspection. If the gas problem
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was safety-related, the wiring and ventilation would both be required,
as well as the possibility of a redundant system for each.
Impact of Quality Assurance on Electrical Work
QA in Design
Two figures developed by United Engineers and Constructors present
a clear picture of the changes in electrical design since the inclusion
of the requirements in Appendix B to 10CFR50. This change can be
realized by comparing Figures 30 and 31. Both figures represent the
requirements for lighting one lightbulb. In the conventional design
represented in Figure 30, the system requires a bulb, wiring, a switch,
a fuse and a source of power. For Figure 31, however, quality assurance
requirements have been added, but the purpose is still to light the
same bulb. The system now requires a second light and a second switch
from a separate power supply, as well as an emergency generator for each
light. The final backup system is a battery, with each system separated
by fireproof boundaries.
QA Work Magnitude
It is obvious from the increased design requirements that the
material, labor and schedule costs are increased tremendously due to
the quality requirements imposed on nuclear power plants. More work
is required by more people, and they are working at a slower rate due to
the need for increased inspection of their work. This is, in the
writer's opinion, not all bad, however, since better quality provides for







































































































QC Inspection and Documentation
In addition to increased direct labor costs, there is a significant
increase in cost due to the requirement for quality control inspection
and documentation. The work force is significantly increased, and the
requirements for direct labor are increased. Field personnel within
the electrical discipline must provide evidence of quality prior to instal-
lation, and strict records must be maintained. These records are required
in addition to those originated by the QC inspectors.
QC Delays
Quality Control can be responsible for several types of delays in
the electrical area. Work stoppages can be ordered by QC personnel not
satisfied with the quality or safety of an activity in progress. Minor
variances in design drawings will halt work on safety-related systems.
This is the very essence of the Approved Design Concept. A third
common delay directly related to Quality Control can occur when a QC
inspector who is required to witness a job fails to arrive in a timely
fashion. Field personnel must wait for the inspector to arrive and
get set up.
QC and Labor
Because so many safety-related activities require a QC inspector at
all times, the inspectors' personalities impact directly on the crafts.
Unfortunately, many QC inspectors have been less than gracious or
tactful, and resentment often surfaces within labor groups. Convincing
the craftsmen that quality control procedures are necessary and important
is often made more difficult if the quality control inspectors do not
possess diplomatic qualities as well as technical expertise.
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The second impact on labor is found in work stoppages or reworks
due to design problems and changes. The minimum effect is reduced morale
and productivity, with extreme cases resulting in the loss of personal
pride and achievement on the part of the craftsman in his work.
QA and Hangers
As has been mentioned, every seismic hanger requires its own design.
This increases tremendously the design effort required, and slows instal-
lation significantly. Additional slowdowns are caused by the need for
interference corrections. Lastly, the direct cost of hanger materials is
multiplied by a large factor as the sizes of hangers become so massive.
QA and Pull/Termination Slips
The entire concept that every cable requires a separate sheet of
paper before it can be pulled, and another before its ends can be
terminated is extremely restrictive. In addition to time delays due to
computer scheduling, field ingenuity and creativity is greatly reduced,
if not eliminated. Group pulls are made virtually impossible on a large
scale by these requirements.
QC and Cable Pulling
In addition to pull slips, QC inspectors are required to physically
witness the pulling of safety-related cable through any duct bank where
it cannot be inspected visually at a later date. The tension in the
cable must be measured in order to insure that it has not exceeded the
yield strength of the copper wire. Determination of tension is usually
made by measuring the current on the calibrated motor of a mechanical
puller and converting the current reading to force.

260
Quality Control in Operation
An actual incident that illustrates how quality control in electrical
work functions in the field was discussed with the writer by the utility
lead electrical engineer on a nuclear power plant construction site. A
safeguard system cable was to be pulled through a duct bank, requiring
constant supervision by a QC inspector employed by the constructor. The
pull slip referenced a pull box which was not present. Since the cable
could not go through a non-existent box, the QC inspector stopped the
pull. It happened that it was close to quitting time, and the QC inspec-
tor decided he would simply go home.
The foreman, however, worked the crew overtime and finished the
pull. Two violations of serious consequence resulted. Initially, the
pull slip was violated. Secondly, the pull was conducted without an
inspector present. The utility concerned removed and replaced the cable
involved, and reported the incident to the NRC through specified
reporting procedures.
Summary
The introduction of large nuclear power plants with their evolving
quality assurance requirements has resulted in the expansion of electrical
work load on a power plant by an order of magnitude over fossil plants.
In addition to increased numbers of craftsmen, improved control of con-
struction procedures, and dramatically increased verification and inspec-
tion, there has been a marked increase in the technological requirements
for electrical design and construction. In the next chapter, similar
changes will be discussed for piping, welding, and mechanical equipment.

Chapter 9
PIPING, WELDING AND MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT
Plant design for a conventional or nuclear power plant includes
a myriad of piping and mechanical systems and related equipment. The
skilled craftsmen required for installation of these systems, typically
pipefitters and pipefitter-welders, represent the single largest labor
factor during the life of the project. The areas of piping design and
fabrication in recent years have been in a continual state of flux as
efforts are made to meet the continuously changing design specification
requirements. The net result is that in the writer's opinion, this
specialty area is perhaps the most difficult and challenging discipline
of power plant construction.
In this chapter the types of piping and mechanical systems that
are common to nuclear power plants, and the challenges and difficulties
presently being experienced on the construction of these plants will be
discussed.
Piping Systems
The following discussion will center on a description of each of the
major piping systems on a typical nuclear power plant. These systems
include temporary piping, yard piping, building service piping, and
process piping.
Each of these systems is brought into being through a similar series
of phases. The first phase is usually design of the system using
code standards and requirements imposed by major components. Design
would typically be followed by detailing of pipe sections, which may be
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done using isometrics or through use of a design model. Pipe sections
are then fabricated, either in a shop or on site, and tested. Finally,
field erection is accomplished, and the entire system is tested as required
Temporary Piping
Temporary piping systems are required at the site to meet the
requirements for construction and potable water. A sanitary water system
supporting a sewage treatment plant is often also required. In addition
to water systems, other temporary piping systems may include heating,
low pressure air, high pressure air, fuel gas, oxygen and inert gas.
The magnitude of each of these temporary systems will vary with plant
location, construction methods, and the ability to use similar permanent
plant systems to fill temporary construction needs.
It is important to realize that although these systems will be
removed or abandoned at the end of the construction phase of the project,
the extended duration of power plant construction requires that they be
designed for a period of five or more years. This extended usage imposes
"permanent" design requirements on each system. Another factor that
must be considered with regard to temporary systems is the potential
for interference with permanent system construction if the layout of
these "temporary" systems is not well planned in advance of actual
instillation. As in so many cases, advance planning and design informa-
tion are critical factors in the smooth operation of the construction
process.
Yard Piping
Yard piping systems include those systems external to the building
which are not categorized as process piping. The temporary piping
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systems are often developed in parallel to, or as temporary replacements
for, the permanent yard piping systems of the actual plant whose capa-
cities need not be as large. Potable water, fire protection, sanitary
sewage systems, yard drainage, and circulating water systems are the
major components of yard piping.
Building Service Piping
In support of the building function itself, several piping systems
are required for the use and convenience of the people who operate and
maintain the power plant once it goes into operation. Oil, gas, water,
air, heating, plumbing, and fire protection systems must all be present.
In addition, roof and floor drainage systems must be designed to tie
into the above mentioned yard drainage system.
Process Pipe Systems
Temporary piping, yard piping, and building service piping are
all systems that are important, and yet act only to support the function
of the power plant. The systems that are an integral part of power
generation are found within the groups called process pipe systems.
Process piping for a power plant can be defined as those piping systems
which contribute directly to the generation of electricity. Conventional
process piping systems would include main and auxiliary steam, feedwater
and condensate, drains, cooling water, vacuum, chemical treatment, waste
treatment, oil, and gas systems. Nuclear process piping systems would
include reactor coolant, pressure surge and relief, heat removal,
safety injection, safeguard and auxiliary cooling, fuel handling and
storage, and waste treatment systems.
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These process piping systems are the systems where measured
quality control and broadening regulatory requirements as well as techno-
logical advances have had the largest impact. The process piping
systems are the systems that are of concern in the remainder of this
chapter.
The System Philosophy
The specialty area of piping is typically classified on a power plant
on the basis of the specific system which is being served. It is
important to realize that one system may be located in several buildings,
and on several floors within that building. The system philosophy
originates in the design phase, when a team of designers is given the
responsibility for designing all of the piping required for one system,
rather than that required for one building. It is felt within the
industry that any other method would create impossible interface problems.
The system philosophy is also the dominant factor in piping
scheduling. The construction schedule is not typically based on the
completion of all piping which is required for one building. Instead,
each system is scheduled individually, with order and priorities
established by the CPM schedule. This scheduling uses information for
the planned turnover and start-up of systems in order to establish time
goals and priorities. The process of starting up a plant will be
discussed in detail in Chapter 12 of this thesis. For now, it is sufficient
to note that systems are typically identified on a priority basis in the
order of requirements for start-up. The systems are then finished and




Piping 2-1/2 in. nominal diameter and larger is commonly referred
to as large bore piping, while piping 2 in. and under is referred to
as small bore piping. In general, the large bore piping segment represents
the largest cost to the owner, and as a result, receives the largest
amount of attention. A typical 1150 MWe nuclear plant might require
2850 to 3350 tons (Budwani, 1975) of large bore piping.
In cases of interferences, large bore piping will always take
priority, and as a result, it should always be designed first. Unfor-
tunately, achieving the objective of having the large bore piping completed
first Is not as straightforward as it might sound. It has been noted
to the writer that the typical A/E does not have the capability to
detail large bore piping, and must, therefore, subcontract the detailing
to the piping vendor. Isometric drawings are required for all piping
runs, and individual spool sheets which detail each piece of piping are
also required. (Note: spooling will be discussed later in this chapter).
All drawings are subject to QA/QC requirements, and because of the
expense involved, detailing for large bore piping must be completed and
approved well in advance of manufacture. All of this development, review
and approval takes a great deal of time. In addition, other areas of
design are also waiting for information. Current material availability
restrictions, detailing and vendor work loads have, therefore, establishes




Mr. Len Zuby, Piping Supervisor, General Public Utilities Service
Corporation, in a personal interview, November 6, 1975.
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Prefabrication has become the key word in a large bore pipe
installation. This is true for reasons of economy as well as quality.
The ability that a typical contractor has to fabricate all of the large
13bore piping systems in the field is in serious doubt. The net result
is that a design which is based upon the prefabrication mode is very
difficult to alter. This has resulted in a priority system for resolving
interferences in which prefabricated sections such as large bore
piping take priority for space over other field fabricated sections.
Small Bore Piping
Although large bore piping receives more attention and publicity,
small bore piping is also of great importance within the power systems.
It has been found that from an economical standpoint it is more
advantageous to detail and fabricate small bore piping on site. Detailing
in this case is typically done by the A/E, instead of the subcontracted
vendor. As a result, the A/E has firsthand control over design progress
and drawing production. The constructor must, therefore, assume additional
responsibility for material control, controlled storage, fabrication
facilities and field installation progress. Fabrication of small bore
pipe, as with large bore, is done in spool sections or pieces. A typical
1000 MWe nuclear plant today would require more small bore piping than the
total amount of pipe for a fossil plant, and represents 2/3 to 3/4 of
the design effort for nuclear-related hangers, supports, anchors, and
seismic restraints (Blount, 1976).
13
Mr. Len Zuby, Piping Supervisor, General Public Utilities Service
Corporation, in a personal interview, November 6, 1975.
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As Mr. George Blount (1976), a piping superintendent for United
Engineers and Constructors pointed out, the weld joint in a 30-in. pipe
with a 4-in. wall would require enough weld metal for 2,000 2-in.
schedule 40 socket welds. Although this may seem impressive, one cannot
overlook the fact that the 2,000 2-in. welds would require seven times
the number of craft manhours to weld, four times the supervisory hours
and in addition require 250 times the number of hours to document.
Piping Hangers
As discussed in the chapter on electrical installations, hangers
represent a tremendous effort and create many problems in power plant
design and construction. The term "hangers" is used here to mean
supports, anchors, and seismic restraints in addition to the standard
hangers which are required. The initial problem in hanger design and
installation is related to hanger size. Current seismic requirements
for safety systems dictate restraints and hangers that are often larger
than structural steel building components. What appears to be a large
structural support for a portion of the building when seen in the field
may in fact be a seismic restraint for a large pipe.
The most critical problem with piping hangers, however, is that
the design of hangers often lags far behind pipe design and even pipe
installation. The reason for this is due to the fact that the design
requirements, based upon dead load, impact loads and thermal analysis,
are critically dependent upon the actual routing and location of the
piping. As a result, the priority item becomes the installation of the
piping. It is often only after this is done that restraints and snubbers
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can be designed. Although it may appear that these designs could be
accomplished in parallel with design system routing, experience has shown
that this is not the case.
Temporary hangers are, therefore, often used to hang the pipe
systems, with the full recognition that properly designed hangers will
have to be backfitted to the system at a later date. Unfortunately, the
time lag until hackfitting is completed can represent a long time, some-
times years. During this time period a lot of other systems have
probably been installed around the piping. At Three Mile Island, for
example, the seismic restraints for the Nuclear River Water System were
not installed until 18 months after the piping for the system was
complete. This fact resulted in a tremendous cost increase due to
redundant use of support crafts and equipment, as well as the development
of major interference problems.
Piping Codes
Piping Codes, like so many other areas of power plant construction,
are in a continuous state of change and upgrading. There are many
different codes and applications, and no one plant will be built under
exactly the same codes as another. Which code will apply to a plant will
vary according to who installs the pipe, the plant's location, the
date of design acceptance and the date of purchase. The designer will
specify the codes, but even within an individual system the applicable
code or specification may vary.
It is not uncommon, for example, to have a "spec break" or a
"code break" at a certain valve. Piping to the left of the valve would
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be under one code or spec, and piping to the right would be under
another. Because of this problem it is vital for the designer and
constructor to maintain a clear understanding of what codes apply where
in each particular circumstance.
According to the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III,
Subsections A, B, and C (1975) nuclear piping is divided into three
classifications. Class Nl, for high pressures and temperatures, covers
piping whose failure could result in serious safety consequences.
Class N2, again for high pressure and temperature, covers piping whose
failure could result in possible safety hazards to the plant staff.
Class N3, for low pressure and temperature, covers piping whose failure
would cause minimal safety hazard to the staff.
At first reading, all codes appear to be very similar, although
they may be quite different. It is wise for constructor personnel to
be familiar with the codes, but not to try to memorize them. The only
safe way is to look up each specific question in the applicable code
as the question arises.
Spooling
Spooling, or the use of spool pieces, is a concept that has developed
for economic and quality reasons. In general, a designated piping run
is developed by joining several spool pieces. The pieces are called
spools because they are short lengths of pipe with flanges on each end
that make them look like a spool. An 80-ft. run might be divided into
seven spool pieces with six to twelve welds per spool. The spools are
shop fabricated, with prefabricated welds on the spool pieces outnumbering
field welds three to one. The result is increased weld quality at lower




Modeling was discussed in detail in Chapter 7 entitled '^re-
construction Activities." In relation to piping, the power industry
remains behind the chemical industry in its employment of modeling.
Model use in power plant piping is limited to checking for consistency
and interferences in design. The chemical industry has long used
modeling to develop the detailing of processed piping. Quality assurance
and the Approved Design Concept, with its incumbent documentation, have
caused the power industry to be cautious in their expansion of model
use. Many firms within the industry, however, are taking a long look
at the possibilities of expanding the use of models.
Craft Requirements
Pipefitters represent the single craft in largest demand for a power
plant project. Schedule requirements for a typical 1000 MWe nuclear
plant require placement rates for small bore piping of 4,100 to over
5,000 lin. ft. per month, with erection-in-place rates for large bore
piping of 2,150 to over 6,000 lin, ft. per month (Budwani, 1975).
These rates can only be maintained by the employment of a craft force
of pipefitters that can peak as high as 615 to 750 pipefitters, repre-
senting a total effort of 2.7 to 4.7 million craft manhours (Budwani,
1975). For estimating purposes, the figure represents 1.3 to 2.3 pipe-
fitter manhours per kilowatt of electricity, but is expected to rise to
3.0 manhours/kWe for a plant scheduled for operation in 1982 (Budwani,
1975). This figure of 3.0 manhours represents 1/4 of the total manhours
predicted for a 1982 vintage plant.
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Problem Areas in Piping
In addition to the everyday challenges of trying to provide for
Quality Assurance, there are several important problems within the
piping discipline of today's power plants. Several of these problems
were mentioned in an article on power piping by Ray Schuster (1973),
editor of Power Engineering
, in October of 1973. The points mentioned
by Mr. Schuster were confirmed in field interviews, and are reviewed in
the following paragraphs.
A primary problem for both the piping fabricator and the constructor
is the lack of knowledge demonstrated by the architect-engineers in
developing specifications. This is an example of the general problem
raised concerning A/E competency in the section on design interfacing
during preconstruction activities. To a certain extent the problem is
attributable to the increased workload of the A/E community, resulting
in assignment of responsibility to trained but inexperienced personnel.
The solution to the manning problem is not clearly in view.
To illustrate the problem, some specification writers have included
requirements such as "no wrinkling or flattening on pipe bends." This
requirement is impossible to meet, and a vendor or fabricator bidding
on a fixed price basis for the work must gamble that he will still make
a profit after he absorbs his losses due to settling disputes and delays
related to the poor specification.
Possibly the most serious problem facing the industry today is a
serious shortage of materials for piping and valve fabrication. Delivery
dates for many steel items include a 15 to 18 month lead time, and it
is not unusual to see a 4 to 6 month slip in delivery schedule. Such
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a slip could very easily alter the critical path of the project, and
lengthen project completion significantly.
Incomplete specifications, issued for bid when only 50 to 60 percent
complete are another problem area. Since such packages are difficult to
bid accurately, cost overruns are common. The result is a multiparty
dispute over who pays for the overrun.
Incompetence and undermanning of the Quality Control program has
given rise to many problems. Inspectors who do not possess the proper
degree of expertise can cause many headaches and piping delays. There
is also a question in the minds of many about whether the entire non-
destructive test system is based upon sound thinking. Perhaps radiography
and some of the other tests that are used are measuring more than need
be required to insure the safety of the plant.
Another area of possible overemphasis or regulation is that of pipe
bends. Although flattening and out-of-roundness of the pipe bends are
considered to be unsatisfactory bends by today's standards, there is no
evidence that a single pipe failure due to the overstresses caused by
such a situation has occurred (Schuster, 1973).
The final major problem in piping today is shared by every discipline
equally. This problem is that of scheduling. "Begin Installation"
dates are given to fabricators by the constructor for use in developing
bid prices. These dates may be delayed by one year or more as con-
struction progresses, and the resultant problems due to changes in the
labor and material markets must be borne by someone. Carefully written





Even in light of today's increased level of education and knowledge,
welding is considered by most to be an exotic artform that must be
handled by a small cadre of welding experts. This is not surprising, in
that Ohio State University offers the only accredited undergraduate
degree in welding engineering. Although many other universities offer
limited electives in the welding field, the majority of the welding
engineers and welding supervisors in the industry have reached their
positions through field experience. Probably the most critical country-
wide need in the power industry today is for a significant increase in
the number of welders and welding engineers. A detailed discussion of
welding is beyond the scope of this thesis, however, several aspects of
welding will be highlighted. Included in the discussion will be the
two primary site welding processes, welding procedures and documentation.
Welding Processes
Shielded Metal-Arc—manual shielded metal-arc welding with coated
electrodes is a process in which an electric arc provides the heat to
fuse the metallic electrode and the surfaces of the work in contact with
the arc. Flux coatings are used on the metal electrodes in order to
improve weld ductility and reduce porosity. The slag-producing flux is
deposited simultaneously with the weld metal from the rod. Manual arc
welding is common in the power industry for manufacture and erection of
ferritic steel pressure vessels, headers, and piping.
Gas Tungsten-Arc (GTA) Welding—TIG (Tungsten-Inert Gas) welding
maintains its arc within a stream of gas flowing between a non-
consumable tungsten electrode and the workpiece. The arc heats the
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piece while filler wire is fed continuously to the workpiece. The
gas acts as a coolant and a protective shield around the weld pool.
TIG welding has applications in the power industry in welding small
diameter tubing and in root passes (or first layer passes) where a full-
penetration weld is required and the back of the joint is not accessible.
Table 29, developed by Mr. J. F. Lancaster (1974), provides a
listing of fusion welding processes and their application.
Heat Treating
High stresses during welding and residual stresses after cooling
of the weld metal are combatted through the use of preheating and post
weld heat treatment of the base metal. Table 30 represents the general
welding heat treatment practices which have been developed by Babcock
and Wilcox (1975).
Welding Design Emphasis
The major emphasis in welding design, at least from the field point
of view, is to minimize the number of dissimilar base metal welds. A
typical site will have only three or four men capable of producing
exotic dissimilar welds. The training, qualification and documentation
for one such weld can be very expensive. For example, at the Three Mile
Island construction site there was a need to weld a bronze alloy to
carbon steel by using an aluminum bronze filler material. Since this
weld is typically shop fabricated, it became necessary to develop sepa-
rate qualification and Quality Control procedures for this weld as well
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Table 30. General Welding Practices




2. Carbon-Molybdenum Croloy %
3. Croloy, 1, 1%, 2
4. Croloy 2%, 3M
5. Croloy 5, 7, 9
Stainless Steel
Minimum Preheat Requirement
200°F for material which has
both a maximum carbon
content in excess of 0.30
percent and a thickness at
the joint in excess of 1 in.
;
60°F for materials not
meeting above criteria.
200°F for material which
has either a specified
minimum tensile strength
in excess of 70,000 psi or
a thickness at the joint
in excess of 5/8 in. ; 60°F
for materials not meeting
above criteria.
250°F for material which has
either a specified minimum
tensile strength in excess
of 60,000 psi or a thickness
at the joint in excess of
% in.; 60°F for materials
not meeting above criteria.
300°F for all thicknesses.
300°F for joints of %-in.
thickness or less; 400°F
for joints in excess of %-in.
thickness.




















3. Croloy 1, 1%, 2
4. Croloy 2%, 3M
5. Croloy 5, 7, 9
6. Stainless Steel
Notes :
1. Postweld heat treatment of carbon steel materials is not required for
circumferential welds in pipes or tubes having a nominal wall thick-
ness of 3/4 in. or less at the joint.
2. Postweld heat treatment of carbon-molybdenum or Croloy % materials
is not required for circumferential welds in pipes or tubes having
both a nominal wall thickness of % in. or less and a specified
maximum carbon content of not more than 0.25 percent.
3. Postweld heat treatment of Croloy 1 through Croloy 2 materials is
not required for circumferential welds in pipes or tubes meeting all
of the following conditions:
a. A maximum nominal outside diameter of 4 in.
b. A maximum thickness of % in.
c. A maximum specified carbon content of not more than 0.15 percent.
d. A minimum preheat of 250°F.
4. Postweld heat treatment of Croloy 2% or Croloy 3M materials is not
required for circumferential welds in pipes or tubes meeting all of
the following conditions:
a. A maximum nominal outside diameter of 4 in.
b. A maximum thickness of % in.
c. A maximum specified carbon content of not more than 0.15 percent.
d. A minimum preheat of 300°F.
5. Postweld heat treatment for stainless steel materials is neither
required nor prohibited. Whether the weldment requires postweld
heat treatment depends on the service intended and should be estab-
lished accordingly. Where required, the recommended heat treatment
may be either:
a. A solution quench from within the range of 1900-2050°F, or
b. A stabilizing treatment consisting of heating to 1600-1650°F




As has been mentioned in previous discussions, every phase of
safety-related construction on nuclear power plants requires a qualified
procedure for its accomplishment. Most construction and Quality Control
procedures are written by the constructor on site, with the exception of
welding and welding Quality Control procedures. These welding procedures
are written off site by welding experts, and it is not uncommon to hire
a consultant to review the work of the experts. Even in this case, how-
ever, site personnel recheck the procedures, and will occasionally find
errors. Site-discovered errors often relate to a procedure being written
to the wrong code, or part of a code, for that site.
A typical weld procedure will include the process, base metal,
filler material, electrode, nature of electric current, position, prepa-
ration materials, techniques (including rates of gas and water flow),
cleaning material, cleaning, defects, temperatures, inspection, identifi-
cation, records and references. A Quality Control welding procedure, used
to insure quality of the weld produced using a weld procedure, defines
responsibility for fit-up (checking the geometry prior to filler material
installation), welding, inspection, testing and documentation. These two
procedures will reference each other, with the resultant goal to insure
compliance to specific requirements developed by the experts.
Welder Qualification
Before a welder can be hired for production welding, he must pass
a rigorous welder qualification process. He is first trained in his
respective process and position, and then his work is tested under
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rigorous nondestructive and destructive test conditions. It is signifi-
cant to note that in most cases if a man fails to qualify during his
first try, he is not given a second chance. There is no allowance for
error.
In addition to initial qualification, periodic updates are required
of the welders to insure that they maintain their skills. A skilled
welder supervisor can minimize the necessity to requalify welders by
keeping a schedule of when qualifications are due and rotating men to
their needed processes in order to maintain an active status.
Detailed weld information is maintained for each welder for every
weld he makes. This allows supervisors to identify poor trends or
individuals suffering reduced productivity and quality in a very short
period of time. An established maximum of three or four weld rejections
will usually result in termination.
Nondestructive Testing
The weld code inspector is usually an employee of the insurance
company, and is authorized by ASME to witness and sign for certain
tests. These tests include radiography, ultrasonics, magnetic particle
tests, and liquid penetrant tests. The technology and application of
these tests are straightforward and may be found in most texts on
welding or nondestructive testing.
Electrode and Material Control
The strengths of nuclear welds are contributed to by the electrode
coating. Thus, electrode handling is controlled. A separate procedure
is developed for electrode control on nuclear plants including the
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requirement that electrodes be stored at elevated temperature in order
to prevent absorption of moisture. Issue stations with caged-in ovens
and a requisition chit system are often employed. No welder can draw
more than a certain number of electrodes or more than one type of
electrode at a time, thus preventing accidental use of the wrong electrode
Further, all used electrode ends and unused electrodes must be turned
back in and accounted for.
Documentation
Every weld on a nuclear power plant has a weld number etched on the
pipe for traceability . The welder is held accountable for his own
welds, and must sign a weld history form for every weld which he finishes.
This weld history form includes the weld number, procedure, nondestructive
testing, type of filler material, purge if required, and any additional
information.
In addition to NOT records, additional weld records include
inspections, procedure qualifications, welder performance qualifications,
fit-up and unusual conditions, special tests, unusual items and repairs
to the weld.
Mechanical Equipment
Similar to the other disciplines discussed in this thesis, the
mechanical installation for a nuclear power plant is an order of magni-
tude more extensive as well as technologically complex than would be
required for construction of a conventional power plant. The installa-
tion is further complicated by the requirement to closely control the
installation procedures in order to provide for the assurance of safety
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within the plant. In this section the discussion will center on the
types of equipment common to a nuclear power plant and the site procedures
and problems involved in the mechanical installation.
Types of Equipment
The principal installations of concern for a nuclear plant are
large heavy walled pipe, heavy reactor internals, closure head, control
rods and drives, fuel handling equipment, and control and protection
systems. Of similar importance on a fossil plant are structural supports,
pressure containing components, drums, downcomers, and the connections
(Babcock and Wilcox, 1975). In addition to these major items, hundreds
of small pumps and motors and other pieces of equipment must be placed
and connected into their systems.
Installation Procedures
The planning by the constructor for all phases of the mechanical
installation is begun very early in the life of the project. Typically,
the lead mechanical engineer will arrive on site about the time the
concrete mats are being poured for the buildings. One of his initial
concerns it to assure himself that the structural engineers were given
sufficient and correct information for the placement of embedments that
are required for the equipment which will later be installed. The
primary task at this time, however, is for the mechanical discipline to
develop its system for the project.
In simple terms, the system is the composite group of procedures
that will detail how every phase and activity on the project related to
equipment will be accomplished. These procedures will normally require
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a preparation time of six months, although the total time may vary with
geographical location. This variation is related to the variance in
interpretation of what is required in a procedure by NRC inspectors from
different regions.
The goal of the mechanical system is to strive for Quality Assurance
within the system, such that the regulatory bodies will approve the final
installation of all equipment.
Component Transport
Many of today's power plant components are prefabricated and shipped
to the site. Increasing plant capacities and expanded QA requirements
have resulted in a drastic increase in the size and weight of these
components. At a nuclear site several components may weigh upwards of
400 to 600 tons each, necessitating very specialized hauling and handling.
In many cases roads or railroads must be either constructed or
reinforced, and bridges must be either strengthened or built.
To illustrate, one of the more difficult and complicated hauling jobs
was accomplished by Duke Power Company for the Oconee Nuclear System
(Heinz, 1975). A 325-ton nuclear pressure vessel was transported from
Mt. Vernon, Indiana, to the Oconee site in North Carolina. In all, the
trip took 55 days, covered almost 2,000 miles, and traveled in the Ohio
and Mississippi Rivers, the Gulf of Mexico, the Florida Barge Canal,
the Intercoastal Waterway, the Savannah River, and 145 miles of road
and rail bed. The Babcock and Wilcox team who planned the trip began




Due to the remote siting of many nuclear power plants, there is
occasionally the case where it is not economically feasible to transport
the reactor vessel or other large components to the site in large pre-
fabricated sections. In such cases the vessels must be field fabricated,
as is being done at the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station being built
for Pennsylvania Power and Light Company at Berwick, Pennsylvania. The
requirements for control of field fabrication are extensive, and far
beyond the scope of the conventional field construction common in this
country just a few years ago.
Site Preparation for Components and Equipment
Babcock and Wilcox (1975) have provided a comprehensive listing of
what provisions must be made prior to the shipment of components and
equipment. These provisions are listed below:
1. Adequate storage space near the site, varying from a few
hundred square feet to several acres, depending on the size of
the vessel and other components. The storage area should be
served by railroad tracks with one or more spurs leading to
the erection site. Roadways must be provided for material
arriving by trucks and for access by mobile cranes.
2. A specific area designated for ground assembly of major components
3. Material flow paths from the storage and ground assembly areas
to the erection site. An uninterrupted flow of material into
several areas of the erection site is essential for meeting
the tight schedules that normally apply.
4. Access into the building, which will house the steam generating
unit, such as hatchways in the roof and large doors in the
walls at ground level. Structural members may have to be
removed or left out to provide the necessary access for large
components.
5. An erection field office, tool and material rooms, and change
rooms for the workmen.
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6. Services such as electricity, compressed air, construction
and drinking water, sanitary facilities and first aid
facilities.
7. Stairways and walkways installed in time to permit safe
access and working conditions.
8. Derricks or other lifting equipment on the roof for raising
material.
9. Construction elevators for the larger units that may be
over 200 ft. high.
Setting Equipment
Major pieces of equipment are usually set prior to installation of
the building walls. This necessitates a great deal of planning, and
the burden falls on the designer to have his major equipment selected
long before detailed system design is begun. Equipment sizes and di-
mensions are often required in order to establish requirements for
imbedments and securing equipment, so information is required at the
very earliest stage of construction. In addition, the embedments
and securing equipment must be manufactured and delivered to the site
in time for the building construction. The impact of this information
need was illustrated at one nuclear power plant site in Pennsylvania
when the construction of the reactor containment vessel was delayed for
several weeks because the proper embedments had not been manufactured
on time.
With today's lengthening lead times on components and increasing
occurrence of delays, major equipment is usually ordered immediately
after approval of conceptual design. This allows the required equip-
ment characteristics and dimensions to be available.
Because of the size, weight, and limited tolerances required by
many of these components, special rigging and handling procedures are
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a must. Specially constructed cranes and boom systems are a part of the
very earliest construction methods studies. One goal of design and
construction alike is to optimize use of the final plant cranes in
construction operations. As a result, construction methods studies
are often incorporated into building design. Although some constructors
are assuming more and more of the rigging responsibilities, special
rigging contractors still do most of the big jobs on site.
Equipment Maintenance
It is not uncommon for a piece of equipment such as a motor or pump
to be installed and then not be required for use for one, two or more
years. This has necessitated the development of an extensive planned
maintenance program. Shafts must be rotated, purges verified, moisture
protection insured and overall security and protection guaranteed.
Systems for such maintenance have been developed using QA procedural
methods and the U.S. Navy's Planned Maintenance System (PMS) as a model.
It is important that the contract specify very clearly who is
responsible for maintenance of a component in the period after installa-
tion but before startup. In some cases the vendors or subcontractors
will agree to provide the program, while in many cases the constructor
must assume the responsibility himself.
Impact of Quality Assurance
Impact of QA on Piping
The primary impact of quality control on piping is again, documenta-
tion. Material sources, manufacturing data, transportation and storage
information, and installation procedures must all be meticulously
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documented in order to provide independent evidence of quality. In
spite of the large cost of establishing a satisfactory QA program,
many suppliers have adopted QA programs so that they can compete for
the tremendously large orders which result on modern large capacity
nuclear power plants.
The total volume and complexity of piping work has increased
alarmingly due to the redundancy and increased safety requirements for
nuclear plants. In relation to these requirements, labor productivity
has been reduced and time schedules have had to be entirely restructured,
Pipe hangers and restraints have also been transformed from basic
hangers and supports to monstrous structural members capable of with-
standing loading conditions far in excess of the design stresses of the
system.
Impact of QA on Welding
Quality Assurance impacts in the welding field have included the
detailed qualification of individual welders for each process and
position, qualification of procedures for both the weld and for its
corresponding non-destructive testing, and the requirements related to
the traceability of every weld. Weld history forms, electrode control,
and material documentation have been required to insure traceability.
The most significant impact of Quality Assurance upon construction
may, in fact, be in the field of welding. The welders and the welding
engineer have been, perhaps, elevated to the level of the most sophisti-
cated and critical craftsmen and engineer on the site.
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Impact of QA on Equipment
A very limited number of vendors are capable of supplying satis-
factory components with the necessary quality assurance documentation.
Because of this and serious material shortages, component suppliers are
overworked and their management is stretched thin. Unfortunately the
solution to this problem is not in sight.
In the placement of equipment, special procedures are required for
welding or torqueing of bolts to insure secure and sound placement.
The requirement to follow procedures and document everything follows
through for purchasing, transport, storage, installation, and maintenance
of all equipment.
Summary
The design, fabrication, and installation of the piping and
mechanical systems for a large nuclear power plant are processes which
require a staggering volume of raw materials and the combined effort
of many hundreds of engineers, designers, draftsmen and skilled crafts-
men. The Quality Assurance requirements imposed upon these processes
have resulted in a severe shortage of individuals and organizations
capable of accomplishing even small portions of the total task. In
addition, stricter regulatory and code requirements continue to be
generated on an almost monthly basis. In the next chapter, the discussion




Nuclear power plant systems, components and structures are designed
and constructed in accordance with many types of codes and standards.
The value, application, and impact of these codes will be discussed in
this chapter.
Power Code Development
The development of technical codes to govern the design and fabrica-
tion process of a nuclear power plant is an awesome task requiring a
clear understanding of the details and interaction of every phase of
the activity under study. In addition to this broad understanding, a
technical expertise for every detail must be developed and utilized to
insure complete coverage. Every possible situation or occurrence must
be anticipated, and consistency of the level of detail is an absolute
necessity. A good code must also be useable by the parties for which
it is intended. It must, therefore, be organized and presented in an
understandable manner.
The data and expertise necessary to develop such a complete code
is often only available after a certain level of experience has been
acquired in the specialty area being considered. In addition, new
information and methods of analysis will often appear after a code has
been placed in use. The net result is the need to continuously review
and update code requirements. Such a review and updating process has
been in progress for many years for codes which are used in the power
plant industry. The introduction of nuclear power plants over the last
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20-year period, with their incumbent radiation hazards and elevated
pressures and temperatures, has further accelerated the review, updating
and new development of power codes to cover this portion of the power
plant industry.
The Need for Codes
The purpose of any technical code is to establish rules which will
insure that all safety and acceptable operating factors are considered
during the phases of design, fabrication, and inspection of the component
or process being considered. As pointed out by Mr. James T. Ramey (1973),
approved codes and standards for any process are an essential part of any
effective Quality Assurance program. It may be recalled from Chapter 6,
that Quality Assurance procedures are established to insure that an
activity or process is accomplished safely, with the expected operational
function of the activity being controlled determined to be safe. Codes
determine and define what requirements and limitations must be met
in order to insure that a process or activity will be safe.
Source of Codes
Historically the responsibility for code development has rested
primarily with the cognizant industry itself. To a certain extent
governmental bodies and agencies are involved, but normally only to
provide regulatory adoption or approval, or to provide a sense of
urgency for the development of codes thought to be critically overdue
within a particular industry. To a layman it might seem odd that industry
sources should be allowed to develop the rules which govern their own
actions, but a little thought will indicate they are probably the only
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group which has the expertise and experience which is required for
such a demanding undertaking. In the writer's opinion the motivation
and dedication displayed by the power industry members involved in the
development of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code have reflected the highest standards
of their profession. It appears that the underlying purpose of insuring
safety ahead of economy in nuclear plants has been maintained foremost
in their minds.
There have been occasions, however, when regulatory bodies have
found it necessary to enter the code development process on a more
active basis. This may be due to the fact that the agency felt that an
existing code was not sufficient or because the appropriate code had
not yet been developed. This situation has been particularly true in
relation to regulatory decisions regarding nuclear power plants as new
design and fabrication procedures have been developed to meet the tech-
nical needs of the industry.
To illustrate, in the late 1950' s it was recognized fact that the
use of non-nuclear industry code applications for conventional high
pressure piping had resulted in a high rate of pipe failures (Olds,
1973). It was, therefore, determined by the AEC, the regulatory body
involved, that use of the same conventional codes for nuclear piping
would not be satisfactory. As a result during the period 1959 to
1964, technical piping requirements proposed in nuclear plant licensing
proposals were considered on an individual basis, and AEC developed
standards were employed until Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, for nuclear vessels, was published in 1964.
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Additional Requirements for Nuclear Codes
Much has been said by members of the power plant industry concerning
the additional requirements which are included when a nuclear code and
a conventional code governing similar activities are compared (IAEA, 1966)
.
The major problems related to nuclear plants that necessitate these
additional requirements are that: (1) the vessels involved undergo
service in high radiation fields which may affect the materials of
fabrication being used, (2) the vessels are inaccessible for inspection
once they are put in use, (3) large amounts of radioactive materials
are often contained in these vessels, and (4) that the consequences of
leakage of this material or failure of components are grave. In addition
to these factors, large component sizes, high pressures and temperatures,
tremendous stored energy potentials and the use of unconventional materials
cause additional requirements to be included in the scope of code
coverage (IAEA, 1966).
A review of the problems listed above indicates that nuclear codes
must include requirements that apply to situations that were never
encountered in conventional fossil fuel plants. In some cases, however,
the basic fabrication and construction processes being used have remained
the same. Welding considerations for fossil and nuclear power plants
are basically similar, for example, except perhaps for the exotic material
constraints which occur in the nuclear reactor phase of construction.
A comparison of nuclear and fossil codes in the welding area, therefore,
reveal that the process requirements are either equivalent or identical.
The difference in the codes may be found in the additional requirements
specified for testing and acceptance of "nuclear" welds. Conversations
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with field personnel have revealed that the net result of these
additional requirements is that nuclear welds are essentially accomplished
as the code specifies. It was felt, however, that although conventional
welds may have the same process code requirements, the actual welding
does not always measure up to these code standards.
Applicable Codes
A power plant will typically be subject to a myriad of local and
national codes or standards, each applying to specific areas or acti-
vities within the power plant. The specific codes and the revisions
within these codes which apply to each activity is dependent upon the
geographical location of the plant, the sources of material and fabrica-
tion, and most importantly, the date of license application and approval.
It should be noted that the date of construction license application is
most important, since it is generally considered to be unreasonable to
determine licensability of a plant by using codes and standards which
are revisions of the ones which were the basis for the original design
and construction.
In general, fossil-fuel boilers are governed by the American Society
of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code; Section I;
Power Boilers; Section II, Material Specifications; and Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications. Similarly, the pressure vessel,
steam generators and pressurizers with their incumbent piping systems
for a nuclear steam supply system must comply with the ASME Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Nuclear Power Plant Components.
These codes apply for new construction, and often for repair work. The
National Board Inspection Code also covers inspection and repair welding
(B & W, 1975).
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In addition to these major codes, there are a tremendous number of
local codes that apply to various areas of the plant. Local plumbing,
sanitary, electrical, mechanical, fire, and general building codes often
apply to the balance of plant. As mentioned, in Chapter 8, the National
Electrical Code does not apply directly to power plants. It does, however,
establish standard practice. Because of the long duration of the power
plant construction process these additional codes will also apply to
the temporary facilities used for construction, since local municipalities
usually consider temporary construction to be less than one year in
length (Blount, 1976). In addition, local regulation may impose require-
ments in excess of the ASME Code to the boiler or nuclear steam system.
It is of critical importance for all parties involved in design
and construction to identify and keep track of which codes apply to
which systems and activities. Tabular groupings and cross-reference
checking is mandatory if the applications are to be clearly interpreted.
Specification breaks or code breaks within a system are particularly
critical, since these are easily overlooked or confused. Designation
of code changes must be clear.
A complete set of the applicable revisions of each code must be
maintained on site in a manner providing for efficient utilization.
Codes should not be memorized by constructor personnel, as similarities
are often confusing, but familiarity should be continuously augmented
by detailed comparison of applicable code sections.
One problem, according to field personnel, is that field procedures
are occasionally discovered to be in accordance with the wrong code or
code revision. Procedures must be carefully checked and rechecked to
insure consistency and applicability.
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Many of the nuclear power plants currently under construction were
granted construction licenses prior to the issuance of Section III of
the ASME Code. In the absence of Section III, the plants were authorized
to be designed under a varying group of other code sections. Table 31
provides a general listing of the components and systems at Three Mile
Island plant and indicates the code that was used and the ASME Section III
comparison.
International Codes
Ninety-four nations are members of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, whose main office is located in Vienna, Austria. In order to
meet the challenge of nuclear development in their countries, many of
these nations have developed codes for nuclear power plants. Tables 32
and 33 were developed from a survey of these codes by the International
Atomic Energy Agency in 1966. It is noteworthy that for the two
United States plants listed in Table 31, the actual wall thickness would
not be acceptable by any other code except the one used in Germany.
This does not necessarily indicate a lack of safety on the part of the
ASME Code Section VIII in use at the time, but rather an indication of
increased conservatism on the part of the foreign code developers.
Code Application
Regulatory Standing of Codes
The Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and other similar national
codes are, in themselves, not binding or mandatory for construction of
a power plant. Instead, they provide suggested rules of good practice
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Table 32. Schematic Code Examples (from IAEA,
Schematic Code Examples)
BWR, Oyster Creek Plant (515 MWe)





Design Pressure (kg/cm )
Material, ASME Spec.







(a) As Actually Built
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introduction to Section III of the ASME Code, these rules are not
intended to approve, recommend, or endorse any proprietory or specific
design or to limit in any way the manufacturer's freedom to choose any
other suitable method of design or form of construction.
Typically, the codes assume regulatory standing, however, when they
are adopted by states and local municipalities. Some local codes may
be developed, but they are generally molded after the appropriate
national standard CB & N, 1975). Authority and application of additional
building codes will vary tremendously from state to state and localities
within each state.
Synopsis of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Rules and Regulations , a
booklet issued by the Uniform Boiler and Pressure Vessels Laws
Society, lists the states, cities, countries and provinces that have
laws governing fabrication and installation of steam boilers. Also
included is information on cognizant officials, fees, licenses, and
required inspections (B & W, 1975).
Code Implementation
In order to comply with the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,
fabrication and installation must be accomplished under the supervision
of an organization authorized to use the ASME power boiler stamp, the
ASME assembly stamp, or a similar appropriate stamp. In addition,
nuclear plants are governed by strict Nuclear Regulatory Commission
requirements to demonstrate compliance of design and fabrication to
ASME, Section III. Such compliance is checked through application




A major problem with the implementation of Section III has been the
achievement of close adherence by vessel manufacturers and inspectors.
The requirements are stringent, and failure of the manufacturers to
comply will invariably result in rejections and delays of serious eco-
nomic consequence if they are discovered. As a result, the regulatory
agencies have appeared to be at blame for some delays which are probably
more directly attributable to manufacturers and inspectors (IAEA, 1966)
.
Regardless of blame, such delays have not been uncommon, and consitute
a major component of the scheduling problems discussed in Chapter 5 of
this thesis.
Code Inspections
Manufacturing and installation under the ASME Code must be
inspected at specified stages by an authorized inspector. An authorized
inspector is one who has been licensed by the local, state, or
municipality and who has a National Board commission. The National
Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors, centered in Columbus,
Ohio, is the organization of chief inspectors of the states and munic-
ipalities who have officially adopted the code. Typically, authorized
inspectors are employed by insurance companies, providing the insurance
company with a degree of control and a measure of assurance in the work
in progress (B & W, 1975).
The inspectors sign data sheets pertaining to work inspected,
and they witness the stamping of appropriate components. In addition to
welding in progress, field inspectors must insure that materials and
methods conform to the code. Random inspections of welding and other
work in progress is augmented by manufacturer's certifications and
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qualification of procedures. Frequent and often continuous inspections
of welding is necessary to assure that:
1. Each operator is qualified under the code for the welds he
makes
.
2. Procedure specifications are rigorously followed.
3. Joints are accurately aligned and fitted before welding is
started.
4. Nondestructive tests required by the code and contractor's
quality control procedures are performed (Babcock and Wilcox,
1975, p. 32-10).
As mentioned previously, ASME Code inspectors are complimented by
regulatory inspectors employed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and
also those employed by various state and local regulatory bodies.
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code
In order to illustrate the complexity of code requirements, the




The 1974 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code is made up of 11
sections, and constitutes volumes of detailed information. The sections,
divisions and parts are listed in Table 34.
Section III
The development of ASME Section III was a significant milestone for
both national and international standards. Significant differences in




Table 34. 1974 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code
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• Part C—Welding Rods, Electrodes, and Filler Metals
Nuclear Power Plant Components, Division 1
• Subsection NA—General Requirements (Includes All
Appendices)
• Subsection NB—Class 1 Components
• Subsection NC—Class 2 Components
• Subsection ND—Class 3 Components
• Subsection NE—Class MC Components
• Subsection NF—Component Supports
• Subsection NG—Core Support Structures
Nuclear Power Plant Components, Division 2




Recommended Rules for Care and Operation of Heating Boilers
Recommended Rules for Care of Power Boilers
Pressure Vessels
• Division 1
• Division 2—Alternative Rules
Welding and Brazing Qualifications
Fiberglass-Reinforced Plastic Pressure Vessels




(a) Section III uses the maximum shear stress (Tresca) theory
of failure instead of the maximum stress theory.
(b) Section III requires the detailed calculation and classifica-
tion of all stresses and the application of different stress
limits to different classes of stress, whereas Sections I and
VIII give formulas for minimum allowable wall thickness (of
the containment and piping).
(c) Section III requires the calculation of thermal stresses and
gives allowable values for them.
(d) Section III considers the possibility of fatigue failure and
gives rules for its prevention (IAEA, 1966, p. 17).
The effects of these changes are felt in three areas. Initially,
due to a complete stress analysis, lower safety factors are permitted.
Secondly, there is more extensive testing of materials, such as close
measurement of brittle fracture due to high radiation and temperature.
The net result is a reduction in material requirements of up to 16 per-
cent for a PWR and 25 percent for a BWR (IAEA, 1966).
Finally, the third effect of the new code is felt in the require-
ments for strict compliance and inspection of manufacturing and erection
of components. The total aim is to replace traditional large factors
of safety with a thorough analysis of the design and erection process,
resulting in a considerable economic savings in material and fabrication
(IAEA, 1966).
To illustrate in a broad way the length of the ASME Code, one
division of Section III constitutes a volume in itself. Nuclear Power
Plant Components, Division 2, Code for Concrete Reactor Vessels and
Containments (ACI Standard 359-74)—1975, is 315 pages in length. Subjects
covered include all the composite metal and concrete components including
their materials, parts, and appurtenances. Detailed information is
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provided for general requirements, prestressed concrete reactor vessels
and prestressed and reinforced concrete containments as well as
appendices and references.
Summary
The magnitude, complexity and potential accident hazard of nuclear
power plants have necessitated the development of very stringent codes.
These codes are intended to describe the standards of quality in the
design and fabrication of a plant that are necessary to insure the
proper functioning of the nuclear power plant during commercial opera-
tion. A broad overview of the requirements for codes, their develop-
ment and an analysis of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code were
presented in this chapter. Due to the detailed complexities of the
codes and their application, an in-depth analysis of any one code
section is beyond the scope of this thesis.
In the next chapter, the impact of a startup and test program on




In the four preceding chapters of this thesis, the various
technical processes of nuclear power plant construction were examined.
These processes typically result in over 70 piping systems and over
15,000 electrical circuits that must be tested individually and collec-
tively prior to commercial operation of the plant. The testing itself
requires thousands of instruments, each of which must be precisely
calibrated.
Due to the magnitude of the testing requirements and the critically
short amount of time allotted for the entire process, a precisely planned
and organized testing program is an absolute necessity on nuclear power
plants today. The planning for this test program must begin in the
very early stages of the project, long before the actual testing is
started. The concepts, programs, and construction impacts of the test
planning process will be discussed in detail in this chapter.
Startup and Test Engineering
The concept of employing a formally planned testing program
using detailed test procedures is very new to the power industry. With
the exception of the Shippingport Atomic Energy Station, this type of
program was essentially non-existent until about 1966 (Barton, 1976)
.
The issuance, and implementation in 1972, of Appendix B to Title 10 of
the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50 , however, made the employment





In the past, the approach to startup of a power plant had been to
"push the button and see if it works" CBarton, 1976, p. 20.4). This
approach is still in use on many fossil fired power plants today. Nuclear
units, however, are subject to Appendix B, as noted above, and are no
longer tested in this manner.
The traditional startup process primarily involved the major com-
ponents, which were checked and certified for operation by the field
engineers of the very same companies that supplied the components.
Startup scheduling for these components was accomplished primarily
through the use of bar charts, with auxiliary equipment and systems not
even scheduled. Essentially, as soon as the boiler and turbine were
ready to go, full operation commenced.
Because of this approach, many problems in auxiliary systems and
safety systems were not uncovered until long after the plant was in
operation. There was no assurance for the owner that many portions of
the plant would operate within the design criteria, and in fact some
equipment and systems were never even tested prior to their required
use during commercial operation.
The Startup Plan
In order to overcome the shortcomings of the traditional approach
to startup a power plant, a formalized plan is utilized for the startup
of a nuclear plant. The preliminary steps involved in the development
of this plan include (Shah, 1971): CI) prepare a list of various
necessary tests to be performed, (2) define the scope of individual
tests, C31 assign the responsibility to write specifications and
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procedures for each test, (4) approve test specifications and procedures,
(5) assign the responsibility for performance of each test, and
(6) evaluate prerequisites for interdependent tests. A complete listing
of all the systems, components and the tests to be performed on each
can then be compiled, with procedure requirements for each test identified,
This document (Barton, 1976) may then be used as the Master Test Index
throughout the project.
Following the identification of required tests, the development of
test procedures, and the assignment of personnel to support the test
program, the actual scheduling of the startup program can begin. Arrow
diagrams (as will be discussed later in this chapter) are commonly
employed for this process.
Test Specifications and Procedures
As noted earlier in this chapter, the responsibility for writing
the test specifications and procedures for each individual test is
assigned to cognizant test engineers. These test specifications (Shah,
1971) include the following: (1) purpose of the test, (2) prerequisites
necessary, (3) reference drawings, specifications, codes, etc.,
(4) detailed description of the test method, (5) safety precautions and
test limitations, (6) data to be collected and documentation required,
(7) estimated duration of the test, (8) number of persons required for
the test, and (9) acceptance criteria.
The Startup and Test Program
The Startup and Test Program consists of several types of tests
that are made in each of several testing periods. The classifications,
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organizations and scheduling requirements for these tests will be
discussed in this section.
Test Periods
There are four distinct testing periods in the startup program of
a nuclear power plant. These periods (Shah, 1971) include, in time
sequence: (1) Cold Test Period, C2) Hot Functional Test Period, (3) Fuel
Loading and Initial Criticality Test Period, and (4) Post-Criticality
Test Period.
The Cold Test Period
,
also called the Pre-Heatup Testings, consists
primarily of the initial electrical and hydrostatic or leak tests for
the various systems. Instrument calibration tests are run during this
period, as well as initial functional and operational tests of non-nuclear
systems.
During the Hot Functional Test Period , the reactor coolant pumps
are run to simulate operating temperatures and pressures of 650°F and
2500 psig (Shah, 1971) in the reactor coolant system. Operational tests
of all the various systems are performed under these simulated conditions.
It is important to note that during this phase there is as yet no fuel in the
reactor.
Successful completion of the Hot Functional Tests is a prerequisite
for the issuance of a provisional operating license that will permit
the Fuel Loading and Initial Criticality Test Period to begin. Detailed
loading procedures must be employed in order to ensure that safe shutdown
conditions are continuously maintained during fuel loading. Fuel loading
is followed by a series of Reactor Safety System Tests.
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Upon completion of the Reactor Safety System Tests, the reactor
is brought to the point of criticality. This is done by a carefully
followed procedure of control rod withdrawal and deboration in a pre-
determined sequence.
During the Post-Criticality Test Period a complete series of tests
are performed at various power levels from zero power to full power. Some
of these checks (Shah, 1971) include the following:
1. Physical parameters are verified at various power levels starting
with zero power level and at several temperature plateaus.
2. Calculated worths of the control rods individually and as a
group are verified at all power levels.
3. Temperature co-efficient of reactivity, boron worth and
excess reactivity are measured at various power levels.
4. Nuclear instrumentation is verified.
Types of Tests
In each of the test periods, there are several types of tests (Shah,
1971), including: (1) Electrical Tests, (2) Instrument Calibration
Tests, (3) Hydrostatic or Pneumatic Tests, (4) Functional Tests, and
(5) Operational Tests.
After the calibration, electrical, hydrostatic and pneumatic tests
have been completed, the system is checked in Functional Tests to insure
that the component or system performs its desired function: such as
pumping water in a loop in the case of the Makeup and Purification
System. Operational Tests on the same system will verify that the





Each test in the startup program is classified further by the
appropriate safety classification of the system for which the test was
developed. These classifications (Barton, 1976, p. 20.21) are as follows
Classification 1—system with safety-related function only—consists
of those systems which may or may not be operating during normal
plant operation, but must be in constant readiness to perform their
safety function (e.g., Core Flooding System).
Classification 2—system with both safety-related and non-safety-
related functions—consists of those systems which are normally
in operation to provide a plant support function and are also
required to operate during an emergency (e.g., Makeup and Purifica-
tion System)
.
Classification 3—system with normal operating function only—consists
of those systems having no safety-related function but which are
required to be operational for normal plant operation (e.g., Secon-
dary Service River Water System)
.
Classification 4—systems that support plant operations and are not
essential to the continued safe or normal operation of the plant
—
consists of those systems which are not required during normal
plant operations (e.g., Sanitary Waste System).
Startup Organization
As noted earlier, the responsibilities for development and implemen-
tation of the many tests involved in the startup program for a nuclear
power plant must be clearly defined. In general, the startup program
is organized into a team, composed primarily of members of one of three
parties. Initially, the constructor or construction manager can have
primary responsibility for startup. A second method allows the owner
to maintain primary responsibility, while the third method occurs when
the owner issues a separate contract for the startup program.
The high costs of nuclear power plants and the complexity of the
test program have caused a general trend toward the second method, in
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which the utility develops in-house startup expertise and conducts its
own startup program. Some initial assistance from the constructor is
required in any case, however, in order to assure a smooth and efficient
turnover. Typical construction responsibilities (Shah, 1971) include:
1. Cleaning and initial lubrication of the equipment.
2. Hydrostatic or Pneumatic Test.
3. Temporary piping or electrical connections necessary to run
any test on the equipment or system.
4. Chemical cleaning and flushing.




7. Instrument Calibration Testing.
Typical Owner Startup Responsibilities are:
1. Functional Test of the systems.
2. Operational Test of the systems.
3. All tests performed during Hot Functional Testing.
4. Fuel Loading and Criticality Test.
5. Post-Criticality and Unit Acceptance Test.
These tests and functions are normally carried out by the owner's
operating personnel with assistance from the construction and vendor
startup personnel.
Startup Scheduling
The high cost of capital investment and large magnitude of tests
that must be completed on a nuclear power plant require a test scheduling
system that will allow testing to be scheduled in a minimum amount of
time and accomplished at the least cost. As in the case of work activity
scheduling, bar charts have given way to the Critical Path Method (CPM)
of scheduling. By the use of CPM, the logical sequences and interdepen-
dencies of all tests may be shown simply and clearly. Further, the




Impact of Startup Upon Construction
The impact of startup and test engineering upon the construction
process is highly significant, particularly in the area of construction
sequencing and scheduling. The entire construction sequence is based
upon getting the plant into operation as quickly as possible. The
operation of the plant is controlled, however, by the logical sequencing
of the startup and test program. As a result, the construction schedule
must be designed so that the proper components and systems are made
available to the startup team at the correct time.
Typically, the water supply systems are required first for the test
sequence. As a result, the construction schedule must insure that the
water systems are among the first to be completed, so that testing can
begin. This idea follows through for the rest of the systems in the plant.
Because of the significant impact that startup logic has on con-
struction scheduling, there is a very real need to develop that logic at
the earliest stage of the project. In order for the computerized CPM
construction schedule to be correct, proper startup information must be
entered into the computer. Conversations that the writer had with
several field engineers and one project manager revealed the feeling
that the entire construction CPM schedule was actually only a support
mechanism for the plant startup program.
A second impact of the startup program is found in the area of
quality. Field personnel on nuclear power plants are aware that, in
addition to the extensive Quality Assurance procedures exercised while
work is in progress, the completed components and systems will be
subjected to a very thorough testing program that will insure that
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specifications and design criteria are met. This knowledge acts as
some incentive for field workers to insure that work activities are
accomplished correctly at the outset.
Summary
The startup and test program for a nuclear power plant, which will
typically require 12 to 16 months from turnover of the first system to
initial fill and another year from fill to commercial operation, is a
formalized and carefully planned program. Every day lost in obtaining
a commercial operating license represents upwards of $20,000 in lost
revenue to the utility. Obviously, close coordination is critical.
The planning for this startup program must begin in the very early stages
of the project, and will have a tremendous impact upon construction
sequencing and scheduling.
In this chapter the discussion was primarily centered upon a
planning process that has major impacts on the construction of a nuclear
power plant. In the following chapter, the impacts upon construction
of a less quantifiable group, labor, will be analyzed.

Chapter 12
LABOR IN THE POWER INDUSTRY
Throughout this thesis, a great many problems that have been
experienced by the participants in nuclear power plant projects have
been identified. Among these have been the changing regulatory environ-
ment, licensing delays, major cost overruns, schedule slippages, and a
great many technical problems regarding the assurance of quality within
the various work activities. A very significant factor in many of
these problems is the role that the labor force has played in the
development of nuclear power projects. In this chapter the writer will
attempt to examine the role of labor in the construction phase of a
nuclear power plant project, identify labor problems and their significance
within the industry, and summarize some possible solutions to the situation
presented.
Labor Overview
The total manpower requirement for the construction phase of an
1150 MWe nuclear power plant represents approximately 13.8 million
craft manhours, with peak manpower requirements in excess of 1500 men
per day. This work force is one that is extremely large from scheduling,
supervision, and control standpoints. It should be noted that in some
cases it is difficult to meet the labor demands of nuclear plants, since
many of them are being constructed at considerable distances from urban
population centers.
This section will present an overview by craft of the manpower
requirements of a typical nuclear power plant, as well as a discussion of
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typical productivity figures for similar plants, and the general trend
of construction wages in the industry.
Craft Requirements
As noted above, the construction labor force for a nuclear power
plant is extremely large. The total manpower requirements for single-,
double-, and triple-unit plants of 1150 MWe capacity per unit are shown
in Figure 32. It is important to note from this figure that although the
peak manpower requirements are much higher for the two and three unit
plants (2400 peak and 3300 peak number of men, respectively, compared to
1500 peak for a single unit) there is a significant reduction in the
peak number of men per MWe factor indicated at the peak of each curve.
This is one of the major factors in the decision of whether or not to
build a multiple-unit plant.
The manpower requirement curve for the two-unit plant in Figure 32
is presented by craft in Figure 33. This figure supports the information
presented in earlier chapters of this thesis which identified pipefitters
and electricians as critical crafts on nuclear power plant projects.
Another major craft, in magnitude of manhours required, that is not shown
in Figure 33 is that of laborers.
Figure 34 presents information similar to that of Figure 33 in terms
of total manhours by craft for two completed two-unit plants. It is clear
from Figure 34 that pipefitters, shown to represent 4.7 million manhours,
and electricians, shown to represent 3.4 million manhours, are the
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Figure 33. Typical Quarterly Manpower Requirements by Craft
for a Two-Unit Nuclear Power Plant of 1150 MWe




















































































The variation between the manhour figures for the two plants shown
in Figure 34 is due to broad variation in labor productivity, licensing
requirements, location of plant site, design variation and the degree
of prefabrication common throughout the industry.
The relationship of various crafts relative to the entire manpower
requirement can be seen by analyzing some typical craft manhour compari-
sons (Budwani, 1975) for a single unit 1200 MWe nuclear power plant




















Productivity and Production Rates
It is important to realize when analyzing the construction labor
requirements of a nuclear power plant that the magnitude of the labor
force is matched by an even greater magnitude and complexity of work to
be accomplished. Although the construction phase for a nuclear plant
may be five or six years in length, the schedule of work activities
required to meet that target is very demanding indeed.
Tables 35 and 36 illustrate this fact by indicating average place-
ment rates for electrical and piping work for various nuclear power plants
As indicated in Table 35, placement rates in excess of 3,000 lin. ft.
per month for large bore piping and 4,000 lin. ft. per month for small
bore piping are not uncommon. Similarly, Table 36 shows that 130,000 lin.
ft. per month for cable and wire and 7,000 or 8,000 lin. ft. per month
for conduit are common rates for many plants.
The large variations in Tables 35 and 36 are a function of licensing
requirements, manpower leveling, plant arrangement, size and length of
run, access availability, and strikes. These factors, which have been
mentioned throughout this thesis, have made comparisons of construction
data within the power industry very difficult.
The information presented in Tables 37 and 38 combines the data
from Figures 33 and 34 and Tables 35 and 36 in the form of manhours per
unit of work. This format is the common method used in comparing labor
productivity data, and will be used for this purpose later in this chapter.
It is important to note from Table 37 that the unit manhour figures
for the reactor building are much higher than those for the other
buildings. This is as would be expected because of the complexity of




Table 35. Average and/or Sustained Placement Rates
for Piping (from Power Engineering , June, 1975)
Placement
Station x Rates
Units Pipe Erection Lin. Ft. /Mo
PWR x 1 Large Diameter 2,770
Small Diameter 4,100
PWR x 1 Large Diameter 6,490
Small Diameter 4,570
PWR x 1 Large Diameter 3,020
Small Diameter 3,350
PWR x 1 Large Diameter 3,780
Small Diameter 4,200
PWR x 2 Large Diameter^ , _ A _
Small Diameter
PWR x 2 Large Diameteri , goo
Small Diameter '
BWR x 1 Large Diameter 2,150
Small Diameter 5,120
BWR x 1 Large Diameter 3,060
Small Diameter 4,410
BWR x 1 Large Diameter 4,270
Small Diameter 14,700
Large Diameter = 2% in. and over, Small Diameter = 2 in. and under.
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Table 36. Average and/or Sustained Placement Rates for





Units Resource Lin. Ft. /Mo,
PWR x 1 Cable and Wire 150,000
Conduit
PWR x 1 Cable and Wire 146,000
Conduit 6,150
PWR x 1 Cable and Wire 157,500
Conduit 12,000
PWR x 1 Cable and Wire 147,000
Conduit 7,500
PWR x 2 Cable and Wire 300,000
Conduit
PWR x 2 Cable and Wire 126,000
Conduit 12,500
BWR x 1 Cable and Wire 135,000
Conduit 9,100
BWR x 1 Cable and Wire 110,000
Conduit 16,200
BWR x 1 Cable and Wire 100,000
Conduit 6,400
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Table 38. Actual or Expected Unit Manhours for Electrical
and Piping Installations (from Power Engineering
,
June, 1975)
Resource High Low Average
Cable Pulling MH/LF MH/LF MH/LF
Power 0.30 0.10 0.17
Control 0.09 0.05 0.07
Terminations MH/Ea MH/Ea MH/Ea
Power 3.20 0.95 2.50
Control 0.75 0.57 0.70
Cable Trays MH/LF MH/LF MH/LF
3.0 1.50 2.30
Conduit MH/LF MH/LF MH/LF
1.15 0.80 1.01
Piping MH/LF MH/LF MH/LF
2% in. and over 13.80 3.35 6.70
2 in. and under 4.80 1.20 2.90
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It is interesting to note in Table 38 that the average unit manhour
figure for conduit (1.01 MH/LF) is significantly lower than that for
cable trays (2.3 MH/LF). Table 38 also indicates that the unit manhour
figures for large bore piping is more than twice that of small bore piping,
Labor Wage Gains
Another factor that must be understood when gaining an overview of
power plant construction labor is the trend of increases in construction
wages and benefits. Mr. Leon Greenberg (1975) of the Contractor's Mutual
Association has reported that in the 10-year period from January 1965 to
January 1975, construction wages plus benefits rose 116 percent. During
that same period, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) rose only 67 percent.
When the construction wage increase was adjusted to the CPI, a 10-year
increase of 30 percent was shown.
Mr. Greenberg wenton to note that the true significance of these
wage increases can only be determined when compared with productivity
growth factors for the industry during the same time period. Greenberg
(p. 10) summarized:
The average annual changes in union wage rates since 1965 have
been significantly higher than the rate of gain in national
productivity whether measured for the postwar period or for the
last decade.
Labor Problems
As one might expect with a labor force as large and varied as that
employed on a nuclear power plant project, there are a great many labor-
related problems that arise. In this section several of these problems,
including craft shortages, increased labor requirements, reduced produc-




As recently as 1973, power plant constructors in various parts of
the country were experiencing serious shortages of manpower in a number
of trades (Budwani, 1975). This was particularly the case for nuclear-
qualified welders, pipefitters and electricians. Inflation and recession
have eased these shortages considerably, since many utilities have been
forced to cancel or delay a large number of power plant projects. These
delays (Palmeter, 1976) have been estimated to represent 3,520,000,000
manhours of work, or employment for about 300,000 building tradesmen and
construction supervisors for a six-year period.
Although there are no major labor shortages at this time, there is
a great deal of uncertainty and concern about possible shortages that will
exist if many of the deferred power plant projects are brought back on
the line. In the writer's opinion, this is one of the most critical
problems facing the nuclear power plant industry today. Even with the
most conservative estimate for future power plant construction (Budwani,
1975), shortages of skilled manpower are apparent. Other less conservative
predictions of future nuclear capacity growth would indicate substantial
shortages.
The effect of labor shortages on a nuclear project is significant.
At one nuclear power plant project in Pennsylvania in 1970 and 1971, there
was a critical shortage of welders. Several months of costly delay were
experienced while union efforts and utility efforts, such as newspaper
advertising and hiring at the gate, were employed to meet the welding
requirements.
More recently, another Pennsylvania project experienced a sudden
loss of boilermaker welders due to another power plant outage. For a
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period of five weeks the absentee rate was 30 to 40 men per day. Again,
costly delays were experienced because of a shortage of skilled tradesmen,
Increased Labor Requirements—Productivity
In general, planned construction manhours have risen steadily since
the mid-1960' s. At that time (Budwani, 1975) , 4 MH/kWe was a common
average for a nuclear power plant. As noted earlier this figure has gone
up to 12 MH/kWe for a nuclear power plant scheduled for commercial opera-
tion in 1982.
The reasons for this increase are threefold. Initially, increased
regulatory requirements and their more stringent enforcement have caused
an increasing amount of work to be rejected with the requirement that the
work be done over. Secondly, increased size and complexity of nuclear
plant designs have made the technological construction requirements more
complex and demanding. Finally, there has been a reduction in labor
productivity.
It is difficult to determine exactly how much of the increase in
manhours/kVTe is due to a reduction in labor productivity, but Mr. Earl C.
Nagle (1974) of United Engineers and Constructors has indicated that the
increasing complexity and quantitative content of the nuclear plants are
the more significant factors. It will be noted in the next section,
however, that there is a wide variation in manpower per kWe figures
between union and non-union projects. This variation cannot be ignored.
Union Problems
As noted above, there is a distinct difference in productivity
figures between union and non-union nuclear power plant projects.

334
According to Mr. Saxon B. Palmeter (1976) of General Public Utilities
Service Corporation, owner work forces and unions not associated with
the AFL/CIO Building Trades Department are performing structural concrete
work on nuclear power plant projects for about 10 manhours per cu. yd.,
in place. Comparable work on building trades projects in the same time
frame required 15 to 20 manhours per cu. yd. The same disparity is
reported by him in the mechanical and electrical disciplines.
The reasons for these disparities, and other problems with union
organizations, that were reported to the writer during interviews with
industry personnel include: (1) the high cost of labor, (2) the restric-
tive work practices, (3) the lack of mobility in the work force, (4) the
union control of the work force through union membership and the hiring
hall, (5) the unrealistic training programs, (6) the abuse of overtime,
(7) the failure by contractors to exercise management rights in collective
bargaining, (8) the undermining of collective bargaining by owners,
(9) the Davis-Bacon prevailing wage law, (10) the jurisdictional disputes,
(11) the fragmentation of contractor associations, and (12) the serious
imbalance at the bargaining table. In the writer's opinion, several of
these problems are significant, particularly restrictive work practices,
jurisdictional disputes, collective bargaining problems and union control
of training and work supervision.
Restrictive Work Practices clearly limit productivity by limiting
the use of labor saving devices, limiting crew sizes, requiring standby
labor and limiting the use of prefabricated components. To illustrate,
under certain union agreements a cement finisher cannot be used as a
laborer to place concrete, but must be paid while he waits for the pour

335
to be completed. Operators are required for automatic equipment and
standby labor must be paid for heavy equipment and lifting operations.
Jurisdictional Disputes impact severely on power plant projects
because construction must often be stopped in order to resolve which of
two or more crafts will be responsible for a particular work activity.
For example, on one nuclear power plant project there were 55 work stop-
pages during a three-year period that could be attributed primarily to
jurisdictional disputes. The stoppages were estimated to have resulted
in 355 days of lost time.
Collective Bargaining Problems have been many and varied, with the
unions continuing to gain more powerful positions in the bargaining process
Many of these problems are being addressed through Project Agreements for
nuclear power plants. These agreements will be discussed later in this
chapter.
Union Control of Work Supervision is alarming because in many cases
the work supervisors are also union members. In many cases, it is
difficult for a supervisor to properly discharge his responsibilities
to the contractor when loyalty binds him more strongly to the union.
Union Control of Training has created a situation where training
programs are good, but limited. This may be an attempt on the part of
unions to insure that tradesmen will remain in demand. In the opinion
of the writer, this is a major contributor to the craft shortage
problem that was discussed earlier in this chapter.
Labor Problem Solutions
The labor problems mentioned in the previous section are significant,
and ones that will not be solved in a short period of time. Certain short
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range solutions have been begun within the industry. These include work
sampling, project agreements and small scale training programs, but long
range solutions are going to require a drastic restructuring of the labor
market. This section will present a discussion of both the short and
long range solutions to the various problems identified.
Immediate Solutions
There are several approaches that have been successfully employed
to bring improvement in labor productivity for a nuclear power plant
project already under construction. The following is a five-point pro-
gram currently being employed at a project in Pennsyvlania : (1) notify
the design engineers that last minute design changes such as additional
inserts in a wall will not be accepted, C2) hire a temporary "Methods
Man" to evaluate construction methods, (3) examine materials handling
methods, (4) meet with local union leaders to work out problems, and
(5) improve supervision. Of these five programs, the suggestion to
improve supervision is often the most difficult to gain control of.
Supervisor- labor ratios are usually defined in union agreements, and
there is often a shortage of "good" supervisors.
Work Sampling
One method being tried by several utilities around the country is
called "work sampling." It is a random sampling method of observation
based upon the theory of probability. The intent is not to measure
information such as the number of bricks being laid per hour (which
would be contrary to many union agreements) but rather to measure the
amount of time being spent by a tradesman on "direct work." Items 1
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through 9 on Table 39, which illustrates the data from several work
sampling studies, are, for example, not considered to be direct work.
Project management personnel use data similar to that in Table 39
to identify indirect or non-productive work areas that are unusually
high. Based upon the assumption (Palmeter, 1976, p. 5) that a tradesman
"will give a fair day's work for a fair day's pay," efforts are then made
by management to reduce non-direct work items so that the tradesman can
spend more time in direct work.
It is important to note that accurate work sampling information
gathering requires the understanding and cooperation of workers and
the unions. Utilities who have tried work sampling have indicated to
the writer that it is often necessary to hire a consultant to set up the
program and enlist cooperation from the unions and the constructor.
It is alarming to note in Table 37 that the average for all samples
indicates less than 36 percent of an eight-hour day is spent by the
average tradesman in direct work.
Project Agreements
A Project Agreement is one vehicle that has been chosen on many
nuclear power plant projects to insure that the project will proceed
efficiently, economically and without interruption. Although the
agreements vary widely from project to project, they generally act as
a contract between the participating unions and the constructors for
the duration of the project. Areas commonly covered by the agreements
include: (1) management rights, (2) hiring without restriction,
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(5) working conditions, (6) shift work, (7) work practices, (8) no-
strike and no-lock-out provisions, and (9) grievance and arbitration
procedures.
Project agreements initially came to the nuclear power plant
industry in 1973, and already over 150 project agreements have been
executed in the United States (Palmeter, 1976). Even so, however, they
are only an interim solution, with long range solutions requiring a more
significant restructuring of the labor market.
Another alternative open to some industry firms is to seek alterna-
tive sources of construction manpower. Open shop and owner force con-
struction are quickly becoming viable alternatives to union construction
in the power plant industry. Examples of the inroads made by open shop
construction were given by Mr. Palmeter (1976, p. 13) as follows:
In 1936 a U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Survey found that the
proportion of union workers in building construction ranged from
41 percent in the South Central States (Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana,
Arkansas), to 80 percent in the Middle Atlantic States (New York,
New Jersey, and Pennsylvania) . In 1973 a survey found that the 41
percent had dropped to 17 percent and the 80 percent to 38.5 percent,
A survey was made by the National Constructors Association of jobs
lost by NCA members to open shop during the time period 1961 to 1973.
They found 121 power plants, 338 petrochemical plants and 207 other
heavy industrial-type projects lost to open shop and owner built
work forces. The value of this work has been estimated at $32
billion.
The advantage that open shop or owner/force construction offers is
the dramatic reductions illustrated previously in the unit manhours




It is the writer's opinion that the only long range solutions to
the labor problems of power plant construction today lie in a total
restructuring of the union labor structure. The experience and expertise
maintained by unions must be retained, but tremendous changes within the
unions are necessary. These changes were itemized by Mr. Palmeter (1976,
p. 9, 10) as he spoke to labor leaders in Pittsburgh, Pa., and are felt
to be valid and of extreme importance by the writer:
1. Call a halt to all restrictive work practices. These practices,
whether requiring an operator for automatic equipment, estab-
lishing crew sizes, rigid foremen to journeymen ratios, pre-
cluding the use of labor saving devices or prefabricated
components, or requiring standby labor, are clearly intended
to limit the worker's productivity.
2. We must remove all supervision, from the foreman on up, from
union control. It is most difficult for a supervisor to
discharge his responsibility to the contractor when loyalty
binds him more strongly to the union than to his employer. Nor
can he act in his employer's best interest when he is vulnerable
to discipline from his union knowing he must look to the hiring
hall for his next job.
3. Resolve once and for all costly jurisdictional disputes. They
are schedule delaying, costly and completely unnecessary.
This waste of time and money must stop.
4. Change your working rules requiring journeymen rates for un-
skilled work. Construction users must pay for journeymen to do
most of the work on a project yet only a small percentage of
that work actually requires journeymen's skills. New classi-
fications for unskilled and semi-skilled workers should be
created.
5. Become once again a mobile work force. Building tradesmen are
no longer free to move to where the work is because most fringe
benefits can be accrued only in their home local. Change your
by-laws to permit "travelers" to accrue to their own account in
their home local benefits earned while working in other
territories. And allow contractors to bring a cadre of skilled
trades with them to jobs in different jurisdictions.
6. Establish standard shift provisions for a reasonable premium.
The wide disparity in shift premiums, ranging from a minimum

342
of about 10 percent to double time in some cases, should be
standardized on the basis of second shift work at 7-1/2 hours
for 8 hours pay and third shift at 7 hours with pay for 8 hours,
The tremendous investments tied up in these mammoth projects
makes finishing them in the shortest possible calendar time a
must. Interest charges alone amount to about 22 percent of the
total capital cost.
7. Consider adopting the General President's Agreement for Main-
tenance by Contract as a model for your "new construction"
collective bargaining agreements. This agreement, with few
changes or additions will make you competitive with non-union
labor. The terms and conditions in this agreement are exactly
what your contractors need to compete and hold on to their
market.
Summary
The labor-related problems associated with nuclear power plant con-
struction are many, and are having a significant impact upon the schedule
delays and cost overruns being experienced on many projects. The solutions
are not easy, and the prospects for significant improvement are dim indeed.





An overview, or state of the art, of nuclear power plant construc-
tion has been presented in this thesis. The various phases of a nuclear
power plant project have been identified, and the impact of each phase
upon the construction process has been discussed. The broad subjects of
project organization and control have been addressed, and specific prob-
lems have been identified in these areas as well as the areas of technical
construction processes within each of the major disciplines. A summary
of typical organizational approaches to nuclear power plant projects
has been provided, along with specific information regarding the sources
and natures of the many project participants.
Summary
The information presented in this thesis was primarily derived from
two sources. Initially, extensive interviews were conducted by the
writer with individuals representing the leading firms and utilities in
the power industry who are actively involved in the construction of
nuclear power plants. Much of the information obtained from these inter-
views represents first-hand knowledge from the industry that has as yet
not been recorded in construction industry literature. This information
was then augmented by a literature research in additional areas that
were identified by the writer as being significant as a result of the
interview process.
A careful review of the interviews and the literature study




1. Nuclear power plant projects are unique in the construction
industry in both magnitude and complexity. A typical nuclear project
represents a capital investment of nearly $1,000,000,000 with a project
life of 10 years or more in length. Of that 10 years, six years is
consumed by the construction phase of the project in fabricating and
erecting over 70 piping systems, 15,000 electrical circuits, a highly
complex containment vessel and a large number of additional buildings.
The complexities of the electrical systems, exotic computerized control
systems, and intricate concrete reinforcing systems are greatly increased
by the ever present requirement to work in highly congested spaces.
Necessary duplication and redundancy in major systems is common, further
complicating the construction process due to regulations which require
that spatial separations between redundant systems be maintained.
2. Nuclear power plant projects are unique in the construction
industry in another major apsect, that of Quality Assurance. The over-
all Quality Assurance requirements for a nuclear power plant have been
fashioned by regulatory requirements such that the scope of any individual
work activity has moved far beyond that of a similar activity on conven-
tional projects. In general, before any work activity can be accomplished,
all materials must be verified for compliance with specifications.
Inspectors must be constantly present during many work operations, and
extensive destructive and nondestructive testing must be completed for
proper acceptance of the work activity. The documentation required to
verify materials, procedures, inspections and test results is extensive.
3. Within the construction process itself, nuclear power plants
are characterized by a new approach to construction. In spite of
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tremendous differences in quantity, size and complexity, the actual
work activities within each of the field disciplines can essentially be
associated with the work activities on conventional construction projects,
There is a difference in nuclear construction, however, in that the
tradesmen who accomplish these work activities must do so in exact
accordance with approved, written construction procedures. Unlike
conventional work, nuclear construction regulation requires that the
specifications of design, material, and construction procedures be
followed to the letter. There is no provision for field authorized
changes to the design, as no work can be accomplished that varies from
the approved drawing for that portion of the plant. Although some
codes and standards are employed in both nuclear and conventional con-
struction, the writer feels that the implementation and enforcement of
the standards are generally more stringent on a nuclear power plant.
4. A great many of the nuclear power plant construction projects
of the past and present have experienced major schedule delays which
have resulted in tremendous cost overruns. These delays have been due
to a variety of reasons, the most significant of which include:
(1) a constantly changing regulatory climate, (2) increased safety and
environmental requirements, (3) the absence of standardization, (4) exten-
sive Quality Assurance requirements, C5) major labor problems, including
manpower shortages, (6) material and equipment shortages, (7) problems
related to incomplete design drawings, and (8) financing problems on the
part of the utilities brought on by inflation and recession.
5. Cost and schedule control in the construction phase of a
nuclear power plant project are difficult processes that can very easily
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revert to little more than cost and schedule monitoring activities.
True control of the project is established very early in the conceptual
design phase of the project by limiting the scope of the project. Although
there are savings to be realized through an active cost control effort
during the construction phase, the potential cost savings are far less
than those that can be achieved during the design phase of the project.
6. Nuclear power plant construction has been severely affected by
major labor problems, particularly manpower shortages and reduced produc-
tivity. Inadequate training programs, increased magnitude and complexity
of the work, changing regulatory requirements and extensive Quality
Control measures are the primary contributers to these labor problems.
There are additional contributing factors, however, particularly in union
construction, that have significantly influenced the overall reduced
labor productivity that has been experienced on many nuclear plants.
These union-related problems include restrictive work practices, juris-
dictional disputes between crafts, abuse of overtime, inflationary wage
increases, and an overall imbalance in favor of labor at the bargaining
table.
The writer feels, however, that a great many of the labor problems
that exist on projects today are the direct result of inadequate project
management on the part of the owners and the constructors in the past.
There is a strong effort underway within the nuclear power plant industry
to revitalize project management. Work Sampling and Project Agreements
are two of the primary vehicles being utilized for this purpose.
7. The nuclear power plant industry has been experiencing serious
material and major equipment shortages. Prices for critical items have

soared while lead times for ordering have continued to lengthen. Many
major components currently have lead times in excess of two years. These
long lead times and material shortages have imposed significant limita-
tions on project sequencing, scheduling and schedule changes.
8. The major participants in a typical nuclear power plant project
include the utility, the architect-engineer, the constructor and the
nuclear steam system supplier. The number of firms in the United States
that are qualified and experienced as major participants in nuclear
projects is very small. There are only four Nuclear Steam Supply System
suppliers, and less than a dozen engineers and/or constructors. Of the
latter group, three major firms have established a dominance in the field.
In conjunction with this situation it may be noted that the number of
utilities that are choosing to build nuclear power plants is growing
steadily.
9. The various firms that have acted as major participants in nuclear
power plant projects have employed a wide variety of organizational
approaches to the projects. Project teams and functionally oriented
organizations have been used to varying degrees within the participating
firms. The contractual relationships that utilities have successfully
employed include: (1) a single engineer-constructor with joint design
and construction responsibilities, (2) a tri-party relationship with a
separate architect-engineer and constructor, and C3) utility design and
construction forces. A multiparty contractual relationship including
an architect-engineer, a separate construction manager and numerous
contractors has not as yet been employed on a nuclear power plant project,




10. The Nuclear Regulatdry Commission (formerly the Atomic Energy
Commission) has been the primary source of guidance and control for the
design, construction and operation of nuclear power plants. The NRC has
become increasingly more influential and powerful throughout the project
life, and the proper exercising of this power is a subject of great
controversy within the industry. Congressional guidance for expanding
NRC functions has often been vague and limited, and the NRC itself is
the source of a great many regulatory requirements.
11. One of the most significant trends in nuclear power plant pro-
ject planning is the emergence of an increased emphasis on the importance
of the early design phase. Cost control and schedule limitations are
primarily influenced during this early phase, and project scope limita-
tion at this stage is the focus of a great deal of attention.
Conclusions
The conclusions that can be drawn from the extensive field inter-
views and the detailed literature study conducted include:
1. The magnitude and complexity of nuclear power plant projects,
in terms of capital investment, scheduling, control and construction
technology, have made nuclear power plant construction the most chal-
lenging type of construction in the United States. It appears that very
few firms and individuals are qualified or prepared to accept this
challenge.
2. The Quality Assurance aspects of a nuclear power plant are the
subject of great controversy. It is apparent that the design standards
of a nuclear plant are based upon the highest degree of safety and
assurance that can be obtained, regardless of the cost or the impact
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on the project, rather than a lesser degree based upon statistically
applied engineering judgment that might conceivably be employed. It
appears that there is a strong possibility that QA requirements have gone
too far, with little or no safety being gained as a result of specific
requirements involving large sums of money. As yet, however, no adequate
means of identifying specific areas where these Quality Assurance excesses
exist has been developed.
3. The primary difference in the actual construction activities of
a nuclear power plant from those of a conventional project is in the
documentation required for these activities. The tradesmen may accomplish
a task in the identical manner for either type of construction, but
nuclear work requires approved and documented materials, construction
procedures, tests, test procedures and inspections. These requirements
often exist in conventional construction, too, but nuclear construction
is characterized by a more thorough implementation and enforcement of
all the codes, specifications, and procedures to the letter.
The increased requirements for documentation of Quality Assurance
and Quality Control activities places a tremendous burden on the design
firm, typically the architect-engineer. A much more thorough and exact
design is required since the constructor cannot make changes to the design
in the field. Interferences of tremendous magnitude will often beset
the design team throughout the project.
A similar burden of documentation must also be borne by the con-
structor in the development and qualification of procedures and tests
and the training and qualification of craftsmen.
4. The major problems that have beset nuclear power plants and
resulted in cost overruns and schedule delays have not as yet been
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solved. As a result, delays and cost overruns must be anticipated
for future projects.
5. Cost and schedule control during the construction phase of
nuclear power plant projects will continue to be critical. In many ways,
however, costs will continue to be monitored rather than controlled. The
place for control is in the design phase of the project. Utilities must
realize this, and be more realistic in their cost and schedule estimates.
6. Although Work Sampling and Project Agreements will aid in
solving some labor problems related to ineffective project management,
there must also be a significant restructuring of the labor market in
the construction industry. Labor unions must relax certain restrictive
practices, and a return to a more balanced relationship between unions
and contractors at the bargaining table must occur. Without this, union
contractors are certain to lose tremendous quantities of work to open
shop and independent union labor source contractors. Construction unions
are major contributors to inflation, and are steadily pricing themselves
out of work.
7. Major equipment and material shortages are certain to become
more critical as the economic recovery of the late 1970' s induces
utilities to return many deferred construction projects to full-scale
production. This is equally true of labor shortages. Manufacturers
and suppliers must plan now to meet projected needs of the future, and
extensive training programs in the critical crafts of pipefitters and
boilermakers must begin at once.
8. The limited competition provided in the nuclear industry today
presents a potentially unhealthy situation. New methods of building
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and establishing contractual relationships, such as construction manage-
ment, must be devised and employed to allow more firms to compete for
specific work packages. An increased emphasis on early design completion
is a necessity if this approach is to be successful. It is important,
however, to insure that new participants are properly trained and qualified
to assume their role in the nuclear power plant construction process.
9. Of the many organizational approaches successfully employed on
nuclear power plant projects, none has been clearly established as the
most economical or the "best" approach. There is a steady trend toward
project team organizations among leading firms in the industry, but no
other trends can be identified.
10. In spite of much criticism and conjecture about the role of
the NRC in a nuclear power plant project, the NRC has done an excellent
job. The writer feels that with limited guidance and no historical
precedent, the NRC has fulfilled its mission of protecting the safety
and welfare of the American public in a manner in which the country can
be proud. There are still unanswered questions regarding the limits of
the licensing "rachet" and the potential for improvements by employing
resident NRC inspectors, but the overall functioning of the NRC remains
centered on the best interests of the American public.
11. There must be a continued emphasis within the nuclear power
industry on the early design phase of power plant projects. Project goals
and corporate objectives must be clearly defined so that the scope of
each project may be established and maintained throughout the project.
Every effort should be made to increase the percent of design work that
is complete prior to the start of construction. Only with an expanded
emphasis on early design work can utilities hope to bring nuclear power
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plant projects to the point where they can be built through the use of
fixed-price contracts. At this point, cost control of construction will
return to the hands of the contractors, and improvement will be seen.
Future Research
The following areas have been identified by the writer as areas for
future research in the field of nuclear power plant construction:
1. Further research in the area of standardization of nuclear
power plant systems, components, review procedures and construction
procedures is required. The benefits and potential hazards of such stan-
dardization must be carefully analyzed, and effective means of implementing
standardization without eliminating competition must be developed.
2. Clear and specific definitions of the boundaries of a nuclear
Quality Assurance program must be developed. Legislative bodies should
make clear what the specific objectives and limitations of these programs
are to be. Necessary laws must be adopted or rewritten to allow the
functioning of Quality Assurance programs to follow the spirit as well
as the letter of the law. Effective and economical QA standards will
require the development of a workable cost/benefit safety analysis
system for nuclear power plants.
3. Research must be conducted in the area of documentation to deter-
mine if the documentation systems presently in use provide adequate
assurance of quality. Do the documentation systems employed today
record and properly display the information that is desired? It must
then be determined how the systems can be streamlined, computerized and




4. Research such as that which resulted in the AEC "Action Plan"
must continue to provide immediate solutions to problems that are
currently delaying construction that is in progress on nuclear power
plants. Short-range problem solutions are vital to the many plants
already built that are experiencing delays and cost excesses even today.
5. Effective systems for the application of sound project control
theory to large power plant projects must be developed. Standard units
of comparison and evaluation must be established, and the technical
method for implementation of a system to provide this data at the earliest
stages possible are needed.
6. Research within the organized labor structure of the United
States must be begun to determine if a planned and controlled restruc-
turing of the labor force can eliminate the many problems of union labor
and yet preserve the individual and collective rights of the tradesmen.
7. Research into new materials, sources, and methods of manufactur-
ing nuclear quality work must be begun if major material shortages are
to be avoided in the future.
8. In addition, new methods of construction and particularly con-
tracting of nuclear power plants must be investigated so that an increased
number of firms will be qualified and capable of competing for nuclear
power plant contracts.
9. As the number of operational nuclear power plants increases,
and more project data becomes available it will be possible to determine
which of the many organizational approaches and philosophies are most
advantageous for certain types of projects.
10. The authority and limitations of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission should be more clearly defined by legislative process. This
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will reduce the power of the NRC "rachet" and insure that trends that
are set by the NRC for the industry are within the authority of the NRC
to control. There is room, also, for further research in the internal
functioning of the NRC. Areas that might be investigated include the
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